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We look at the socio-economic impacts of a rural livelihoods program in Bihar, one of India’s 
poorest states. Adopting a model prevalent in several Indian states, the Bihar Rural Livelihoods 
Project, known locally as JEEViKA, relies on mobilizing women from impoverished, socially 
marginalized households into Self Help Groups. Simultaneously, activities such as micro-finance 
and technical assistance for agricultural livelihoods are taken up by the project and routed to the 
beneficiaries via these institutions; these institutions also serve as a platform for women to come 
together and discuss a multitude of the socio-economic problems that they face.  
We use a retrospective survey instrument, coupled with PSM techniques to find that JEEViKA, 
has engendered some significant results in restructuring the debt portfolio of these households; 
additionally, JEEViKA has been instrumental in providing women with higher levels of 
empowerment, as measured by various dimensions. Since the evidence points to improvements 
in economic and gender inequality, we consider household bargaining models to unpack the 
causality between economics and empowerment.  
We propose a new framework of household bargaining that allows us to map out the interplay 
between household outcomes and bargaining equilibrium. We then proceed to demonstrate that 
when bargaining powers are endogenously determined, a strategy to deliberately suppress 
household income is rational. We regard such behavior as ‘Aggregate Inefficient’ behavior, and 
 
note that it is completely possible for such behavior to coexist with Pareto Efficiency in 
consumption.  
We use the Indian Human Development Survey to test the demand systems implied by two 
competing frameworks: collective bargaining and the framework that rationalizes aggregate 
inefficient behavior. We find that although the implications of the Collective Hypothesis are 
rejected, those for the alternate framework are never rejected. Thus, we conclude that ‘Aggregate 
Inefficient’ behavior is a real possibility in some societies. 
We note that strategies geared towards Aggregate Inefficiency are driven by concerns over one’s 
bargaining position in the household; such strategies are encouraged by social norms which 
create pressure on the individual to maintain a position of dominance in the household, 
especially in patriarchal societies. Thus any policy to encourage gender empowerment by 
providing women with more resources (for example, policies to increase women’s labor force 
participation) must crack the conundrum of Aggregate Inefficiency by working on the stumbling 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Research Agenda 
 
As the most basic socio-economic unit after the Representative Individual, households command 
a lot of interest among social scientists. For the sake of simplification, researchers have usually 
focused on the differences between households, assuming away the issue of differences between 
the constituent individuals. This is popularly known as the Unitary Household Hypothesis, where 
the household is captained by a dictator. This dictator might either be a person (probably the 
head of the household) or an economic construct whose preferences are a weighted average of 
the preferences of the individuals in the HH (household); as long as the weights on individual 
preferences remain unaffected by external factors that affect HH decision making, the HH is 
effectively unitary in nature. Thus the Unitary Household and the Representative Individual have 
absolutely indistinguishable economic behavior. 
The implications of this model have been empirically tested in the last two decades, and have 
been generally rejected. One implication of the Unitary Household Hypothesis is the Income 
Pooling implication. The demand for a good is a function of the available total income; given 
total income, changes in individual incomes would not affect demands. Empirically, this 
prediction has been proved wrong time and again. Slutsky symmetry, which is an essential 
property of maximization by a single entity, has been frequently rejected in demand analyses, 
implying once again that households do not behave as a single agent.  
These results proved that it was important to recognize that individuals have unique preferences, 
and a bargaining approach was necessary to map these preferences into HH outcomes. Several 
bargaining models were suggested, of the co-operative and non-cooperative flavor. The 
empirical evidence for each model has been mixed. If the empirical implications were rejected, it 
was not clear if the reason was a misspecification of the bargaining process or whether 
bargaining itself was non-existent. 
A parallel strand of literature, regarded as the Collective Household Hypothesis was proposed 
and developed by a host of economists in the following years. In this model of bargaining, the 
only assumption made was that resources inside the HH are allocated Pareto optimally; given the 
total resources available, an agent cannot improve his own lot without lowering the welfare of 
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others inside the HH. This assumption is realistic; it is conceivable that in a long term institution 
like family, information symmetry leads to Pareto-Optimal outcomes. The elegance of the model 
lies in the fact that despite this minimal assumption, falsifiable empirical tests were derived. 
Usually, the implications of the empirical tests were not rejected pointing to the fact that the 
Collective model of household bargaining was responsible for the results. These empirical tests 
usually relied on the effect that distribution factors had on household demands; distribution 
factors are essentially parameters exogenous to the household and have no contribution in 
individual indirect utility functions as income effect, price effect or effect as taste shifters. 
However, the distribution factors affect household demands by realigning bargaining power 
inside the household; for example, changes in individual incomes affect household demands 
even after controlling for the total household income. Thus, the household demand function 
reflects the preferences of the individual who experienced the increase in income, by putting 
more emphasis on his or her bargaining weight. 
Theses insights from the Collective Hypothesis have led to the framing of policies geared to 
increase public welfare in households by routing resources to the woman in the household. 
Conditional Cash Transfers and women’s Self Help Groups are examples of interventions and 
institutions which assume that household welfare is better reflected in the woman’s preferences; 
channeling economic resources through the woman has the dual effect of addressing the 
provision of public goods in the household and increasing the empowerment level of the woman.  
However, the Collective approach does not explicitly state the mechanism through which these 
distribution factors influence bargaining weights. Rather, it assumes that bargaining weights are 
determined as an exogenous function of distribution factors and are not affected by actions taken 
by the constituent individuals. Indeed, this setup allows the Collective model to not rely on an 
explicit bargaining process but still recover some information on whether preferences are diverse 
inside the household. Clearly, if the determination of bargaining power is an outcome of the 
optimization system in the household, this framework may paint an incomplete picture.  
Let us consider for a moment that bargaining power is not determined exogenously; if there are 
no further implications of such endogeneity other than satisfying scientific curiosity, this 
simplistic modeling would still lead us to similar policy conclusions. However, as we argue later, 
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there are far reaching implications of bargaining power being determined through individual 
strategies, which would feed into household decision making and outcomes.  
This paper proposes a new framework, the RU (Reservation Utility) Augmented Hypothesis, 
which argues that rational strategies by an individual lead to sub-optimal or even non 
participation in productive activities by other individuals in the household. Driven solely by 
economic benefits and without any consideration about bargaining power, an individual in the 
household finds it rational to limit his or her spousal Income after it equals a certain ‘bliss-point’ 
level. This bliss-point is analogous to that faced by an individual when he maximizes his utility 
function, given income and prices. However, the bliss-point faced by an individual with respect 
to his spousal income is always achieved at a lower level than his own income. Thus, individuals 
find it rational to limit their partner’s income, given own income; for the househo ld, this is an 
inefficient outcome, as it foregoes additional resources. 
We recall that although the Collective model recognizes the importance of bargaining as a 
definitive characteristic within a household and the role bargaining plays in affecting household 
demands, it proposes that bargaining powers are determined exogenously. In the RU Augmented 
Hypothesis, we do not allow bargaining power to be a choice variable in individual preferences 
but allow it to be determined as an outcome of the household decision making process. Under 
this framework, with constant individual income and increasing spousal income, tactics to 
subvert spousal income is rationalized by concerns about an even lower ‘bliss-point’, coupled 
with erosion in bargaining power. This loss of bargaining power undermines the position of the 
dominant spouse continuously, and over a limited time frame reverses the role of dominance in 
the household. 
Rational income subversion tactics for the individual puts the household on an ‘Aggregate 
Inefficient’ path, where it generates less resource than it could have. Such behavior is 
completely consistent with efficient allocation of given resources, thereby nesting most 
bargaining models, including the Collective Hypothesis within the RU Augmented Hypothesis.  
Naturally, such behavior has the potential to destabilize well thought out policies and programs. 
In the developing world, numerous programs, especially microfinance and CCT interventions, 
deliberately target women to engender benefits which have a distinctly ‘public’ flavor in the 
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beneficiary’s household.  However, if Aggregate Inefficient behavior plays a role, then the 
uptake of program benefits would be lower in scale and scope.  
This paper extends this thought in several related directions. We take a close look at the impacts 
of a rural poverty reduction program in Bihar, one of India’s poorest states. This program 
JEEViKA, focusses on building Self Help Groups (SHGs) of marginalized women; these groups 
are then federated into higher order institutions of such women at the village and local level. 
Cheap credit for a variety of purposes, technical assistance for various livelihood activities and 
encouraging awareness about various public services are the key agendas of this program. 
However, due to the very nature of JEEViKA’s target population, and given Bihar’s vicious 
income and gender inequality, the potential for impacts on women’s empowerment exists. A 
retrospective survey instrument, coupled with ‘Propensity Score Matching’ methods are used to 
estimate the impacts.  
In Chapter 2, we look at the program in greater details, including its geographical coverage, 
focus areas for rural development and expansion strategies. In Chapter 3, we discuss the design 
of the research study including the most important process of identifying good counterfactual 
villages for the project villages, the survey instrument and the key algorithms used for propensity 
score matching. We consider the quality of the matched sample and discuss how different 
specifications of the outcome variables could give us precise estimates of the final outcome. In 
Chapter 4, we discuss the entire basket of changes that have been brought on by JEEViKA in the 
6 project districts of rural Bihar. 
In line with findings from a variety of studies in various disciplines, we find that poverty 
reduction (in terms of relaxation of the credit constraint) and gender empowerment (in terms of 
greater involvement in decision making, mobility and collective action) have gone hand in hand 
in the JEEViKA project area. However, the nature of this study does not allow us to map the 
resource allocation of the average household and neither can we get a look at the resource 
generation; although we observe that the household and the woman are better off, we cannot 
make any claims about the nature of the link between the two. We do note that although 
empowerment outcomes are higher in project areas, outcomes which indicate participation in the 
public domain are always at a lower level that participation in the individual domain. Given that 
these outcomes have matured over the course of 3 years, it needs to be examined if there are any 
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factors which mitigate higher levels of empowerment when the woman deals with her household 
or community. 
To reasonably unpack the link between empowerment and economics, we first appeal to the 
existing literature on household bargaining. We focus on the Collective Hypothesis, which has 
had a wide range of applications in the last two decades. We note the role of ‘Distribution 
Factors’, parameters which influence household decision making by affecting the bargaining 
weights. After a thorough discussion of the literature and findings, we consider some findings 
which are potentially dissonant with the implications of the Collective model. We note that these 
findings have two common features; they are usually nested in a ‘developing country’ setting. 
Additionally, these findings do not stem from a study of just the consumption decisions of the 
household, but have an overlap with some production decisions.  
In Chapter 5, we consider the literature and evidence about the Collective Hypothesis; we also 
discuss the key empirical implications of this hypothesis on cross-sectional data. In Chapter 6, 
we use a pan-Indian cross sectional dataset, the IHDS 2004-2005, to empirically test the demand 
systems as implied by the collective model and find that the implications are usually rejected. 
In Chapter 7, we develop the RU Augmented Hypothesis including the theoretical implication of 
Aggregate Inefficiency and the empirical implications that this framework posits for a cross-
sectional dataset. We maintain the assumption of Pareto Efficiency in consumption decisions, 
which is also the key assumption of Collective Bargaining. However, we make a subtle change 
in the optimization program. The decision maker in the Collective household is an ‘agent’ whose 
preferences are a weighted aggregate of actual individual preferences in the household; the 
weight on an agent’s preference is his/her bargaining power, which is determined exogenously 
by distribution factors. In our model, we look at the maximization problem from the view point 
of one individual (really, the extant household head, regarded later as the Dominant Decision 
Maker) who has to incorporate constraints on total budgets and partner’s incentives while 
making decisions on optimal resource allocations.  
Under such an optimization program, we find that Aggregate Inefficient behavior is rationalized. 
Determination of bargaining power is an outcome of the optimization program (the key 
difference with the Collective model), and concerns about preserving the bargaining power 
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drives Aggregate Inefficient behavior. Although not modeled, we recognize that preserving 
bargaining power is not driven solely by economic considerations; the social environment of the 
household plays a considerable role.  
In Chapter 8, we use the same sample from IHDS 2004-2005 and find that the empirical tests on 
the RU Augmented model are never falsified by the data. It would not be out of place here to 
point out that the empirical tests are not used to estimate the extent, or even the existence of 
Aggregate Inefficiency, which is the main socio-economic implication of the RU Augmented 
Model. We look for evidence proving or disproving the existence of such a model. The non-
rejection of the demand system implies that the RU Augmented Collective model may be 
underlying the bargaining structure inside the average household. Chapter 9 concludes this 
research by summarizing the findings and proposes policy adjustments to address the concerns of 
Aggregate Inefficiency and accelerate reduction in socio-economic inequality.  
In the next chapter, we discuss the architecture and aims of the JEEViKA program, before 













Chapter 2: An Introduction to JEEViKA 
 
Historically, Bihar has been one of India’s most impoverished states, languishing at the bottom 
of the heap along various socio-economic dimensions. Social segregation along caste lines, 
gender discrimination, poor infrastructure and a near breakdown in provision of public amenities 
had accentuated the abysmal income levels, especially in rural Bihar. However, in recent times, 
Bihar has witnessed a steady turnaround under a slew of administrative reforms. In late 2006, the 
Govt. of Bihar inaugurated the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project or JEEViKA, executed by the 
autonomous Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society and funded by the World Bank. 
JEEViKA slowly became the flagship rural poverty reduction program of the government, 
operating in 9 out of 34 districts of Bihar. Recently, JEEViKA received the mandate of scaling 
up its model across Bihar under the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM). Over a period 
of the next 10 years, the mandate is to mobilize 12.5 million rural HHs into 1 million SHGs (Self 
Help Group), 65000 VOs (Village Organization) and 1600 CLFs (Cluster Level Federation). 
The project has certain key features, which include 
a) Focusing on the poor and vulnerable members of the community, particularly women.   
b) Building and empowering pro-poor institutions and organizations. 
c) Emphasis on stimulating productivity growth in key livelihood sectors and employment 
generation in the project area. 
d) Positioning project investments to be catalytic in nature to spur public and private 
investment in the livelihood areas/sector of poor households. 
e) Identification of existing innovations in various areas and help in developing processes, 
systems and institutions for scaling up of these innovations. 
 
The basic building block of the project is to promote socio-economic inclusion of rural 
impoverished households by mobilizing women members from such families into SHGs (Self 
Help Groups). In Bihar, the sharp caste segregation implies a considerable correlation between 
belonging to a low caste and being impoverished; additionally, in an average village in rural 
Bihar, low caste populations live in a separate hamlet (which may be a fair distance from the 
actual village center) inside the village. JEEViKA does not conduct any baseline of any kind to 
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identify its target population; project personnel take advantage of the geographical and economic 
segregation to approach the relevant hamlets and target low caste households for initial 
mobilization.  
In an average SHG, members meet regularly to participate in savings, borrowing and 
repayments; additionally, it provides a small platform for 10-15 women of similar backgrounds 
to come together and discuss their day-to-day lives. The microfinance activities have a humble 
beginning where each member makes a weekly saving to the tune of 10-20 cents; the members 
start inter-loaning among one another, by drawing on the aggregate savings parked at the SHG. 
Once such practices continue over time, the project provides the SHG with a one-time grant of 
900 USD, which the SHG disburses as loans to the members. Going forward, these SHGs get 
linked to banks and leverage funds from formal credit institutions. All avenues of such micro 
credit have an annual cost of 24%, as opposed to the credit from village money lenders and 
shopkeepers which are usually to the tune of 60% or 120% annually. 
Once a minimum number of SHGs form in a village, they are federated into a Village 
Organization (VO); a VO is perhaps the key institution of the project as it is large enough to 
affect changes in the village and small enough to account for the demands coming out of the 
community. Thus, the key interventions of the project, such as food security, health and 
nutrition, livelihood activities, identification and training of youth and convergence with other 
schemes are driven by the VO. The VO also has a mandate to identify issues at the village level 
and liaison with the project’s staff to provide practical solutions. 
JEEViKA piloted initially in 5 blocks (sub-districts) and had its first major expansion in 2008, 
when it rolled out in 13 more blocks; thus at various points of times in 2008, JEEViKA started 
operations in 18 blocks across 6 districts of Bihar, namely, Gaya, Khagaria, Madhubani, 
Muzaffarpur, Nalanda and Purnea. The objective of the following study was to understand the 
changes brought about by the project in the socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries over a 
time period of 3 years, from EARLY 2008 to end 2010.  
A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, in development microeconomics, suggests that 
credit constraints limit income and consumption growth and increase vulnerability among poor 
households; when credit is routed through women, the household as a whole experiences better 
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outcomes in the form of increased consumption or investment on goods with a public flavor. Pitt 
and Khandker (1998) examine 3 group based credit programs by BRAC, BRDB and GRAMEEN 
and find that credit routed through women increases labor supply across gender, schooling across 
gender, consumption expenses by the household and non-land assets held by women. Bobonis 
(2009) finds a similar effect of increased income for women (due to the PROGRESSA program) 
on expenditure for children’s goods. However, Banerjee et al (2010) do not find any effects on 
long term investments (health, education and empowerment) due to the SPANDANA program in 
the urban slums of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, India. Feigenberg et al (2010) find evidence in 
West Bengal, India that increased interaction in a group setting (for the purpose of microfinance) 
enhance social networking and cooperative outcomes like regular repayments and repeated credit 
dosage.  
However, it is unclear if such programs affect women’s empowerment. The complexity of 
measuring women’s empowerment is probably a major reason why there is no clear answer. 
Kabeer (1999) and Agarwal (1997) provide excellent discussions about how multiple dimensions 
like agency, ability to choose and participation in decision making indicate women’s 
empowerment; the authors also discuss initiatives which could affect some or all of these 
dimensions. 
Given JEEViKA’s thrust on building institutions and providing cheap credit, we should expect 
that the program have impacts on debt reduction; if financial wisdom (encouraged by the 
program) is practiced by beneficiary households, we hope to see some movement towards credit 
for productive purposes. To encourage livelihood opportunities, JEEViKA’s main thrust was to 
provide technical assistance for agriculture; thus, we could expect to see some increased 
adoption of agricultural activities. Indeed, if such adoptions are significant, we may expect to see 
increased land holding or land leasing. Finally, given that JEEViKA beneficiaries meet weekly 
to engage in financial transactions and discuss agendas about their personal and communal life, 
we could expect that some effects on women’s empowerment should be visible.   
The main complication that the research team and the project team faced was that no baseline 
instrument was fielded prior to the expansion. Additionally, the project did not expand into the 
new blocks in a haphazard way; rather, the project targeted villages for entry that had large 
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numbers of target populations. Thus, non-availability of information at baseline combined with 
non-random expansion complicated any interpretation of causality. 
To address the problem of non-availability of data at baseline, a questionnaire with current and 
retrospective modules was administered in early 2011, which probed for situations at the end of 
2010 and at the end of 2007. The non-random nature of JEEViKA’s expansion was taken 
advantage of, by selecting villages from un-entered blocks (in the same districts as the entered 18 
blocks) which would have been entered (according to JEEViKA’s expansion logic) had the 
project selected those blocks for expansion.  
The details on the questionnaire and selection of villages to survey are discussed at greater 
lengths in the following chapter; we pay attention to understand if the selected villages were 
indeed good counterfactuals on average, since the validity of the study rests on making a credible 
case that had JEEViKA expanded into another block, surveyed control villages had a good 
chance of being treated. We subsequently use the method of propensity score matching to match 
the treated primary sampling units (households from treated villages) to the appropriate 













Chapter 3: The Research Design 
 
Multiple discussions with the JEEViKA team revealed that project personnel considered the 
Census 2001 data to identify villages with high populations of SC/ST, regarded as target 
population. Such villages would always get the highest priority for intervention. Grassroots 
personnel would then enter the village and identify the hamlets where the SC/ST populations 
live. The spearhead team from the project would then hold a meeting in the center of such 
hamlets and inform the villagers about the project, the benefits of regular saving and arrange an 
exposure visit to a project village. Mobilization would start when 10-15 women from such 
communities commit to a weekly savings amount and federate themselves into an SHG. 
The discussions with the JEEViKA team pointed out that for each block, prioritizing villages for 
entry was contingent on the number of total households & target (or low-caste) households in the 
village, as per Census 2001. Once the block-level plan had been formalized and the sequence of 
village entry finalized, the field team would conduct some initial scoping to look at the priority 
villages more closely. Specifically, they would consider the number of women in the village who 
are functionally literate, as JEEViKA mobilizes community members to perform as book-
keepers and act as resource personnel to handhold the community institutions of SHGs and VOs. 
Additionally, the scoping team would also look at the number of people who are working in the 
village or locally; this information would be helpful when the VO becomes mature enough to 
conduct the interventions for various livelihood options. 
In light of these discussions, the research team considered village level data from Census 2001 in 
18 administrative blocks across 6 districts of Bihar, namely, Gaya, Khagaria, Madhubani, 
Muzaffarpur, Nalanda & Purnea. Out of these 18 blocks, 12 blocks were marked for the 
JEEViKA program in October 2007. Field operations in 5 of the remaining 6 blocks had started 
in early 2007. The remaining block, Bochaha in Muzaffarpur, was the pilot block for this 
program and field work had started here in late 2006. 
In these 18 blocks, the research team considered 200 villages that were entered by the JEEViKA 
project at various points during 2008. For the purposes of this study, these villages were 
considered as the treatment units and all surveyed households in a treated village were 
considered beneficiaries of the JEEViKA program. 
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 To look for counterfactuals, we consider villages in a separate set of 21 blocks in 5 of these 6 
districts (excluding Khagaria). When the retrospective survey instrument was administered in 
early 2011, the JEEViKA project had just brought these blocks under its ambit; the block 
management offices had been set up and some initial scoping had been done to understand the 
logistics behind future interventions. After the retrospective survey was completed, the project 
scaled into 26 blocks, including all the 21 blocks containing the control villages.  
To identify the proper counterfactuals for the 200 treatment units, we consider village level data 
from Census 2001. The details on the variables that were used to match villages are provided in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Variables used to match villages (Data Source: Census of India, 2001) 
Number of Households in Village 
Information considered to compare a non-project village to a 
project village came from the Census 2001 dataset for Bihar. 
Attention was restricted to only those non-project villages of 21 
blocks in districts Gaya, Purnia, Madhubani, Muzaffarpur and 
Nalanda. The variables provided to the left are Census 2001 
village level data that were used to construct the matched sample.  
Total Population in Village 
SC Population in Village 
ST Population in Village 
Percent Females Literate in Village 
Percent Population Working in Village 
Percent Workers Main Workers in Village 
Percent Females Working in Village 
Percent Working Females Main Workers in Village 
 
The hope behind this matching was to construct a set of non-project villages from the 21 non-
project blocks, which were reasonably similar to the set of project villages from the 18 project 
blocks. However, there is a potential problem that may invalidate this ‘reasonable similarity’. 
Recall that JEEViKA targeted villages (in the 18 blocks) for entry based on data from Census 
2001; once the village was scoped in 2008, it is possible that the field personnel found out that 
due to migration, the caste profile of the village had changed. This creates the possibility that the 
project would change the intensity of mobilizations drastically, especially given scarcity of 
resources at its disposal. We have the potential of a bad match if a village that is selected as a 
counterfactual unit, on the basis of 2001 data, does not retain the required demographics for 
JEEViKA to intervene in 2008. 
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To address such issues, the survey was administered to 10 randomly selected households from 
the target hamlets in all 200 project and 200 non-project villages; we can assume that had caste 
compositions changed significantly since 2001 in either the selected project or non-project 
villages, this should be reflected in the sample statistics. It is to be noted that the survey team did 
not have a beneficiary list for the treatment villages; thus the selection of interviewed HHs were 
truly random, and not a sample of beneficiary HHs only. 
An identical survey instrument covering several broad areas on socio-economic indicators was 
administered to each of the 4000 households. The instrument had two broad modules; the general 
module was administered to a responsible adult (preferably HH head), and the women’s module 
was administered to an ever married adult woman. The general module collected economic 
information focused on asset ownership, debt portfolio, land holdings, savings habit and food 
security condition; social indicators attempting to capture changes in women’s empowerment 
focused on women’s mobility, decision making and networks were part of the women’s module. 
The demographic profile of each household was captured by an appropriate household roster and 
caste-religion profile; in addition, a livelihood roster was also administered. Given the 
retrospective nature of the study, questions on certain indicators were designed to capture the 
levels at end 2007, along with the current level. However for other indicators, like debt portfolio, 
questions for end 2007 levels were not asked since the chances for incorrect responses are 
considerable. 
The first agenda is to check for balance in treatment and comparison groups on dimensions 
which are invariant to interventions, but which may interact with interventions to cause impacts. 
To start the procedure of checking for balance in key variables, a distinction needs to be made to 
identify which variables are relevant for analysis at the individual level, and which are relevant 
for analysis at the village level.  
Balance in key variables at village level enables an answer to the question: If the project had 
gone to control Village B instead of Treatment Village A, could we expect to see similar 
impacts? Now a similarity (difference) in impacts could be due to a combination of several 
characteristics in the village, and how the characteristics interact with the project, once it enters. 
Thus it is important to understand whether the village characteristics are similar, and whether the 
project interventions would have been similar in the villages. Note that the answer to this 
14 
 
question is of paramount importance when we construct the counterfactuals; after all, if we 
cannot reasonably infer that Village B would have been intervened if JEEViKA went to that 
relevant block, then it is not very useful to consider households from village B to construct 
counterfactuals. In the following section, we examine sample characteristics at the village level 
to understand if the 200 non-project villages are a reasonable image for the 200 project villages. 
Section 3.1: Balance at Village Level 
 
a) Balance in indicator variables determining project expansion 
We look at the determinants of project expansion first. Conversations with project officials 
revealed that expansion of the project uses two broad indicators. At every level of the project 
hierarchy (State→ District→ Block), project officials are given macro targets like achieving an 
N number of SHGs and X number of SC/ST beneficiaries. Under such targets it is optimal for the 
project to roll out into 
a) Villages which have high levels of target population to raise chances of meeting the joint 
target levels, N SHGs and X SC/ST members. 
b) Villages which have high proportions of target population in smaller villages to raise the 
chances of enrolling X SC/ST members. 
c) Larger villages, but maybe smaller numbers in target population, to raise chances of forming 
N SHGs. 
The choice is clear: Rolling out in (a) type villages is better than the other types. However the 
choice between (b) and (c) is fuzzy. Obviously, the project manager is limited in his/her choice 
by the distribution of demographics in the block; for example, if there are no villages with high 
levels of target population, the decision collapses to a choice between (b) and (c). The question 
to consider here is as follows: Assume in late 2007, that instead of Phase-1 (actually entered) 
Block A, the project had decided to roll out in Phase-2 Block B (entered in late 2010), where 
both blocks are in the same district. Consider that identical targets were provided whether the 
block in question was A or B. Would the project manager follow the same strategy for 
expansion in the control villages that he had followed for the treated villages? With 
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reasonable confidence, the answer is Yes, if the project manager faced similar distributions in 
levels of target populations and total households in both blocks. We can also consider a related 
question: could a similar target be feasible in both blocks? Once again, the answer is Yes, if 
the blocks in question had similar number of villages with similar distributions of target 
populations.  
Thus the first checkpoint for balance is to identify if the control villages match up to the 
treatment villages in terms of the distribution of the above variables. When the project was 
operational in the first 18 blocks, targets and strategies were based on data from Census India 
2001. The strategy for balance checks thus relies on the Census 2001 dataset; the total target 
population (SC+ST) is calculated in each village. The overall distribution of the Target 
populations in the 400 villages is considered, which provides us with mean and standard 
deviation of the distribution. Each Standard Deviation interval is considered as a Stratum (since 
the S.D. came out as about 660, the 1
st
 Stratum is 0-660, 2
nd
 Stratum is 661-1320, and so on). 
Villages are then grouped into strata based on their target population level. We then ask if, 
a) Within each Stratum as defined above, are there a similar number of villages across T-C 
Status? 
b) Within each Stratum, are the averages of target population and total households statistically 
similar across T-C status? 





Non-Project Project Total 
Stratum 
   
1 122 116 238 
2 57 55 112 
3 13 14 27 
4 7 7 14 
5 1 8 9 
Total 200 200 400 
 




Table 3.3: Distribution target population (low caste) and total number of HHs, by status of intervention, 
across strata of target population 
  







Non-Project Project p-value  Non-Project Project p-value  
Stratum 
       
1 
Mean 326.6 297.3 0.2101 229.5 250 0.5088 





Mean 949.7 920.8 0.3901 715 620.5 0.2948 





Mean 1586.7 1619.2 0.6788 1455.5 1233.9 0.5154 





Mean 2264.3 2345.4 0.5511 1713.6 1357.4 0.1462 





Mean 2668 3287.1 NA 3279 1801 NA 





Table 3.2 reveals that the number of villages by each strata of target population (apart from 
Strata 5) is statistically similar across project and non-project areas. Table 3.3 implies that in 
these villages the number of households affiliated to low castes and the total number of 
households was statistically similar across status of intervention, for each stratum. Together, they 
imply that similar targets were possible had the project rolled into the non-intervened 21 blocks, 
instead of the actually intervened 18 blocks. Not only that, the similarity of the numbers of target 
population and total households imply that block project managers would follow a similar 
expansion strategy in either case; distribution of villages of type (a), (b) and (c) is similar in the 
intervened 18 blocks vis-à-vis the non-intervened 21 blocks.  
b) Balance in indicator variables for village quality 
It can be argued that even with similar intensity of expansion in villages across status of 
intervention, village quality may have an important say in the manifestation of impacts; after all, 
a village with better infrastructure might be paid more attention by project staff, as mobilization 
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in such areas makes their job easier. On the other hand, due to geographical and economic 
segregation, villages with better infrastructure might have little or no populations of low castes. 
Thus, they may not be on the radar of JEEViKA at all. Although there may be ad infinitum 
indicators of village quality, we consider the presence of three key public amenities at the village 
level to identify if treated and control villages are similar, at least in the existence of these three 
amenities. The three indicators considered are the presence of a school, a PDS (Ration Shop) and 
a Primary Health Center in each village.  
The table appended below considers the percentage of villages which DO NOT have the above 
amenities in the village, across intervention status; the p-value on the null that percentages of 
absent amenities are similar across intervention is provided. 
Table 3.4: Distribution of percentage of villages without given amenity, across status of intervention 
 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 prove that on the basis of available data, coupled with an understanding 
of the expansion strategies of JEEViKA, we can claim with substantial confidence that the 
grassroots managers would have faced, 
a) Similar targets 
b) Similar distribution of target population and total population in villages  
c) Similar basic quality of villages 
in the 21 blocks had they been intervened in the first place, instead of the actual 18 intervened 
blocks. This is a key result; we can now use matching techniques to look for counterfactual 
households from the non-intervened villages for the beneficiary households in the project 
villages. Constructing a counterfactual is not a useful exercise if the average non-project village 
  
Non-Project Project p-value 
Situation of Amenity 
    
School Absent in village 
Mean 0.07 0.085 0.5748 
S.D 0.018 
  
PDS Absent in village 
Mean 0.32 0.33 0.8309 
S.D 0.033 0.033 
 
Health Center Absent in village 
Mean 0.61 0.585 0.6102 




in question is radically different from the average project village, since chances are that the 
former village would not have been intervened by JEEViKA in any case. The above results 
nullify such a scenario. 
We are now in a position to consider techniques for appropriate construction of comparison 
units; we use matching methods through propensity scores for this. As with all PSM based 
studies, the choice of variables that are used to generate the propensity score assume 
considerable importance. In the next section, we combine the thoughts from existing work in this 
area with knowledge of the project to identify the candidate variables that should be used to 
generate the propensity scores.  
Section 3.2: Towards a Propensity Score  
 
Let a population of N units be divided into two sets of n1and n2. Let a representative unit from 
each set be denoted by i1and i2 respectively. Let an intervention T be administered to the units in 
set n1. Heckman (1997) pointed out that the relevant statistic is the ATT (Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated) to measure the success (or failure) of the program and is given by 
]0[]1[)( 11  TYETYETYE ii  
The problem of the missing counterfactual is that the 2
nd
 term is not observed. Experimental 
studies approximate the 2
nd
 term by randomization; hence if the population units were assigned 
to sets of n1and n2 randomly, the effect of treatment could be consistently estimated by 
]0[]1[)( 21  TYETYETYE ii         
However if separation into the sets was by some rule, then the above expression is an 
inconsistent estimate of the ATT, since the units i1and i2 are fundamentally different from each 
other.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman and Robb (1985) and Lechner (1999) proposed a quasi-
experimental approach to exploit knowledge about assignment of treatment to properly identify 
the control units from the set n2 for the beneficiary units in set n1. The essence of this approach is 
to note that if we can observe the levels of variables which affected the assignment of treatment, 
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then if we can find a pair of units (one from each set) with the same levels on the same variables, 
either unit is the counterfactual of the other. This known as the Conditional Independence 
Assumption, which essentially proposes that if assignment of Treatment was a function of a 
vector of covariates, that is, )(XfT  then   
ceindependendenotessymbolthewhereXTYY ii 21,  
In such a case, the ATT can be consistently estimated by ]0[]1[)( 21  TYETYETYE ii   
Note that the vector of covariates X affects treatment, but not the other way round; for example 
consider a poverty reduction program which targets beneficiaries after conducting a baseline 
survey to identify the households below a certain poverty line. The vector of covariates would 
then contain the consumption levels, asset positions and other poverty indicators; however they 
must be measured at pre-treatment levels (for both treated and control units) to construct 
counterfactuals. Of course, time invariant variables (like caste) which contain information about 
poverty and hence influence treatment assignment should also be included in the vector X. 
Constructing matched pairs for a given value of X becomes improbable when the vector has 
multiple dimensions, and is complicated even more by continuous elements in the vector. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that a balancing score, b(X) which is essentially a scalar 
projection of the vector can be of substantial use to redress this ‘curse of dimensionality’; indeed, 
if potential outcomes are conditionally independent of treatment assignment given the vector X, 
they are also independent of treatment assignment given the index b(X).  
The propensity score p(X), which is essentially the probability of treatment as predicted by the 
vector of regressors X, is an excellent candidate for the balancing score; matching on the 
propensity score allows the proper construction of the counterfactual Yi2, which allows us to 
estimate the ATT. 
We now consider the broad types of information that we use to construct the propensity scores. 
The 1
st
 category consists of household level variables which cannot be affected by the project, 
but may interact with interventions to cause differential impacts. For clarity, such variables are 
regarded as time invariant variables. For example, if education of the HH Head is 
systematically higher in treated areas, then one can argue that practicing financial wisdom 
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through SHG participation would have a greater impact in treated areas. The problem is that in 
that case it would be tricky to ascribe what part of the impact is due to higher education, and 
what part is due to the intervention. Note that in various econometric settings this is still feasible, 
especially since the AFC data collects the information of the HH head. However we are in 
trouble when we consider the fact that higher education probably indicates higher motivation and 
abilities, which are not collected in the data (or in any data set for that matter). In such a 
scenario, it is impossible to ascertain what part of the impact was due to a) higher education in 
treated areas b) highly motivated individuals in treated areas and c) just due to the intervention 
itself.  
The above discussion motivates why one needs to first check for balance on time invariant 
characteristics. This brings us to the 2
nd
 category of household level variables on which balance 
checks are necessary. Consider an indicator for project impact, for example, the number of cows 
in a household in 2010. If treated households systematically had a higher number of cows in 
2007 than control households, then comparing the 2010 levels would overestimate the effect of 
the project in increasing the holdings of cow. On the other hand, if control households had 
systematically higher holdings in 2007 than treated households, then a comparison of 2010 levels 
would underestimate the impact of the project. Thus, a balance check is necessary on the pre-
intervention levels of outcome variables before one gets into discussing impacts.  
Note that in case balance does not exist (for one or both categories of variables), a comparison is 
not impossible; attention has to be restricted to those treated and control households which have 
similar levels of indicators. Various matching strategies can be employed to identify units to 
which attention should be restricted to; but more on that later. Of course, the village level 
indicator variables on amenities and target population levels are included in the balancing 
analysis. The detailed list is provided in Table A3.5, A3.6 and A3.7 in the appendix. 
These variables are used in a probit specification, where the dummy indicating whether the 
observation in question is a treatment or control unit is the dependent variable. The predicted 
probability of participation is the propensity score, and is used in conjunction with various 
matching methods to generate the counterfactuals.  
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Some words about the specifications that are used to study the impacts are in order here; 
although the score generating mechanism is always a probit specification, we consider two broad 
cuts of the data, each of which have two specifications. The details are as follows; 
Spec 1a) All households with complete information are considered in the analysis; however only 
economic outcomes are under study.  
Spec 1b) Around 90 households did not provide information on the women’s module, and 90% 
of such observations came from control areas. To look at all outcomes (economic + 
empowerment), we repeat the p-score estimation and matching algorithms to construct the ATT 
for all households with complete information from general and woman’s module.  
Spec 2a) Some of the surveyed households did not have any outstanding loans; since the most 
basic intervention of JEEViKA is to provide micro-credit, it would be instructive to consider the 
debt portfolio of the households. To do this, we consider only indebted households in this 
specification, rerun the complete analysis and consider only economic outcomes. 
Spec 2b) In this last specification, we consider indebted households which provided information 
in both general and women’s modules; thus, we are in a position to look at all economic and 
empowerment changes across indebted households in this specification. 
With these thoughts on matching variables and specifications, we are now in a position to discuss 
the matching algorithms that we use to study the impact of JEEViKA. However, the 
retrospective nature of the instrument raises the potential of recall error, which if not accounted 
for, can lead us to false conclusions. Next, we discuss this issue in detail. 
Section 3.3: The Problem with Recall Errors 
 
Before we consider matching algorithms, we need to consider the probability and implication of 
recall errors, given the retrospective nature of the survey and the need to balance on pre 
intervention values of outcome variables. Usually, there is no clear reason for a recall error to 
have a different character in general across treated and control groups. But consider an outcome 
which might change substantially, and change at a quicker pace, due to interventions. For 
example, field experience reveals that a member experiences increased freedom to move within 
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3-4 months of joining an SHG. Now, in January 2011, when a question was asked to a 
beneficiary about whether she went to a particular place at the end of 2007, there is a 
considerable risk that she might reply yes, although that increased mobility may have 
materialized 6 months down the line. Recall errors on such outcomes, which can materialize in 
the short run, are always going to bias the outcome upward at 2007 levels due to extrapolation by 
the respondent.  
Indeed we can consider a question to identify if this extrapolation is actually taking place. In the 
mobility section, the respondent is asked whether she went to SHGs during end 2007. Around 
15% of the respondents in the treatment areas said that they did; however, it is a fact that there 
were no SHGs (run by JEEViKA) during that time, and almost none of these respondents were 
part of any SHG prior to their current affiliation with JEEViKA.  
What might happen if outcomes, which are subject to a systematic recall error of the above type 
get included in the matching process? Note that by their very nature, such outcomes are going to 
be higher in treatment areas at 2007 levels, which means that they will have a strong and 
significant contribution to the estimation of the propensity score. Now consider two potential 
matches, identical on all dimensions apart from the outcome on recall-error prone variable 
vector, say, mobility. Recall errors on that vector would then imply that the estimate for the 
propensity score of the treated household diverges from that of the control household; the 
distance in p-scores contributed by the vector may invalidate an otherwise excellent match.   
Thus, among variables which have 2007 levels, we have only considered those for which impacts 
should materialize over a longer time horizon. In fact, the only outcomes from the women’s 
module that has been considered for balance at pre-impact levels are whether the respondent 
would be able to engage in collective action when faced with some issues. The reason is that 
collective actions can materialize when sufficient numbers of women have joined the SHG 
movement in a given village, and that should take a longer time to happen than say, increased 
mobility to a given place.  
However, this opens up the analysis to a reasonable challenge that since 2007 levels are not 
considered on matching, ATT estimates of 2010 levels on such variables would not account for 
the fact that 2007 levels were actually different and this difference was not due to recall errors. 
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To address this concern, all variables (for which 2007 figures are available or can be generated) 
have been considered at two different specifications while constructing the ATT. The 1
st
 
specification is the level at 2010; hence the ATT is a first difference. The other level is the Delta-
Outcome, the difference in 2010 from 2007. Hence, for variables which were not used for 
balancing at 2007 levels, the ATT on the delta-outcome consistently estimates the change across 
the groups; a caveat being that the groups did not share divergent trends during 2007 and before.  
How does recall error on a variable affect its ATT on the delta-outcome? Consider a situation 
where there are significant recall errors on a vector, say the mobility vector, where some 
respondents in the treated area systematically respond that they went to different places at end 
2007, when actually they did not. If the same respondents still go to these places, the delta on 
these observations is essentially 0. This implies that for variables prone to recall errors, the 
estimated ATT on the deltas will be biased downward, the bias depending on the extent of recall 
error. Thus to summarize, in case a recall error causes an upward bias in 2007 outcomes in 
treated areas, the ATT on the Delta-outcome will be biased downward and vice-versa. An 
ATT estimate would hence provide a lower bound on the actual impact.  
The delta-outcome variables play another significant role. Note that the matching technique 
matches on propensity score, and not exact covariate matching. Thus it is completely possible 
that although matches have close propensity scores, they diverge on the 2007-level of some of 
the balancing variables. A balance check is always performed to check for significant differences 
in average level across the treated and control groups; however, this does not imply that the 
individual matched pairs are actually similar on all dimensions of pre-outcomes. To consider a 
crude example, imagine that a treated and a control HH have been earmarked as a match for each 
other, but had dissimilar holdings of, say, cows in 2007. If the 2010 level is comparable, the 
contribution towards the ATT would be negligible. However, the delta for the HH which 
increased its holdings would contribute much more towards the ATT on the delta for the overall 
sample. Thus, considering the delta-outcomes, along with the first difference increases the 
confidence in changes, as the delta controls for level differences at 2007 and just considers the 
net change in 3 years.  
Hence, the delta-outcomes play a dual role: they mimic the advantages of a Difference-in-
Difference estimation, but are able to allow information in time invariant characteristics to 
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construct the counterfactual, when such variables are used to estimate the propensity score. Do 
note that the assumption of similar trends apply to either process of estimation for consistent 
results. 
If the 2007 level is balanced across T-C on average, then a significant ATT on the first difference 
will imply a significant ATT on the delta. In fact it would be a very odd result, if for outcome X, 
2007 levels are balanced, 2010 levels are significantly different but the delta is statistically 
similar across groups.  
However, if the 2007 level is not balanced across T-C on average, we may have a significant 
ATT on the first difference, and an insignificant ATT on the delta, which implies that the groups 
are moving similarly. In fact, if the ATT on the delta is positive, it can probably be said that the 
gap is closing.  
A significant delta will not imply a significant ATT on the first difference, due to inexact 
covariate matching at 2007 levels. In this case a significant delta contributes towards the 
confidence in impacts.  
To summarize the discussion on recall errors: 
1) A systematic component of the recall error may bias the 2007 level of some outcomes upward 
in the treatment areas. Using such variables in matching would raise chances of inexact matches. 
Thus such variables are not used for matching. However the deltas are used, along with first 
differences, to address the issue that had the 2007 levels been used, ATT estimates on the first 
difference might be very different; the key point is that the estimated ATT on the delta, if recall 
error of the above kind has taken place, will be a lower bound on the actual ATT. 
2) Since exact matching on all covariates at 2007 levels is impossible, the estimate on the ATT 
of the Delta-outcomes raises confidence in the presence or absence of impacts, as the delta 
removes the concern of mismatch at 2007 levels.  
Hence, the broad types of variables considered: 
Type A: 2007 level is available or computed. 2007 level is used for matching and balance. ATT 
on 2010 level and ATT on Delta are computed.  
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Type B: 2007 level is available or can be computed. However, 2007 level is not used for 
matching and balance. ATT on 2010 level and ATT on Delta are computed. 
Type C: 2007 level is not available. Hence only ATT of current responses are computed. The 
implicit assumption is that Type C variables are highly correlated with both Type A and B 
variables.  
Before we move on to the algorithms for matching, we briefly digress to discuss systematic 
recall errors that may be introduced on the account of any retrospective values. Given the 
previous discussion, it is clear that if beneficiaries ascribe changes in outcomes at the 
retrospective level, the ATT would underestimate the true effect. It might be argued that 
beneficiaries may underestimate pre-treatment outcomes and paint a ‘worse’ picture than it 
actually was, before the program came in. This might be due to a psychological effect of 
imagining a worse situation than it actually was; it may also be due to a strategic ploy on part of 
beneficiaries to paint a better picture about the program. This would be a sensible ploy only if the 
beneficiaries know that the program is being evaluated and they have found the program actually 
beneficial. A counter-argument may be that under such a scenario, beneficiaries may under-
report current outcomes, if they assume that reduction in poverty may remove them from the 
program’s ambit. 
In any case, if a systematic recall error causes beneficiaries to underreport retrospective levels, 
the difference in outcomes at current periods would overestimate the actual effect. If under this 
situation, beneficiaries underreport current levels, then there is a downward bias. In any case, the 
absence of a true baseline complicates our understanding about the direction of bias if systematic 
recall errors exist. Indeed, the data points out clearly that on some dimensions, beneficiaries are 
ascribing program outcomes to retrospective scenarios; for example, claiming that they did go to 
SHGs when it is a fact that SHGs did not exist. We know that under this scenario, ATTs on the 
current outcomes are a lower bound on the actual effect. However, a-priori we do not know 
which outcomes are subject to systematic recall errors, and in what direction. For this reason, we 
re-run Specifications 1b and 2b without any outcome variables measured at retrospective levels. 
The results on balance and subsequent matching from these re-runs are presented in the 
appendix, as an additional robustness check on the main specifications, which still include the 
retrospective levels of outcomes. 
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In the next section we look at the various matching methods along with the respective pros and 
cons, before concluding the chapter and moving onto the results. 
Section 3.4: Matching Procedures to find the best counterfactual 
 
Essentially, all matching algorithms come with a tradeoff between bias (approximated by 
distance in p-score) and variance, and thus there is no algorithm which is a silver bullet for all 
matching questions. We discuss the various matching methods first, before moving onto the 
methods adopted for the present study. 
a) NN Matching, w/o replacement: Under this algorithm, each treated observation is matched 
to one control. Once a match is found the T and C pair is removed from the sample, and the 
algorithm looks for the next best match. Now there is some confusion on how this matching 
should work; optimally (minimize distance in p-score estimate in full sample) or greedily 
(minimize distance in p-score estimate between each matched pair). A few studies focus on the 
distinction between the two algorithms, and usually claim that optimal is better than greedy 
matching.  
b) NN Matching, with replacement: W/o replacement procedures tend to get better matches 
when the propensity scores are very close together. However, in its attempt to find matches for 
every treatment, match quality decreases when a) propensity scores are not close and/or b) after 
removing matched pairs, propensity scores get progressively further for remaining observations. 
With replacement addresses this problem. Once a control matches to a treatment, it is returned to 
the sample and considered once again. Thus, with replacement, both greedy and optimal 
algorithms would perform much better and similarly. Not only that, with replacement will do at 
least as good as w/o replacement matching, given optimal/greedy algorithm, on the quality of 
matching. However, the problem is that with replacement implies that fewer control cases are 
used to form the match, which means that although bias may decrease, variance will increase. 
Note that in w/o replacement strategies bias may become a serious issue if progressive matches 
are made on propensity scores that are further and further apart.  




c) k-NN (Nearest Neighbor) Matching, with replacement:In this algorithm, it is specified a-
priori how many controls are to be used to frame the counterfactual for each treated observation. 
Although this would reduce variance due to more observations being used, note that it would 
increase the bias, as at least k-1 controls will have a greater distance in p-score from the one 
treated observation, had we used 1 NN matching.  
d) Caliper Matching:NN matching faces the risk of bad matches, if the closest neighbor is far 
away. This can be avoided by imposing a tolerancelevel on the maximum propensity score 
distance (caliper).For a given treated (control) observation A, the control (treatment) observation 
lying within the tolerance level and closest to A in terms of p-score is matched up to A. This 
implies that the choice of the caliper is very important: too small a caliper would throw out a 
bunch of observations, and too large a caliper would include outliers which are potentially bad 
matches. Unfortunately, there is no consensus at all about the caliper distance, just like there is 
no consensus about the number of neighbors to match in k-NN matching. Note that since the 
caliper method uses ONLY the nearest neighbor inside the caliper, it uses less information and 
hence increases variance. Indeed, specifying a tolerance level implies that the researcher is 
comfortable with the distance specified in terms of p-scores, and considers that all observations 
within the tolerance level are ‘good matches’. Considering the nearest neighbor among such 
observations means that extra observations which are good matches are not being used, which 
may increase variance. 
e) Radius Matching: Radius matching works very similar to caliper matching; however ALL 
observations within the tolerance bounds are considered as matches, thus reducing variance.  
f) Kernel Matching: Kernel matching weights all control units to construct the counterfactual 
for each treated observation; the weights are a factor of the kernel bandwidth specified by the 
user and the distance in propensity scores between the treatment unit and the control unit under 
consideration. Since kernel matching uses all the control units to construct counterfactuals, the 
variance should decrease. However, even a small but positive weight on the most distant control 
units could seriously contribute to bias; thus, the choice of the bandwidth becomes very 
important. To sum up: 
With Replacement VS W/O Replacement:  
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On Bias: ‘W/o Replacement’ should usually perform worse than ‘with replacement’ when it 
comes to reducing bias. Indeed, progressive matches reduce the quality of matching, if the 
estimated propensity scores on the remaining observations are further and further apart.  
On Variance: Since with replacement would tend to consider the same observations to construct 
a match (especially if propensity scores keep diverging), it would generally use less information 
than w/o replacement strategies, thereby increasing variance. 
With Replacement, 1-NN VS K-NN: 
On Bias: 1-NN matching cannot do worse than K-NN when it comes to decreasing bias. 
On Variance:K-NN can never do worse than 1-NN when it comes to reducing variance. 
However, both NN methods are subject to bad matches due to propensity score divergence.  
With Replacement, Caliper VS Radius: 
Imposing a tolerance level avoids the chances of a bad match, in the sense that observations with 
scores far away are not considered. The choice of the tolerance level becomes very important, 
since a small interval will increase the match quality, but reduce the number of observations 
(both treated and control) that are used for analysis. A large tolerance level raises the chances of 
a bad match, but includes more observations into the analysis. However, given a tolerance level, 
caliper matching provides better matches than radius matching as it considers only the nearest 
neighbor. However, being inside the tolerance level implies that all observations are considered 
‘good enough’ for matching; considering only one of them increases the variance. Radius 
matching solves this problem because it constructs the counterfactual by considering all ‘good 
enough’ matches. 
In the present study we consider 5 matching methods to construct the counterfactuals. The 1
st
 
two methods are NN (with replacement) matching and kernel matching, where the bandwidth is 
given by the auto-generated rule of thumb optimum. 
The 3
rd
 method is also a kernel algorithm; it uses a bandwidth which comes out of minimizing 
the root mean square error (RMSE) by using a process of leave one out cross validation 
(LOOCV). A few words about this process are in order before progressing further.  
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The Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation (LOOCV) process uses a minimization criterion of the 
RMSE to identify a reasonable bandwidth by the following process: 
a) A variable, say X, which was used to estimate the probit model is used as an outcome. 
b) A bandwidth is assumed; any one observation is left out, and the remaining observations are 
used to predict out X for the one left out observation, where the explanatory variable is the 
Propensity scores from the original probit fitting. The difference between the actual X and 
predicted X for the left out outcome is an error. This process is repeated for all the observations 
in the sample, which generates an Average RMSE from predicting X for given bandwidth. 
c) Multiple bandwidths are used to find out which bandwidth minimizes Average RMSE on X. 
The X chosen here is the pre impact level of Mobile phones (2007 levels). There are two reasons 
for this choice. This variable is significant in the probit specification across all cuts. The idea is 
that if a variation in a variable precisely predicts the variation in propensities, propensities would 
precisely predict the variable out. Additionally, the purpose of using multiple matching 
algorithms is to check the robustness of the estimates of ATT; the ATT on mobile ownership is 
significant across all methods. Thus if the LOOCV bandwidth generates an ATT that is biased, 
we can compare it with the ATT from the other methods. However comparing the ATT on an 
outcome which is not significant is meaningless for robustness checks.  
The last 2 methods considered are a caliper and radius specification with the same tolerance 
level. We recall that the choice of this tolerance level is important for caliper/radius 
specifications; hence, we spend some time to discuss the reason behind choosing the tolerance 
level.  
Recall that a probit estimation is used to predict the probability of participation, given the 
variables that were considered in section 3.1. A t-test of the estimated probabilities is then done 
across status of intervention to get a crude understanding of the distribution of p-scores. The 
tolerance level for radius/caliper matching is then computed as: 
Tolerance Level=  (SE of Average Treatment Probability of Treated Observations) – 
   (SE of Average Treatment Probability of Control Observations) 
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Assume that the estimated probabilities have reasonably identical distributions, both in the 
treated and control sample, with the average probability of treatment higher in the treatment 
sample. In such a case, the difference in the standard errors would be small, irrespective of 
whether the standard errors themselves are large (distribution is spread out) or small (distribution 
is tight). This implies that as the distribution of p-scores gets tighter in both treated and control 
groups, the tolerance level gets smaller to prevent a potentially bad match-up. If the distribution 
of p-scores are more spread out (which is the scenario when NN matching does badly), the 
tolerance level will still stay small to prevent bad matches; obviously, this would mean that less 
observations are used, which means that variance should increase. 
What happens when one distribution is much more spread out than the other? In this case, the 
tolerance level increases thus raising the chances of bad matches; however, it would allow more 
observations to be used in the analysis, thus reducing variance. Note that NN matching would 
still find out matches for all treated observations under very different distributions of p-scores, 
thereby increasing the probability of bad matches. Indeed, the tolerance level, even though it is 
larger under such a scenario, would ensure that bad matches are kept to a minimum. Under such 
a specification, a tolerance level would be disastrous only if the estimated distributions are very 
different, leading to an absurdly high radius. Even in such a case, matching without specifying 
tolerance levels will lead to worse matches, since NN matching would attempt to find matches 
for every treatment, some of which may be invalidated by large tolerance bounds.  
To summarize, the matching algorithms considered are 
a) Nearest Neighbor, with replacement 
b) Kernel Matching, where bandwidth is rule of thumb optimum 
c) Kernel Matching, where bandwidth is LOOCV optimum 
d) Caliper Matching, where tolerance bound is the difference in the Standard Errors of the 
estimated scores from the treatment and control groups. 






Section 3.5: Understanding Balance in key dimensions 
 
We start by looking at the estimation of the propensity scores and their distribution among the 
treatment and control units; these are distributions are from the unmatched sample.  
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Propensity Scores, by Intervention Status, across Specifications  
(Distribution of propensity scores of Treatment & Control units in green and red respectively) 
 
Spec 1a: All HHs, only variables from gen module used                   Spec 1b: All HHs, variables from both modules used  
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The distributional graphs contain a major implication; a substantial number of observations from 
either treatment or control sets are in the common support region. In plain terms, in 2008, a large 
number of households in either set enjoyed the same probability of getting treated. Had that not 
been the case, we would have been unable to say anything about the control units with very low 
probability of participation and the treatment units at the other end of the spectrum.  
We recall that for each of our 4 specifications, we use 5 matching algorithms. Although the 
distribution of the propensity scores are identical for each algorithm by specification (see above 
graphs), the matches are not. Below, we provide the graphs of distribution of matching and the 
statistics on post-match balance for Spec 1a to understand the intuition.  
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Matched Units, across Match Algorithms  
 
 Nearest Neighbor Post Match Graph   Radius/Caliper Post Match Graph  
      
      
      
 Red:  Matched Treated Units  
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 Blue: Control Units   
    
 Kernel Post Match Graph 
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score




In the balancing exercise, common support had been imposed; this essentially means that the 
treated units with a propensity score higher than the propensity score of the control unit, with the 
maximum propensity score, are not considered for matching. For nearest neighbor and kernel 
algorithms, this is the implication of common support. Note that in nearest neighbor and kernel, 
all treatment units are matched; additionally, in kernel matching, all control units are used to 
construct the match. 
In radius/caliper algorithms, the imposition of a tolerance bound, say ε, implies that all treated 
units which do not have a control unit within a distance of |ε| in propensity scores are left 
unmatched. Thus under radius/caliper algorithms, the quality of matching (in terms of proximity 
of propensity scores) is decreasing in ε.  
In table A3.8 we look at the balance statistics on the pre-treatment levels of the outcome 
variables for Spec 1a. The main columns pertain to the algorithms of NN (with replacement), 
Caliper, Radius and Kernel (Rule of Thumb bandwidth) matching respectively. For each 
balancing variable, the 1
st
 row indicates the statistics from the unmatched sample, while the 2
nd
 
row captures that from the matched sample. For each algorithm, the 1
st
 column captures the 
average level of the variable for the treated units, while the 2
nd
 row relates to the sample average 
from the control units. The 3
rd
 column is the t-statistic on the difference in means, while the final 
column indicates if the difference in means is significantly different from 0. Thus, for a given 
variable, if the p-value indicates no statistical difference in the means from the treated and 
control units for the unmatched sample, then we really do not need a balancing exercise on that 
variable. If that is not the case, a balancing exercise is necessary; the p-value on the difference of 
means in the matched sample tells us if the matched sample generated balance on the variable 
being considered.  
A variable can be balanced, in the same specification, under some of the matching algorithms but 
may be unbalanced under the others. The direction of difference at 2007 levels contains a caveat 
towards interpreting the ATT in 2010. If there is a statistically significant positive difference 
between the averages from the treated and control units at 2007, then a significant positive ATT 
at 2010 may be an overestimate of the actual impact. Indeed, let us consider such a scenario; how 
do we know what the true effect of the program was on an outcome, given that the levels were 
unbalanced in 2007 and has a significant ATT at 2010? To fix ideas, assume that for this 
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outcome A, the 2007 results indicate a significantly higher average among treated units in the 
matched sample. The ATT on A is also significant and positive. The ATT for the Delta-outcome 
on A assumes a lot of significance in such a scenario. Assuming that pre-intervention trends on 
the variable in question were similar in treatment and control areas, if ‘Del’A is insignificant, 
then the project has had no impact on this dimension in the last 3 years; the difference in 2010 
was driven by the difference in 2007. However, if the ‘Del’A is significant and positive, then the 
program has accelerated the realization of outcome A among treated units. The detailed results 
for the balancing exercise are in Table A3.8 of the appendix. 
To put more clarity into the previous discussion, we consider the variable, 
‘Tot_PermEarner_past’; this indicates the number of members who earned some income, 
throughout the year, in 2007. The unmatched sample indicates that the average control unit had a 
significantly higher number of such members. If the program does not affect this outcome, then a 
simple comparison of the average (without matching) on this variable at 2010 levels would 
falsely imply that due to the JEEViKA project, the average beneficiary household has fewer 
regular income earners than the non-beneficiary household. 
Consider the variable ‘Land_2007’ now; in the unmatched sample, the averages from treated and 
control units were statistically similar. However, the matched samples (under NN and caliper) 
have significantly lower land ownership under treated units. We need to keep this in mind when 
we consider the ownership levels at 2010; if the ATT is negative and statistically different, it 
does not imply immediately that the program is having a negative impact on land ownership. 
This is where the Delta-outcome on land ownership becomes important (assuming that historical 
trends in ownership were similar before interventions). For example, if the ATT on the Delta is 
significant, and (say) positive then beneficiaries have accelerated land ownership and thus the 
gap has reduced; if it is the other way round, then the program beneficiaries are indeed reducing 






Chapter 4: Socio-Economic Changes due to JEEViKA 
 
We are now in a position to interpret the results. Due to the number of specifications, algorithms 
and probable outcomes, we have a large set of ATTs to consider. The preceding discussions on 
the aim of the JEEViKA program point out that although we consider a multitude of outcomes, 
the key focus areas of JEEViKA are micro-finance, livelihoods and empowerment. Impacts on 
these dimensions would hopefully lead to higher level outcomes such as improved quality of 
living, consolidation of assets, higher incomes and consumptions, better planning for children, 
etc.  
We first look at outcomes on livelihoods, keeping in mind that the survey instrument was not 
geared towards pinpointing changes in incomes from various sources due to the retrospective 
nature. Instead, we try to understand if such changes happened by considering a variety of proxy 
indicators, such as number of income earners, substitution among livelihood activities, land 
holding and leasing patterns and finally, buildup of assets. 
We then consider a variety of outcomes on quality of living, education and aspirations before 
moving onto outcomes related to the debt portfolio and empowerment indices for the woman. 
These are two of the three main thrust areas of JEEViKA and we hope that the survey instrument 
could accurately measure the impacts of the program along these dimensions. 
Section 4.1 Results on Livelihoods and Assets 
 
JEEViKA was unable to change the number of income earners in beneficiary households, 
irrespective of the income being seasonal or year round. We note that across each balancing 
exercise for a given algorithm and specification, the number of seasonal and year round income 
earners in 2007 was always balanced across treated and control units. Now, this may not signify 
absence of impacts once we recognize that JEEViKA does not provide employment 
opportunities, but attempts to expand livelihood options (an avenue of generating income). Thus, 
income earners in the beneficiary household may either allocate more time to their existing 
livelihood(s) or substitute towards a better livelihood option generating higher net income. Due 
to the retrospective nature of the instrument and the difficulty in collecting accurate income 
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figures from rural India, we do not ask for income earned for each past and present livelihood. 
Rather, we look at the livelihood activities (by season) and attempt to infer something from that. 
There is a small and significant shift towards casual labor in urban areas, during monsoon 
months; but this result is sporadic across matching algorithms. There seems to be a small and 
significant shift away from doing agriculture on own land during the summer months. We find 
a similar trend, that is, a shift away from agriculture on lease land during the same period, 
especially for indebted households. There are some small sporadic shifts towards casual 
agriculture in rural and urban areas, but these results are not robustly significant under 
algorithms.  
However, two options stand out for the stability in significance and impacts. There is a 
significant and negative, albeit small, shift away from salaried employment in the treated 
areas. There is an even more robust (still small) result for animal husbandry; treated 
households are shifting towards animal husbandry as a primary livelihood option, across 
most algorithms and all specifications.  
Thus, for livelihoods, the take away result is that animal husbandry is an option being taken up 
by project beneficiaries. Note that salaried employment is not a project outcome; however, 
reduced rural migration is an agenda for the program. Whether the shifts away from salaried 
employment are bringing beneficiaries back to their native places, and whether that is making 
them better off with alternative livelihood options is a question beyond the scope of this study.  
The shifts away from agricultural activities (given that the evidence is sporadic, but strong under 
some algorithms) provide us with reason to look at the land patterns for cultivation. We have the 
luxury of having pre-intervention levels of land owned to balance on, when we consider these 
outcomes. 
First we note that land ownership levels were unbalanced, under Spec 1a and caliper and NN 
matches at 2007 levels. The ATT on land ownership at 2010 is insignificant across all 
specifications and algorithms, except for Spec 2b under radius and caliper. Interestingly, under 
Spec 1a, the ATT on change in land ownership is significant for NN and caliper. This is an 
excellent example of the use of the Delta-outcome; it shows that land ownership patterns were 
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accelerated (although the evidence is not universal at all) under the Spec 1a among treated 
HHs. Thus, the gap closed at 2010, although control units had higher holdings in 2007. 
For indebted HHs, there is some evidence under NN and caliper matches that the level of land 
rented was higher in treated areas. However, when we consider all households, there is some 
evidence that treated units are leasing in less land over the last 3 years, under NN and caliper 
algorithms. 
The preceding results on land patterns point to a small shift away from agricultural activities in 
JEEViKA areas, especially when we recall the small sporadic away-shifts from agriculture 
related activities. Whether this is good or bad comes down to the question of alternate options. 
Before concluding this dimension, it is apt to mention that 2009 and 2010 were drought years in 
Bihar; a shift away from agriculture related activities might imply that an expanded option of 
livelihoods is proving beneficial for beneficiaries, while the control units are choice constrained; 
hence we see the shift away. 
When we consider indebted households only, the current holdings of buffaloes by treated units 
are lower than control units, under Spec 2b. A quick look at the balance reveals that in 2007, for 
NN, caliper and radius matches under Spec 2b, buffalo holdings were lower in treated areas. The 
Delta-outcome becomes important; Indebted treated households exhibit a robust significant 
reduction in buffaloes. 
Another very interesting result manifests itself in holding of cows; treated households seem to be 
increasing their holdings of cows over the last 3 years, especially under kernel algorithms. 
Indeed, the trend exists when we consider Spec 2a and radius/caliper algorithms. We recall a 
result from the discussion on the livelihoods dimension; a small, but sure shift towards animal 
husbandry. The confusing part is that ownership levels over the last 3 years are moving in 
opposite directions for cows and buffaloes, which are essentially substitutes. The buffalo is 
monetarily dearer than the cow, and provides better milk, but the cow brings an immense value 
of prestige and sentiment with it. The instrument does not collect any details on the leasing in of 
animals, which is a substantial activity under animal husbandry. Future work may provide a 
better understanding of this result. 
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However, an even stronger, across the board result materialized in the ownership of mobile 
phones; ownership of mobiles in 2010 is significantly higher under almost all algorithms 
and specifications. Finally there is some evidence on reduced holding of cots (especially among 
indebted HHs) and increased holding of watches (especially under all HHs). 
Section 4.2 Results on House Quality and Food Security 
 
Across all specifications, but usually under radius algorithm, there is evidence that the 
percentage of households with flooring made of permanent or ‘pucca’ (cement, concrete, 
etc.) materials in the house has increased at a faster pace in control areas than in treatment 
areas.  
A promising effect materializes across the board when we consider the defecation practices. 
Across the board (specifications and algorithms), treated HHs are using open fields less 
than control HHs, for defecation over the last 3 years. Use of closed public or private toilets 
has increased in project areas. Indeed, around 1% extra households from treated areas have 
started using private toilet facilities over the last 3 years.  
However, we need to put this change in perspective; a high percentage of the population (around 
86-90%) still use open fields for defecation in the present day, both from project and non-project 
areas. A lot of work remains to be done in this area, given the fact that defecation in the open 
leads to a plethora of health problems. 
Across specifications and under kernel algorithms, there is evidence that the duration of acute 
food shortage has reduced over the last 3 years in treated units. However, this reduction is 
extremely small, although significant and robust at about .09 months. Once again, the absolute 
number of months of acute shortage is very high (around 1 month for the control areas, 27 days 
for the treated areas) which is why the difference works out to around 3 days. 
Across specifications, especially for kernel and radius algorithms, there is evidence that the 
percentage of insecure HHs has reduced faster over the last 3 years in project areas. This 




Section 4.3 Education of Children, Women’s Aspirations and Profile 
 
The enrollment figures for the girl child are significantly higher in treated areas, under 
Spec 1a and the NN, caliper and radius algorithms. Around 8%-10% more girls attend 
schools in treatment areas. However, these results are not repeated under other specifications. 
The enrollment figures for the boy child are more significant, for the indebted households, 
apart from the caliper algorithm. Around 8%-13% more boys are currently enrolled in schools 
from the treated units. 
Respondents from both treated and control areas wanted to marry off their daughter when 
she is 16 years old; and due to this, there were no differences along this outcome across 
specifications or algorithms. The NN and caliper algorithms under Spec 1b imply that women 
from treated households want to educate their daughter for 0.4 years more on average. 
However, the significance is lost for the other specification as well as the other algorithms.  
Women from treated areas seem to be much more interested in their son’s education; women 
from beneficiary HHs want their boys to be educated for 0.47-0.54 extra years; when we 
focus on indebted HHs, women want to educate their sons for 0.42-0.54 more years. 
33%-34% more women are signature literate from treated areas. Now this is, to a large 
extent, a trivial impact. Women are encouraged to sign their names in JEEViKA SHGs. We can 
consider the ATTs on sign literacy to understand if women are getting keener in recognizing 
numbers or letters. Around 3.3-4.4% more women are sign literate from treated areas under 
Spec 1b. Once again, scope exists in this area as percentages of sign literacy are in the range of 
16-20% in the entire sample. Lastly, we consider the percentage of women who mentioned their 
husband’s name by themselves. Although this is no direct indicator of empowerment or well-
being, orthodox societies consider this as taboo. It is interesting to see that 15-17% more women 






Section 4.4 Savings Habits and Debt Portfolio 
 
We note that JEEViKA members are highly encouraged (in fact, required) to deposit a weekly 
saving in their Self Help Group. Thus an impact on savings is expected. Unfortunately, due to 
the retrospective nature of the instrument, we cannot look at past and present savings amounts 
and compare. We consider the regularity of savings at current levels and changes in such 
behavior over the last 3 years; additionally, we consider where these savings are usually parked.  
Quite naturally, savings practices have been boosted significantly in treated areas; indeed 69-
75% more indebted households from the treated areas practice savings. The magnitudes of 
the ATT on savings and the significance levels are preserved when we look at all HHs (Spec 1a 
and 1b). Around 57-60% more HHs, across specifications and algorithms, started regular 
saving over the last 3 years. Quite obviously, SHGs have become the dominant place to park 
these savings, at the cost of non-formal and other formal mechanisms.  
Although these impacts are structural, and simply massive, we should note that this is somewhat 
trivial. A more fundamental change would have been had beneficiary households saved larger 
and larger amounts voluntarily. Unfortunately, the instrument did not probe for voluntary saving 
amounts (rather, any savings amounts) due to the retrospective nature and the fact that a concept 
of voluntary savings is confusing in non-SHG areas. However, we need to take cognizance of the 
fact that even a token savings practice is absent in impoverished households of rural Bihar. At 
the end of the day, weekly savings to the tune of 5-10 Rupees is still an achievement, given the 
resource constraints on JEEViKA’s target population.  
We now consider the (and perhaps the most important) dimension of debt portfolio. The 
pernicious poverty levels in rural Bihar are engendered to a large extent by high cost informal 
credit markets, and complete unavailability of formal credit. Emergency situations make 
expensive credit unavoidable, leaving fewer resources to take credit for productive purposes. 
Assets get mortgaged, leading to the debt trap; the extent of the debt trap leads to occurrences of 
bonded labor in some areas. We take a careful look at the debt portfolios to understand whether 




The retrospective nature of the instrument meant that we could not look at the initial credit 
position of any household. Indeed, the best indicator for historical indebtedness is the year of 
borrowing; one could look at the amounts and purposes of old loans (that are still outstanding) 
and make some inferences. This is exactly what we exploit, by looking at loans taken on or 
before 2007 and since 2008. Note that loans taken on or before 2007 are not variables that we 
should balance on; if the intervention takes root, old loans should get retired much faster in 
treated areas. Hence, we cannot balance on any debt related variables. 
We take a close look at the distribution of high cost (monthly interest rate greater than 2%) loans, 
separated by the year of 2008, across treated and control areas. We then look at loan uptake by 
purpose. Immediately we run into a problem; interpretation of amounts borrowed by purpose 
doesn’t make a lot of sense if we cannot control for the entire portfolio. For example, cheap 
credit may encourage loans for consumption and/or productive purposes in treatment areas. 
However, if beneficiary households keep using credit for consumption purposes, then the 
beneficiary households may be getting to higher credit equilibrium for the time being, but that’s 
about it; such practices would not translate into higher incomes. Just a casual comparison of the 
absolute borrowing by purpose might be very misleading, as the total portfolio (and the part 
allotted to consumption) may be higher in project areas just due to easier and cheaper credit. 
Thus we need to consider percentages. This means that we necessarily consider only the 
currently indebted households; and this is the main motivation for Spec 2a and 2b.  
1.5-2% less households from project areas has high cost loans which were taken before 
2008. Note that in any case, 5% households from control areas still have outstanding 
amounts on such loans. The amounts borrowed on such loans are similar across treated and 
control units. 
Note: The similarity of amount borrowed on old high cost loans, across treatment and control 
units under both specifications is a major result; it points to the similarity of these households on 
this dimension before the project expanded. In light of non-availability of debt data at baseline, 
this result is a powerful indication that debt portfolios were perhaps similar before interventions.  
Strong results show up when we consider high cost loans taken after 2007; program areas show a 
clear substitution away from such loans. 17.6-19.6% less households from JEEViKA areas 
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hold such loans; 42-44% households from control areas have outstanding amounts on high 
cost loans taken after 2007. The amounts borrowed on such loans are Rs 3500-4100 less in 
project areas; the average control HH borrowed Rs 7750-8300 on high cost loans. 
Additionally, the average number of loans (any loan) is 0.5 units higher in treated areas.  
The results are expected and encouraging; JEEViKA beneficiaries have retired old loans at a 
faster pace; significantly lower numbers of project households have taken high cost loans after 
the project expanded into the blocks. Additionally, the amounts taken out on such loans are 
significantly lower in project areas. Due to the lower cost of the loans, beneficiaries are taking 
more loans on average; however, the total amounts borrowed are not different. 
We glance quickly at the borrowings by purpose; project beneficiaries are taking loans more 
frequently for a variety of purposes, including repair of house, purchase of food, marriage 
expenses, durables purchase, debt reduction, livestock purchase and petty business. However, the 
differences in amounts borrowed by purpose are not significant across the board. This implies 
that beneficiaries are taking out loans more frequently; however, this does not translate into 
higher total borrowing, implying that smaller amounts are borrowed more frequently by 
beneficiaries. 
We now turn towards the indebted households; results on the debt portfolio become more 
pronounced and more clarified now, as we have the luxury of considering percentages. 
Among currently indebted households, 4.9-6% less households from project areas still have 
positive outstanding amounts on old high cost loans. About 10% households in the control 
areas still retain such debts. Once again, the amounts borrowed on such loans are still 
statistically similar.  
47-50% less households from project areas have taken high cost loans after 2007; indeed, 
the percentages of control HHs with ‘new’ high cost debt burden is 77-80%. The results on 
amounts borrowed are even starker. Program HHs have taken around 9300-10000 Rs less on 
high cost loans after 2007; the control HHs borrowed around 14200-15000 Rs on high cost 
loans after 2007. 
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Two results follow immediately, which are extremely encouraging when taken together; 
indebted HHs in project areas has taken 0.18 more loans (any loans) than indebted control 
HHs. However, although the number of loans is thus higher in program areas, control units 
have a higher total borrowing to the tune of 5400-6500 Rs. Indeed, their total borrowing is 
around Rs 19500-20500. 
These two results imply that project HHs take more frequent loans, but borrow smaller amounts 
on each loan. This may lead to a potentially healthy practice of repeat doses of credit, if it’s done 
for income generation activities. We also note that due to the practice of mortgaging assets while 
accessing loans from informal spheres, rural families usually borrow a high amount of money for 
multiple purposes, in lieu of mortgaging a single item. Obviously, this is a prime recipe for debt 
trap. Cheap credit with no requirement of mortgages has been able to crack this conundrum, and 
thus program families can now go for repeat doses of smaller credit. We now look at the 
purposes of borrowing to understand if these repeat doses are being used for short run benefits 
like consumption purposes. 
The radius algorithms point out that there is a reduction in the number and amount of loans taken 
out for health purposes. For every 100 Rs borrowed, program households take 4.4-5 Rs less 
for health reasons. This is the by far the most important purpose of credit in rural Bihar; 
out of 100 Rs borrowed by the control unit, almost 41 Rs is for a health reason.  
There is a strong result when we consider loans taken for marital expenses; program HHs 
have taken out 1700-2900 Rs less than control HHs for this reason. This translates into 10-13 
Rs difference, when we consider a project and control HH with a total debt of 100 Rs. The 
average control HH borrows 23-24 Rs for marriage expenses, out of every 100 Rs it 
borrows. 
Distribution of borrowing patterns is very similar when it comes to the purposes of food 
requirement and schooling across treatment and control areas across all algorithms. 
However, treated HHs borrow lower amounts for house repair. Indebted control HHs borrow 
around 1900-2500 Rs for house repairs; treated HHs borrow around 700-1100 Rs less for 
this reason. However, there are no significant differences in the percentage borrowed for house 
repair. There is some sporadic evidence of program HHs borrowing lower amounts for purchase 
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of durables, under the NN, caliper and radius algorithms to the tune of 470-550 Rs; once again, 
there is no significant difference when we consider the percentage of total money borrowed for 
purchase of durables across treatment and control. 
An extremely strong result shows up when we consider the purpose of debt reduction; indebted 
program HHs borrow, on average, 700-800 Rs more than the indebted control HHs to 
reduce other debts. If we consider a program and control HH with a total debt of 100 Rs, 
the average control HH borrowed Rs 27-70 for debt reduction; the program HH allocates 
Rs 7 more to this purpose; in percentage terms, this is 0.48-0.80% of the total amount 
borrowed. Simply put, cheaper loans are being used to retire other loans by beneficiary 
households; it is a significant step towards coming out of the debt trap. Now, we recognize that 
this would be a sustainable strategy if program HHs move towards credit for income generation.  
Program HHs borrow around 250-380 Rs more to purchase livestock; this translates to 4.3-
4.9 Rs more being borrowed, by the beneficiary, for every 100 Rs borrowed by either 
beneficiary or non-beneficiary. Indeed, the average control HH allocates 1.7-2.5% of her entire 
portfolio to this purpose.  
2.2-3 Rs more are allocated by beneficiaries towards setting up a shop, when either treated 
or control borrow 100 Rs total; however, we do not see a significant difference in the amounts 
borrowed. 
Unfortunately, due to oversight, the author did not create a separate category for agriculture 
purpose; such information was lost as it got clubbed under others. 
However, the debt portfolio sends out some very clear results; a structural change has taken place 
in the debt portfolio of program households. They take more frequent loans but they borrow 
smaller amounts on each tranche. The loan burden under high cost debt is lower by a large 
margin; additionally, a much lower percentage of project HHs have such debt. Old high cost 
loans have been retired at a faster pace by project HHs.  
The results on the purposes of debt reduction, consumption and income generation point out that 
the borrowing pattern implies financial wisdom on the part of beneficiaries; they borrow more to 
reduce other debt, they borrow less to arrange for marriages, house repairs and purchase of 
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durables. Although there is some evidence that percentages of amount borrowed are lower for 
health purposes, the evidence is not across the board. It makes sense, since credit for health 
emergencies and food requirements would fall in project areas only if JEEViKA provided health 
services, or the agricultural interventions were adopted by large sections. From the livelihoods 
section, we already saw that this was not the case, especially in the view of droughts in 2009 and 
2010. However, the program households have definitely moved towards credit for productive 
purposes, evidenced by higher uptake of loans for livestock rearing and setting up small shops. 
Section 4.5 Dimensions of Empowerment 
 
Stable results on mobility materialize across algorithms along the entire dimension of mobility, 
especially when we consider all households. We start with the results from indebted 
households, where the ATTs are a bit dampened. Presently, around 3.9-4.5% more women 
from project areas can go to health centers for concerns regarding themselves and their 
children. Note that the ATT on the change in mobility to health center question was not 
significant; there is no significant difference among treated and control areas, in the percentage 
of women that have started going to health centers over the last 3 years.  
Before moving on, we recall the earlier discussion on recall errors; note that we had said that the 
Delta-outcome is of much use when exact covariate matching is not used. However, when we do 
not balance on 2007 levels due to the chances of recall error, the ATT on the current level may 
well be significant due to not balancing. However, the ATT on the Delta-outcome always 
provides a lower bound, and hence provides additional information towards validating impacts. 
An example follows. 
We look at another across algorithm result from indebted households; attending panchayats 
meetings is really not usual among women from impoverished, low caste households. 
Reservation for women has not been of much use either, because the elected representative is 
usually remote controlled by her husband anyways. Women, especially from the program’s focus 
households, have enjoyed abysmally low levels of voice, participation and representation in the 
political process at the grassroots. 
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 However, 5.8-6.5% more women from program areas attend such meetings currently. To 
understand the importance of this impact, note that only 3-3.5% women from control areas 
go to panchayat meetings presently. Due to the possibility of recall errors, balancing was not 
done on pre-impact levels of mobility. Thus we consider the Delta-outcome, the number of 
women who have started going to panchayat meetings over the last 3 years. The ATTs are 
significant (although small) on this outcome; around 1.4-1.7% more respondents from project 
areas have started this practice over the last 3 years. This is where the Delta is of additional 
importance; clearly, it tells us that the program has made women more participatory in the 
political process, and that the estimated effect is still a lower bound. 
We now consider the results from all households, keeping in mind the importance of the Delta-
outcomes. 
2.7-3.5% more women from the project areas go to neighborhood grocery stores in 2010; 
however the ATT is not significant when we consider the change over the last 3 years. 
4.5-6.3% more women from project areas go to health centers in 2010; over the last 3 
years, 2-2.6% more women have been going to this facility from the project areas. The 
significance of the Delta tells us that the program has been able to change mobility patterns when 
it concerns the health of the woman or her child. 
When it comes to visiting a friend or neighbor in the village presently, around 2% more 
women from treated areas have been able to do so; note that the percentage from control 
areas at present dates are at 95%. Over the last 3 years, similar percentages of women from 
the program villages are visiting their neighbors. Thus the program has been able to relax 
restrictions on mobility, even to the woman’s immediate neighborhood for the most ‘strict’ 
households. 
Around 3.3-5% more women from treatment areas are able to go outside their village to 
visit a relative presently. Around 2-3% more women have done that over the last 3 years, 
from program villages. Thus, the program has been able to engender better contacts between a 




The results on attending panchayat meetings presently and attending such meetings over the last 
3 years are consistent and comparable with the results from the indebted households. Once again, 
we recognize that JEEViKA has been able to crack a very low level equilibrium and encouraged 
participants in the program to participate in the political and deliberative process of their 
community.  
No significant differences can be seen on the decision making patterns with respect to daily 
cooking and purchase of personal items, where percentages of women who participate in such 
decisions are high across areas.  
However, around 8-10% more women from JEEViKA villages provide an opinion in the 
purchase of a durable item in 2010; around 2% more women have started doing that over 
the last 3 years. To put this in perspective, 41-43% women from control areas provide their 
opinion on this aspect currently.  
We should expect that due to the close correspondence between the outcomes “Participating in 
decision related to health of self or child” and “Mobility to health center for health purpose”, the 
results should follow similar lines. This is confirmed, as the ATTs are dampened for indebted 
households but get pronounced when we look at all households. 2.8-4.4% more women 
participate in such decisions currently, while 2-2.6% more women have started 
participating in the last 3 years. 
Among indebted households, 10-13% more women from treated villages have an opinion 
when it comes to their children’s education in 2010; however, the Delta is not significant’. 
When we look at all households, 8.5-9.5% more households exhibit such opinions; additionally 
the ATT on the “Del” is significant and implies that 1.5-2% more women started providing such 
opinions over the last 3 years. Putting this in perspective, 68-70% women from control areas 
have any say in their children’s education currently. 
Among indebted households, around 5% more women have a say about what and where the 
primary livelihood should be while 2% more women have started providing this opinion over the 
last 3 years. However, this result is significant only for the radius algorithm for indebted 
households. When it comes to her employment, 5.4-7% more women have a say presently; 
around 1.7-2.5% more women have participated in this decision over the last 3 years.  
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These results are more pronounced and stable when we look at all households together. 5-6.3% 
more women provide a decision about the primary livelihood activity currently; in 2010, 
6.4-7.5% more women participate in decisions regarding their own work. Over the last 3 
years, 1.9-2% and 1.5-2% more women have started to provide an opinion about primary 
livelihoods and self- employment respectively. Once again, we note that around 50% of 
women from control areas participate in either aspect of decision making currently. 
We’d expect that since cheap credit is coming from SHGs via the female member, the woman 
should have a higher say in borrowing decisions. Among indebted households, 18-20% more 
women provide an opinion currently, while 6-7% have started providing an opinion over 
the last 3 years. Results are stable (and more pronounced) when we look at all households. We 
note that currently, only 58% women from control areas provide an opinion in the credit 
needs of the household. 
Lastly, we look at the patterns of decision making when it comes to politics. We recognize that 
having a separate political identity in such families is extremely unusual for women; a cursorily 
look at the profiles of some of the elected candidates from the ‘Hindi Heartland’ is proof enough, 
where irrespective of performance, caste alignments dictate political allegiance. Indeed, from 
control areas, around 19-20% women have any say in the political preference of the 
household. However, in 2010, 8.7-10% more women from JEEViKA areas provide an 
opinion in this aspect of household decision making. Around 2.6-4% more respondents 
have started to participate in this decision over the last 3 years. 
Once again, we see that the program has encouraged the participants to engage with her family 
on increased issues at increased frequencies regarding the dimension of household decision 
making. Such changes have materialized at either high (for example, education/health) or low 
(for example, politics) level equilibriums. 
We now look at the propensity of program participants to engage in problem solving at the 
community level. We look at 4 issues, which relate to some woman being beaten up, some 
problem with the PDS, some problem with the school and some problem with the mukhiya (the 
elected panchayat chief). We ask if the woman would act if she faces such a problem, and if she 
does, who would she approach to take a suitable action. We focus on the percentage that would 
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act by themselves and/or act with other women. Note that we assume that if she does not act, 
then she does not take anybody’s help either. Thus if the woman responds that when confronted 
by given problem, she is unable to act, then the response for who she acts with are coded to 0. 
Essentially, the percentages who act by themselves or with other women are defined over the 
entire sample and not for the subset which says that they are capable of doing something. We 
should note here that 0s on ‘who you would approach/act with’ includes responses like ‘ask my 
husband’, ‘approach mukhiya’ and the responses ‘can’t do anything’. 
Note that the percentages of women who would take some action when faced with such issues at 
end 2007 are used as balancing variables. Thus, although we look at the Delta-outcomes, the use 
of them as a triangulation mechanism for the corresponding variables at current levels is less 
now.  
Among indebted HHs, 6.4-7.8% more women from project villages claimed that they would 
act if a woman is beaten up in her village in 2010; over the last 3 years, 4.2-6.8% more 
respondents have become capable of acting in the last 3 years. Around 5% would act by 
themselves and 13% (which may include some or the entire previous figure) said that they 
would act in sync with other women. Around 73% women from control areas would act 
when some other woman is beaten up in her community; however, only 36-40% of the 
(entire) respondents would act by themselves or in sync with other women. The impacts are 
more pronounced when we consider all households, irrespective of indebtedness status. 
Significant results materialize for indebted HHs only under the kernel algorithms, when we 
consider issues with PDS. Around 5% more women would act presently (and 5% have 
become capable of acting over the last 3 years) when there are issues with the PDS. 6-7% 
more women would work with other women in harnessing this issue. Around 38-40% of 
respondents from control areas would act on this issue, and around 15% would act with 
other women. When we consider all households we get comparable results and statistics on all 
of the above figures. There is no difference in propensities of acting by self in case of PDS 
related issues between treated and control areas, across specification. 
Similar statistics hold true for indebted households when we consider issues with the school in 
the community. 5% more women would act presently and similar percentages have become 
50 
 
capable over the last 3 years. Additionally, 5-6% more women from project areas would 
act with other women to resolve such issues. The results are comparable (somewhat more 
pronounced) when we look at all households. Around 36-40% of women from control areas 
would be capable of acting to resolve this issue. 
Women from indebted treated households are not more likely to act than their counterparts in 
control areas when they have some complaints against the mukhiya; however, the pattern of 
action is different. Around 3.4-4.7% more respondents from indebted households in program 
areas would work with other women to act on mukhiya related issues. 
The result becomes more interesting when we consider all households. Currently, there is no 
significant difference between the percentages of women (between project and non-project 
areas) who would act when some issue with the mukhiya crops up. However, 2.6-3.6% more 
women, under JEEViKA’s ambit, have become capable of dealing with mukhiya related 
issues over the last 3 years. 4.4-4.7% more women from program areas would work with 
other women to resolve mukhiya related issues. 
Once again, we note that this is an impact at a low-level equilibrium; about 26-28% women 
from control areas said that they would be able to do anything when faced with mukhiya 
related issues; only 11% would be able to work with other women to try and address those 
issues.  
To quickly summarize the findings from the previous 3 dimensions; clearly, JEEViKA has 
unambiguously affected empowerment levels of women. We see clear evidence in the mobility 
of the average beneficiary woman, her participation in household decision making and her 
confidence and propensity to engage in Collective action when faced with issues related to the 
community. One avenue of these changes is clearly strengths in numbers; once the SHG 
movement spreads in the village, the woman’s network inside her village keeps expanding 
exponentially. But these numbers progressively relax the social norms of ‘right and wrong’. 
We’ll return to this discussion later, when we summarize the entire paper. The detailed results on 
ATTs, for all households reporting information in women’s modules across the key matching 




Section 4.6: Changes due to JEEViKA- A Summary and Some Questions 
 
The JEEViKA program has brought about some definite changes on a variety of dimensions in 
the lives of the socially and economically marginalized castes in Bihar. It has freed up most of 
the households from high cost debt; beneficiaries have started to take steps towards using credit 
for productive purposes, after retiring expensive loans. The results from different matching 
algorithms and across specifications imply that these trends are robust and stable, as they are 
manifested in different cuts of the data. Additionally, beneficiaries are now practicing regular 
savings. 
However, these trends have perhaps not translated into higher level outcomes to the extent that 
the project may have envisaged. For example, there is strong evidence for higher ownership of 
mobile phones and watches; however, there is mixed and weaker evidence when we consider 
clearly productive assets like cows and buffaloes. Beneficiary households seem to be increasing 
the holding of cows, but reducing the holding of buffaloes. The survey instrument does not 
collect information on leased animals, a quite popular practice in rural Bihar.  
The project seems to have reduced incidences of acute food shortage. Similarly, there are clear 
trends in decreased defecation in open fields. In both cases, the impacts are small in scale, and 
there exists scope of further reduction in food insecurity and unsanitary practices. 
When we consider livelihood practices, we observe some stable trends in two broad activities; 
income generation through salaried employment has declined and beneficiaries have moved 
towards animal husbandry as a primary livelihood option. There is some evidence for shifts 
towards casual labor; given the low land holdings among the target group in rural Bihar, coupled 
with the droughts in 2009 and 2010, these changes indicate that the constraint on changing 
livelihoods has relaxed in program areas to an extent. The instrument cannot say anything 
further, that is, whether such relaxation has led to higher incomes. 
If we look at indicators of social achievements, JEEViKA’s impacts are substantially deeper. 
Women aspire to educate their children more, especially the male child; we can see some 
evidence of those aspirations taking root, as evidenced by higher enrollments of the boy child in 
project areas. The ability to sign one’s own name is definitely higher among beneficiaries; but if 
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the project assumed that this would trigger an automatic interest into higher orders of literacy, 
then the trends show that this is not the case. There is evidence that a higher percentage of 
women from project areas can read numbers, letters and signs, but once again, there exists 
considerable scope in improving these numbers. 
Mobility, decision making and propensities towards collective action can be assumed to be 
definite indicators of women’s empowerment, especially among low caste households of rural 
Bihar. The program has made significant strides towards empowering women along a variety of 
dimensions; the results on increased political participation, an erstwhile no-go area for women, 
are highly encouraging.  
However, it is worthwhile to note the following point; relative to counterfactuals, women from 
JEEViKA SHGs demonstrate significantly higher empowerment, as evidenced by a variety of 
indices. In absolute terms though, there is scope for higher achievements.  Outcomes related to 
political awareness or participation are a clear example of this phenomenon; although women 
from project areas display considerably higher engagement in political decision-making, the 
scope for further changes are immense. On the dimension of participation in decision making, we 
find such phenomenon for every decision which relate to outcomes that are more public in 
nature. Thus, JEEViKA women have significantly higher say in self-employment, primary 
livelihoods, purchase of durables, etc., than control HHs; however, in absolute terms, the 
percentage of women that do participate in such decision making can still improve by a large 
margin.  
Given that this evaluation takes place over a 2-3 year time horizon, a question can be asked of 
the impacts in empowerment; have they run their course? Note that apart from bringing women 
together and then encouraging participants to ‘develop a greater say’, JEEViKA did not have 
tailor made interventions designed to bring about women’s empowerment. But the question still 
remains. Given that these women are bringing in cheap credit to the household and thus relaxing 
the budget constraint, their absolute levels of empowerment (as evidenced by engaging with their 
respective household and community) can be higher. Well-designed interventions to ratchet up 
these ‘empowerment’ outcomes to a high level equilibrium can definitely play a role. But could 
there be anything intrinsic in their environment which is holding them back? After all, 
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engendering empowerment by ameliorating a mitigating factor in the woman’s environment may 
be more cost effective and sustainable than a specific intervention to increase empowerment. 
We note that high absolute levels of empowerment may be in the best interest of the individual, 
but may not be of particular attraction to a household consisted of such highly empowered 
individuals.  Indeed, if the preferences of such individuals are not aligned with each other, the 
household itself may cease to exist. To attain a high level equilibrium, the household needs to 
continuously align the individual preferences, while relaxing constraints on budgets and 
empowerment. If relaxing one constraint acts as catalysis for relaxing the other constraint, then 
we should have a self-sustaining path to higher equilibriums; however, if an unrecognized 
‘intrinsic’ factor(s) mitigates, or even reverses this catalysis, projects are back to designing costly 
interventions which would not attain their potential outcomes. 
In the next chapter, we turn to models of household bargaining in an attempt to understand the 
presence of such factors and the rationale behind them. We look closely at contributions from 
other scientists in the literature of household bargaining; however, we lay a special focus on the 
literature of the Collective Household, since the alternate theory that we propose later borrows 
heavily from the Collective school of thought.  
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Chapter 5: A Review of Household Bargaining and the Collective Hypothesis 
 
Samuelson’s seminal work on Consumer Theory to understand the behavior of the 
‘Representative Individual’ was extended to modeling household behavior. The implicit 
assumption was that agents in such households could be seamlessly modeled as 
a) Having identical preferences, and hence represented by the ‘Representative Individual’. 
OR 
b) Were captained by a benevolent dictator, whose preferences were a weighted aggregate 
of the preferences of all agents in the household. 
Such an approach was known as the ‘Unitary Hypothesis’. Assuming away heterogeneity in 
individual preferences inside the Unitary Household provided computational and theoretical 
simplicity in predicting household behavior and designing policies. A key implication of the 
Unitary Household was that incomes of all agents were pooled prior to consumption decisions. 
This means that only total income mattered for demands; the identity of the income earner had 
absolutely nothing to do with consumption.  
In the last years of the 20
th
 century, this implication came under increased scrutiny. A multitude 
of programs with diverse themes as micro-finance, livelihood assistance and conditional cash 
transfers were designed to exploit the heterogeneous preferences in the household; the policy aim 
was to identify the bottleneck to a particular development agenda(s), and place resources in the 
hands of the individual(s) who care most about such agenda(s). Obviously, such programs are 
meaningless if the Unitary Hypothesis of household behavior is correct.  
Lundberg et al (1997) found evidence that household resources were diverted towards women’s 
and children’s clothing in response to a policy of reallocating child allowances towards mothers 
in the UK in the late 1970s. Thomas and Chen (1994) found evidence from Taiwan that demand 
for some goods were affected by the identity of the income earner, and the quantity of income 
earned by that earner. Browning et al (1994) and Bourguignon et al (1993) found similar 
behavior among couples in French and Canadian datasets respectively. Fortin and Lacroix (1997) 
studied the labor supply behavior of Canadian couples and found evidence against income 
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pooling. Apart from such (and more) examples of scientific findings, the success of programs 
like PROGRESA, BRAC, SEWA, etc. indicate that assuming away individual heterogeneity in 
household decision making may be too simplistic an assumption. 
Scientists proposed various bargaining structures which would account for individual 
heterogeneity and predict a household equilibrium. Manser and Brown (1980) developed Pareto 
Efficient Cooperative Equilibriums (in a 2-person household) based on Nash and Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions. McElroy and Horney (1981) focused solely on the Nash 
bargaining solution to derive off-equilibrium (comparative statics) behavior of bargaining 
households and derive conditions for such a household to follow the Unitary Hypothesis. Such 
research usually proposed that the benchmark for bargaining be the welfare levels at divorce. 
However, Lundberg and Pollack (1993) argued that it would be unrealistic to suppose that agents 
threat each other with divorce while deciding on the allocation of usual HH goods. They 
proposed that the appropriate fall back positions should be the welfare that each would receive 
when they stay as a family but do not cooperate; maximization is done as if they are separate 
entities inside the HH. Naturally, such solutions were not Pareto Optimal since welfare 
improving trades in consumption allocations were not possible. 
A common theme among all these studies was the effect of extra-environmental parameters or 
distribution factors. Several studies pointed out that these parameters contributed to the welfare 
level of the individual if he or she pulled out of the household. These parameters did not affect 
demands through individual preferences, either as choice variables or taste shifters; nor could 
their effects be justified as the usual income or price effects on individual demands (while they 
were part of the household) via the indirect utility functions. The literature justified the effects of 
such parameters by arguing that variation in these factors recalibrated the bargaining weights on 
each individual; this recalibration affected individual demands, thus finally affecting household 
demand.  
The empirical evidence for each model has been mixed. In case the empirical implications were 
rejected, it was not clear if the reason was a misspecification of the bargaining process or 
whether bargaining itself was non-existent. Additionally, the assumption of Pareto suboptimal 
consumption decisions seems untenable, especially in the backdrop of a long-term institution like 
marriage. A parallel strand of literature, regarded as the Collective Household Hypothesis was 
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proposed and developed by a host of economists in the following years. In this model of 
bargaining, the only assumption made was that resources inside the HH are allocated Pareto 
optimally; given the total resources available, an agent cannot improve his own lot without 
lowering the welfare of others inside the HH. This assumption is realistic; it is conceivable that 
in a long term institution like family, Pareto optimal outcomes can be reached due to information 
symmetry. The elegance of the model lies in the fact that despite this minimal assumption, 
falsifiable empirical tests were derived. 
The literature on collective bargaining has 3 principal strands. Perhaps the most rigorous strand 
uses price variation on commodities to untie the properties of household demand functions. 
Browning and Chiappori (1998) showed that demand functions of collective households should 
satisfy a special case of the Slutsky Matrix; responses to prices form a symmetric negative semi-
definite matrix plus a matrix of at most rank 1. They examine panel data from Canadian 
households and find that the implications of unitary model were rejected for multi-agent 
households. As might be obvious, exploiting price variation on commodities requires multiple 
rounds; exploiting wage differentials, where the commodity in demand and under study is leisure 
(or labor supply), provided an opportunity to use cross-sectional data to test the competing 
implications of unitary and collective hypotheses.  
Chiappori (1992) proposed preference structures under which the household behaves as if it first 
allocates non-labor income among members, after which labor supply and consumption 
decisions are made individually. Blundell et al (2005) use a rich, multi-round dataset from the 
UK and exploit the fact that hours of labor supply do not vary too much among males, although 
there is significant variation among women. They go on to show that although the implications 
of unitary model are rejected, those of the collective are not. Chiappori et al (2002) identify the 
‘sharing rule’, which is essentially the allocation of non-labor income and show that sex ratios 
and divorce laws affect this sharing rule. Such parameters have no apparent role in a unitary 
setting (since they do not affect budget constraints and preferences); however, they play a role in 
collective households as shifters of bargaining weights. Donni and Moreau (2003) use PSID data 
to condition female labor supply on the food consumption of the household to unpack estimates 
of the sharing rule without using distribution factors. Donni and Moreau (2007) carry out a 
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similar analysis on French data with similar non-rejection of the collective model and estimates 
of the sharing rule.  
However, this strand relies on a key assumption; all hours over and above labor hours are for 
leisure and are not used for any domestic production. Even if such an argument could be made, 
the estimation of the sharing rule requires that individual leisure has no public component; that is 
spousal leisure does not affect the welfare of the individual. In an attempt to bypass these 
objections, and to satisfy the key requirements to unpack the sharing rule, scientists have 
attempted to explain the demand for assignable goods in a collective setting. Assignable goods 
are consumed individually, and the individual consumption levels could be observed. To 
estimate the sharing rule the benefit of consuming such assignable goods can accrue only to the 
relevant individual. Expenses on male and female clothing in 1 and 2 person households have 
been used as prime candidates. Browning et al (1993) and Bourguignon et al (1994) use these 
insights on Canadian and French data and decisively reject the unitary model for 2 person 
households, but could not reject the same implications for 1 person households. Indeed, the 
effects of individual non-labor income on clothing demands (where total expenditure was 
controlled for) led to the rejection of the unitary hypothesis.  
The 3
rd
 strand of the literature on Collective Bargaining focuses on precisely such effects; in the 
above examples, only salaried agents were considered (to bypass the endogeneity of labor 
supply). The effect of individual incomes (once the effect of total income is accounted for) is the 
effect of individual resources on realigning the bargaining weights. Such distribution factors 
clearly identify collective behavior and have the additional benefit of identifying factors 
favorable towards the male (female) by realigning the bargaining weights towards him (her). 
Thomas and Chen (1994) use these thoughts to reject the unitary hypothesis for Taiwanese 
households. Thomas et al (2002) use marital practices of bringing in and retaining control over 
assets brought into the household during marriages in Indonesia to show that health outcomes 
improve as the asset levels brought in (and controlled by) women increase. The 3 strands of the 
literature are nicely summarized in Vermeulen (2002) and Bourguignon et al (2009).  
A common broad feature of all these strands is that the empirical implications of collective 
bargaining usually concern consumption decisions, including leisure. Indeed, labor supply (and 
thus leisure) is always considered an outcome of the bargaining process and not a determinant. 
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The implicit assumption (indeed, a restriction) is that the bargaining weights are not influenced 
by outcomes at all; the effect of distribution factors on the bargaining weights are entirely 
exogenous to the household’s choices. It would probably not be a naïve supposition that choices 
made by individuals in the household could influence bargaining power; after all, that should be 
the crux of bargaining. Before we move onto a discussion along such lines, we consider some of 
the literature which did not confirm to the predictions of the collective model. 
Udry (1996) finds that women controlled agricultural plots in Burkina Faso suffer from a sub-
optimal allocation of resources compared to plots controlled by men in the same household. 
Strictly speaking, the Collective Hypothesis posits that consumption allocations are Pareto 
Efficient, while Udry’s findings point to inefficiencies in production. However, it is clear that 
such sub-optimal production practices constrain the Utility Possibility Frontier during 
consumption; even though Pareto Efficient allocations could be made on a lower Utility 
Possibility Frontier, such allocations are clearly sub-optimal to those that could have resulted due 
to a more efficient allocation of production inputs. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) find that 
impoverished Southern Ethiopian households do not pool health risks (where health is the 
commodity in demand). Indeed, as the levels of landholding in such households go up, the 
nutritional allocation towards the wife increases; the confounding fact is that in such households, 
the land is usually held by the husband. The authors argue that as poverty levels increase, sub 
optimal allocations are made towards the woman as a result of gender and productivity bias, thus 
violating Pareto Efficiency.  
Consider the following anecdotal evidence from Agarwal (1997). She talks about the experiences 
of women in Bangladesh who have been engaged in co-operative activities by BRAC bank. 
Women who participated in the BRAC’s initiatives faced severe restrictions on their mobility 
under the ambit of ‘Purdah’ (Curtain), which was institutionalized by the religious head of the 
village under pressure from the village elders. However, Purdah restrictions were relaxed for the 
women in the same village who had not joined the BRAC co-operative. This suggests a carrot-
and-stick policy towards women who were engaging in income generating activities; engaging in 
cooperatives and forming networks inside their village would tighten their mobility, while non-
participation would be rewarded by a relaxation of the moral norms for women. Evidently, 
joining a cooperative allows unemployed women to participate in income generating activities, 
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which should raise her say over household decisions. However, it would increase the income 
flow to the family. The fact that men get together to prevent this from happening seems to be 
irrational behavior on their part, but it would seem that they are motivated by a loss in bargaining 
power to take such a step.  
Lancaster et al (2006) extend the Collective Hypothesis in an interesting direction; they allow the 
bargaining weights to be a function of outcomes, and find a high correlation between bargaining 
weights and aggregate household expenditure. The authors propose that the movement of these 
weights is decidedly non-linear and hence an even distribution of bargaining weights is more 
beneficial to the welfare of the household, compared to a skewed distribution (even towards the 
woman). Basu (2006) introduces a game-theoretic framework to argue that in a dynamic setting 
of collective bargaining, bargaining weights in any period are a function of resource allocations 
in the previous period. He goes on to show that a sub-game perfect equilibrium, characterized by 
inefficiencies in consumptions are possible under this setting. Basu shows, via an example, that 
if the husband knows that allowing his wife to work now will shift all the decision making power 
to her in the next period, he finds it optimal to forego the additional income from her labor wage, 
and just keep her at home. Although this argument was made through an example, it showed that 
strategies by one agent to subvert income of the other are rational under some circumstances. 
Given these thoughts and findings, several questions emerge; does Pareto Efficiency in 
consumption preclude inefficiencies in other domains, especially production? If not, how 
probable are such situations? Should they be exceptions, or can we expect them? And what role 
does bargaining play in such scenarios?  
In the next section, we revisit the Collective Hypothesis, starting from its very fundamentals. We 
then look at the implications of the Collective Hypothesis in a situation of little price variation, 
fixed labor supply, and multiple distribution factors.  
Section 5.1: Empirical Implications of the Collective Hypothesis 
 
As mentioned before, the only maintained assumption in this setting is that resource allocations 
are done in a Pareto efficient manner. Individuals have well defined preferences, which are not 
necessarily the same. The vector of distribution factors (Z) plays a key role in this model as the 
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determinants of bargaining power. It is important to note that usual determinants of demands like 
income, prices, and taste shifters (X) can and will act as distribution factors too; however, 
empirically the issue would be to isolate their distributional impacts from the usual effects. For 
example, age and education of each partner can affect their demands as taste shifters. But the 
differences in their demands, given aggregate HH demand, can still be a function of age and 
education which is precisely the distributional impacts of the above mentioned variables. 
Whether we can untie these separate impacts is an empirical question.  
With these insights, the optimization program for the Collective household (Chiappori, 1992; 
Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Vermeulen, 2002) can be written as 
][);,,()],,(1[);,,(),,( 321321 qpYXqqqUZYpXqqqUZYpL BA    (1) 
Where A and B are the individuals in the HH, goods q1and q2 reflect private consumption of A 
and B, and q3 denotes public good consumption. Allowance is made for the fact that the agent 
can derive utility from partner’s consumption; thusqjis a determinant of Ui.The price vector of 
the goods is given by p´. 
Y is the aggregate income for the HH, and it can be made of a combination of individual labor 
and non-labor incomes. WLOG, let  
NLBA YYYY           (2) 
YI is the income earned by member I, and YNL is non-labor income. Thus, λ is the standard 
multiplier on the budget constraint.  
A fair point here is the identity of the agent performing the above optimization; in the Collective 
setting, this agent is a constructed individual whose preferences are a weighted transformation of 
the preferences of the actual individuals, A and B. The weights depend on θ, which is the 
variable of paramount importance here; it reflects the bargaining power of each agent and is 
bound between 0 and 1. To make ideas clear, if θ = 1, the HH welfare function can be replaced 
exactly by agent A’s preferences. If θ = 0, then B’s preferences are reflected by the HH. For 
intermediate values of θ, the HH welfare function recognizes the unique preferences of each 
individual. The key point is that if θ is a constant, then we are back to the world of unitary 
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households; this is the case where the dictator is a weighted aggregation of individual 
preferences.  
The Collective model recognizes bargaining by proposing that θ be a function of prices, income 
plus a vector of distribution factors, Z, which play a prime role in the working of this framework. 
This dependence allows bargaining powers of constituent individuals to realign as external 
factors change. 
Empirically, this variation in bargaining power allows us to test for the Collective model against 
the competing unitary model. Note that θ is never observed in any dataset; however, if external 
factors have a distributional effect on HH demands (via bargaining power) and that effect could 
be observed, then that is an empirical proof for the Collective hypothesis. In the unitary model, 
distribution factors have no role to play.  
Thus in the Collective model, the demand for good i can be written as, 
));,,(,,( XZYpYpfq ii           (3) 
X is a vector of control variables which affect demands (education, age, occupation, etc), and Z 
is the vector of distribution factors. Note that there might be an overlap between Z and X.   
Since distribution factors affect demands only through the scalar θ, a test can be framed by 
taking the ratios of the responses of demands with respect to a unit change in any distribution 
factor(Vermeulen, 2002, Bourguignon et al, 2009). Thus for any pair of goods 1 and 2 and 
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That is, for any pair of goods, the ratio of the change in the demands due to a change in any 
distribution factor is invariant with respect to any distribution factors.  
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Another test can be framed by using conditional demands. Distribution factors play no role in the 
decision making process other than realigning the bargaining power, which itself is a scalar otput 
as a function of exogenous parameters. Thus, when the demand for, say, good 1 is conditioned 
on the demand for good 2, all the information contained in the distribution factors is already 
present in good 2 (Bourguignon et al, 2009). Hence, the conditioned demand for good 1 is 
independent of distribution factors. The following steps show the logic. 
The demand for good 2 is expressed along usual lines as, 
));,,(,,(22 XZYpYpfq    
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This implies that the response of conditioned demand of good 1 to a change in any distribution 















          (6) 
Thus the relationships given by the Proportionality (4) and Conditional Demand (6) tests provide 
testable implications for the Collective Hypothesis. Before concluding this section and moving 
onto the empirical evidence, we note here (once again) that the optimizing agent in the Collective 
model is a weighted representative of the partners, and not any individual. More importantly, 
bargaining weights are determined as an exogenous function of external parameters, and is 
independent of actions taken by individuals in the HH.  
In the next chapter, we examine cross-sectional data from the IHDS survey of 2004-05 to 
examine if the implications of the Collective Hypothesis are validated by the data. We note that 
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the empirical literature exploits equations (4) and (6) on cross sectional datasets to (dis) prove 





















Chapter 6: Evidence for or against the Collective Hypothesis 
 
The Indian Human Development Survey: The data for the present analysis is a sub-sample of 
the Indian Household Development Survey (IHDS) undertaken from late 2004-2005. The IHDS 
is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554 households in 1503 villages and 971 
urban neighborhoods across India (www.ihds.umd.edu). Two one-hour interviews in each 
household covered health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility, gender 
relations, and social capital. Children aged 8-11 completed short reading, writing and arithmetic 
tests. There are 3 broad modules in the dataset. In Module 1, a responsible adult, usually the 
head, answers questions about demographics, income, consumption, community level 
institutions, etc. In Module 2, another responsible adult, usually the spouse of the head provides 
information on current students, marital practices, health, etc. In Module 3, an eligible woman 
(where eligibility is defined by an ever married woman between the ages of 15-49) answers 
questions on gender relations, fertility outcomes, and beliefs about health.  
The sub sample used in this analysis consists of nuclear families; irrespective of the number of 
minors, a nuclear family can have at most 2 adults older than 21 years of age. This is done to 
minimize any effect of a 3
rd
 adult income earner might have on HH bargaining. It is necessary to 
control for the simultaneity of leisure choice when considering demands. Thus the dataset 
consists of adults who are either unemployed or employed in salaried jobs, where work hours are 
pre-determined by the contract. Moreover, although the agents in the framework may not be 
husband-wife, the agenda of this paper is to discuss this framework in the backdrop of spousal 
bargaining. Thus we only consider nuclear HHs where the two adults are married to each other. 
Additionally, we drop those households where the income source is purely non-labor; usually 
such households are dependent on remittances and pension and are hence not of interest to the 
topic at hand. According to work status, the sample of 3371 HHs can be divided into: 
1) Head is employed while spouse is unemployed- 3020 HH 
2) Head is unemployed while spouse is employed- 41 HH 
3) Both Head and Spouse are employed-  310 HH 
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Section 6.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
Given the cross-sectional dataset and the sample at hand, we closely follow the empirical 
strategies adopted by Bourguignon et al (1993), Thomas and Chen (1994) and Browning et al 
(1994). These papers consider the effect of distribution factors on household demands by looking 
at French, Taiwanese and Canadian family expenditure data respectively. To avoid the problems 
of endogeneity of labor supply with the choice of consumption goods, these studies consider 
households where the income flow is either through salaried jobs or non-labor income, or a mix 
of both. We examine if and how distribution factors affect household demands and observe if the 
effects confirm to equations (4) and (6), as proposed by the Collective Hypothesis. The 
consumption shares which are studied under the present analysis are as follows: 
1) Share of Staple consumption, where staple items consist of rice, wheat, other cereals and 
pulses. The motivation behind this categorization is that the above 4 items are the most 
basic and cheapest items to meet the nutritional needs of an individual.  
2) Share of Other Food Consumption, where every other food item is included (apart from 
meals taken outside the HH). 
3) Share of HH Public Goods, where the items consist of goods which have a distinct public 
nature of consumption, including rental payments, consumer taxes, telephone bills, house 
repair bills, furniture, crockery, etc. 
4) Share of Private goods, where the items consist of goods which are essentially private in 
nature. However, we observe expenditures only at the HH level, and thus it is impossible 
to isolate individual expenses. This share of made up of expenses on toiletries, personal 
care goods, other personal items, and personal transport equipment. I also include 
conveyance expenses into this share.  
5) Share of Fuel expenses, which consist of expenses on kerosene, electricity, lighting, etc.  
6) Share of Clothing, which includes expenses on Clothing, bedding and footwear. 
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All shares are expressed as ratio of spending on that group to the total expenditure. Note that this 
dataset contains price information only on food items, including staples. Of course, price 
information is implicitly included as we use expenditures on each item to construct shares. 
However information on Price indices from a separate report on CPI levels in India in 2005 is 
used in this study. These are Indices on the 5 broad categories of food, fuel, clothing, tobacco, 
alcohol and Miscellaneous items, which vary by states and whether the HH is urban or rural. The 
reason for including prices in a cross section analysis where we estimate, at most, Engel curves 
will become clear later. There are other goods which we do not include in the present analysis, 
since a substantial proportion of the households do not exhibit demands for such goods. Note that 
since expenditures are collected for these goods for the past one year (like jewellery, health, 
education, etc.), such zero demands are not due to infrequency of purchases; rather, they are 
corner solutions.  
As pure distribution factors, we include 3 variables which come out of Module 2 from the 
section of marital practices. The first variable is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the HH 
belongs to a community which allows the daughter to be married into her natal village. Note that 
although the sample consists of predominantly urban households, this variable is evenly 
distributed since this question is about a community practice. The other two distribution factors 
that we use are the logged average expenditures incurred by the bride and the groom’s families 
during marriage. Note that this again is a community level variable as the question is how much 
do families of ‘your community’ usually spend during the wedding. Now it can be easily argued 
that the more the bride’s family spent during the wedding, the better was the bargaining of the 
groom’s family in determining the total outlay for the wedding. It should be noted that although 
we recognize that these expenditure levels may reflect bargaining outcomes, we implicitly 
assume that they are pre-determined to the current demand system, and hence can be safely 
included as regressors.  
To model the unconditional demand system, we include as regressors the number of children in 
various age groups, variables controlling for Urban/Rural region of residence, religion, castes, 
and states. We also include the logged age and education levels of the head and the spouse, and 
of course, the distribution factors. We also include the 5 price indices from the CPI data. We also 
include the log of the total expenditure incurred by the HH in the last year.  
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Immediately we have a problem regarding the correlation of the variable total expenditure with 
the error term. Since total expenses are made up of individual shares, any unobserved effect on 
any expenditure share will affect total expenses by precisely the same amount. To account for 
this link, we instrument total expenses by the level of HH assets, which is simply the sum of 30 
dummy variables which each take the value of 1 if the asset in question is possessed by the HH. 
The intuition behind this is borrowed from the Permanent Income Hypothesis, where long run 
wealth, as captured by level of HH assets is correlated with current wealth, which is captured by 
the income levels. However, current consumption should be financed out of current income, if 
we assume away income shocks. Since we consider either salaried or retired Households, the 
chances of an income shock are minimized, since even retired Households should have built up 
assets such that their non-labor income is sufficient to cover their current expenditures. Of 
course, a big ticket purchase like a car can have a direct impact through HH assets, but we are 
modeling expenditures on goods which by themselves are not a huge proportion of total 
expenditures. However, there are a couple of natural instruments that we can use; the log of total 
income. The hypothesis is that total income can have an impact on each share only through the 
budget constraint as an income effect. This effect should be captured by the instrumented value 
of logged annual total expenditure. Any secondary effect of income on each share has to be due 
to a distribution factor effect; but to capture this we will use the individual incomes as regressors 
in demand equations. Thus total income is a natural instrument for total expenditure. The last 
instrument that we use is the general CPI, varying across states and region of residence. It should 
have an impact in the 2
nd
 stage due to substitution effects between goods, but that will be 
addressed by the presence of the 5 group wise price indices in each 2
nd
 stage.  
There is another reason to exclude total incomes from each share. Since, individual incomes add 
up to total income (along with non-labor income), putting the latter into the 2
nd
 stage will 
underestimate the distributional effects of individual incomes. To get an idea about this 
underestimation, we run two alternate specifications on the demand system. In the 1
st
 
specification, we use total income in both stages and instrument total expenditure on assets and 
the general CPI only. In the 2
nd
 specification, total income is excluded from the 2
nd
 stage. If total 
income does soak up distributional impacts in the 2
nd
 stage (probable, since a large proportion of 
observations have one income earner in the HH), coefficients on individual incomes should 
attenuate towards 0.  
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However, this raises a statistical issue. Excluding the log of total income from the 2
nd
 stage 
makes the over identification tests fail (for Fuel share), since if the components of income are 
significant, the aggregate will be significant by default. This creates a problem during the over-id 
tests for each share; if they reject, one would not know when they were rejected just due to the 
effect of total incomes or if the excluded instruments, say HH assets enter the 2
nd
 stage. For this 
reason, we run all the individual shares by including HH assets in the 2
nd
 stage, excluding total 
incomes and general CPI.  
To sum up the discussion on the estimation strategy for unconditional demands, we run 3 broad 
specifications: 
Spec 6a) Excluded instruments from demand equation: Total Income and General CPI; HH 
assets included in the demand equation. This is to check whether HH assets can be properly 
excluded. 
Spec 6b) Excluded instruments from demand equation: HH Assets and General CPI; Total 
Income is included in the demand equation. This is to check the extent to which Total 
Income soaks up the distributional impacts. 
Spec 6c) Excluded instruments from demand equation: HH Assets, General CPI and Total 
Income. If Total Income does soak up distributional effects in spec 6b (due to low variation 
of multiple income earners in the sample), excluding it from demand equation should allow 
individual incomes to regain significance. If coefficients on other variables stay stable 
(especially that on total expenditure), then including or excluding total income does not cause 
a difference in information, apart from soaking up distributional impacts; in such a case, 
specification 6c could be used to test the implication from the proportionality test.  
In case of the proportionality test note that if individual coefficients are imprecisely estimated, 
equality may well be trivial. An insignificant coefficient will have a large interval around it; 
taking a ratio with another insignificant coefficient will just inflate the bounds on the ratio even 
more. And when the coefficients are small in magnitude, equality of ratios may just be a 




The unconditional demand system in specifications 6a-6c is estimated by robust 2-stage least 
squares. However, to perform the proportionality tests, we run absolutely the same specification 
in 6c, but the estimation is done via a 3 stage least squares system, so that across equation tests 
can be performed.  
To carry out the conditional demand approach, we use the share of expenses on Staples as the 
conditioning good. There are several reasons to use Staples on the right hand side. 
Theoretically it makes sense to use a good on the right hand side, if its consumption is pre-
determined or rationed somehow. Staples are the most necessary good that a HH can consume, 
but once the necessary level is met, staple demand does not rise with income. In fact, a cursory 
glance at the results from the unconditional demand regressions shows that Engel’s law holds for 
staple items; the coefficient on Log Total Expenditure is negative. This makes Staple goods an 
ideal candidate for use as a conditioning good. Note that the bargaining model does not put any 
restriction on the good that should be used for conditioning. The above discussion just motivates 
the use of staples as a natural candidate. However, we do need to account for the fact that if there 
is absolutely no bargaining over staple goods, then a rejection of the exclusion test of distribution 
factors may well be due to the fact that staple demand does not have any information on 
bargaining. In other words, if distribution factors do not affect staple consumption, then 
including staples as a regressor will contain no information on distribution effects. Examining 
the unconditional demand for staples should tell us if distribution factors play a role in the 
determination of the demand. Recall we have 3 pure distribution factors and the two individual 
incomes to capture the distributional effect of money.  
If such regressors are significant, we should instrument for Staple before we put it on the right 
hand side. Thus each individual demand would have two endogenous variables; total expenditure 
and demand for staples. We have a natural instrument for the Share of Staples; the price vector 
on staple goods. Prices can have only two effects (according to standard theory); the Income 
effect, which will be controlled for by the inclusion of prices in the equation estimating total 
expenditure. The Substitution effect will be captured by the instrumented value of Staples on the 
right hand side of each conditional demand equation. The Collective Model does predict a 
3
rd
effect of prices; that as a distribution factor which acts through θ. But since we are using 
conditional demands, that effect should again be captured by the coefficient on Staples.  
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However, the risk with two endogenous variables in one equation is that if the excluded 
regressors do not have a significant projection on the instrumented variables, coefficients in the 
2
nd
 stage are meaningless. We use Shea’s partial R squared measures to understand if excluding 
the price of staple goods is a sufficient strategy for instrumentation. Note that the exclusion 
restriction proposed by the Collective model implies that distribution factors can be safely 
excluded from the 2
nd
 stage, which is the equation for conditioned demands. We exclude female 
income and examine if a) Statistics on over-identification tests suggest that excluded instruments 
should have been included and b) Coefficients on included distribution factors are significant. 
The set of excluded instruments for the conditional demand system are then 
Spec 6d) Logged General CPI, HH Assets, logged total income and price vector of staple 
goods. If the Shea’s R-Squared statistics indicate insufficient explanatory power, we use the 
specification b; the excluded instruments are 
Spec 6e) Logged General CPI, HH Assets, logged total income, female income and price 
vector of staple goods. 
Section 6.2: Results 
 
Prior to looking at the first series of results on the proportionality tests, we need to first check for 
the diagnostics which indicate the validity of the IV regression. Recall that we used 3 
specifications to test for the exclusion restrictions on total income and household assets. In the 
following paragraphs, we try to understand the validity of the excluded instruments and the 
effect of each specification on the coefficients of the distribution factors. After all, the present 
exercise is not to provide an unbiased estimate of the instrumented variable, total expenditure; 
we are examining for the robustness in the estimates of distribution factors before various tests 
are performed.  
Specification 6a shows that when total income and the general CPI are excluded, HH assets is 
significant at the 95% level only for the demand for private goods (OthHHGoods). Moreover, the 
over-identification tests do not rule out the exclusion restrictions at 95% level for any goods (and 
rules out exclusion at 90% level only for Fuel demand).  
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In Specification 6b, Total Income is included while excluded instrument are the General CPI and 
HH assets. The exclusion restriction fails at the 95% significance level only for Fuel demand. 
Total Income is significant only for the demand of private goods; note that this is the same good 
which had a significant coefficient on HH assets in Spec 6a, pointing to the possibility that the 
demand of private goods is contingent on longer run wealth levels.  
Turning our attention to the coefficients on the distribution factors (Head and Spouse Income, 
Average expenses during marriage by bride and groom’s families and lastly, whether intra-
village marriage is allowed) we notice a negligible change in the estimates across specifications 
6a and 6b, even for significant estimates. 
We look at the results from Spec 6c, where Total Income, HH assets and general CPI are all 
excluded instruments from all demands. The exclusion restrictions fail at 95% significance for 
private goods; head income becomes weakly significant (at 90%) for private goods, suggesting 
that is soaks up some of the long run wealth effect (in the absence of total income and HH assets) 
in the demand for private goods. However, all other distribution factors do not exhibit much 
variation in their coefficients, given the demand equation across all 3 specifications.  
A key question is which specification to use for the tests; we use spec 6c, since theoretically, we 
are looking at demands which should not be contingent too heavily on long run wealth levels. 
Moreover, spec 6c offers us the best statistics for the first stage, that is, the excluded instruments 
contribute significantly towards explaining the total consumption equation.  Indeed, the F-stat 
and partial R-squared for 6b and 6c are given by: 
Spec 6b) 98.54 and 0.0885 
Spec 6c) 92.26 and 0.1291 respectively 
Thus, we use spec 6c to conduct the proportionality tests. Note that to perform cross equation 
tests we rerun spec 6c on a 3sls system before STATA is able to perform the required tests. We 
have noted that the proportionality tests are strong only if the distribution factors are significant 
in their contributions towards explaining the pair of demands under examination. Otherwise, 
products of insignificant coefficients would be equal by default. In the following page, we first 
look at the unconditional demand system (Specs 6a, 6b and 6c) to look at significance of the 3 
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‘proposed’ distribution factors in each demand; the expenditures undertaken by the bride and 
groom’s family and the dummy (MP1) to indicate if intra village marriage is allowed.  
Table 6.1 Dependence of Unconditional Demands on Distribution Factors 
SPEC 6a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ShareStaple ShareOthFood ShareFuel ShareHHPub ShareOthHHGoods ShareClothing 
       
MP1 -0.00307 0.00210 -0.00333 0.0107*** -0.000622 -0.00191 
 (0.00225) (0.00400) (0.00221) (0.00402) (0.00160) (0.00144) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp 0.000809 -0.00331 -0.00726*** -0.00654** 0.00426*** -0.000465 
 (0.00167) (0.00344) (0.00187) (0.00324) (0.00150) (0.00105) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00169 -0.00550 0.00249 0.00625* -0.00313** -0.00172 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ShareStaple ShareOthFood ShareFuel ShareHHPub ShareOthHHGoods ShareClothing 
       
MP1 -0.00328 0.00136 -0.00344 0.0107*** -6.00e-05 -0.00199 
 (0.00228) (0.00377) (0.00219) (0.00401) (0.00165) (0.00144) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp 0.00115 -0.00195 -0.00706*** -0.00651** 0.00317** -0.000302 
 (0.00167) (0.00321) (0.00183) (0.00325) (0.00151) (0.00101) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00218 -0.00347 0.00278 0.00631* -0.00476*** -0.00148 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ShareStaple ShareOthFood ShareFuel ShareHHPub ShareOthHHGoods ShareClothing 
       
MP1 -0.00329 0.00145 -0.00344 0.0107*** -0.000189 -0.00197 
 (0.00229) (0.00379) (0.00218) (0.00401) (0.00161) (0.00144) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp 0.00118 -0.00221 -0.00707*** -0.00664** 0.00351** -0.000363 
 (0.00167) (0.00322) (0.00182) (0.00322) (0.00148) (0.00101) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00222 -0.00388 0.00277 0.00610* -0.00423*** -0.00158 
 (0.00193) (0.00331) (0.00198) (0.00333) (0.00142) (0.00116) 
 
It can be observed that across specifications, there is no gain/loss in significance of any 
distribution factor for a given demand. Thus, we consider Spec 6c to perform the tests. We 
consider only those pairs of distribution factors and pairs of demands such that at least one 
distribution factor is significant in at least one demand equation. The null hypothesis is that given 
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a pair of demands A and B, and a pair of distribution factors C and D, under the Collective 
model C(demand A)*D(demand B) = C(demand B)*D(demand A). The p-values are tabulated 
below. 
 MP1 (Fuel)*Groom Expense (Public Goods) = MP1 (Public Goods)*Groom Expense 
(Fuel): 0.0128 
 MP1 (Fuel)*Bride Expense (Public Goods) = MP1 (Public Goods)*Bride Expense 
(Fuel): 0.0829 
 Groom Expense (Fuel)*Bride Expense (Public Goods) = Groom Expense (Public 
Goods)*Bride Expense (Fuel): 0.3285 
 MP1 (Public Goods)*Groom Expense (Private Goods) = MP1 (Private Goods)*Groom 
Expense (Public Goods): 0.1240 
 MP1 (Public Goods)*Bride Expense (Private Goods) = MP1 (Private Goods)*Bride 
Expense (Public Goods): 0.0840 
 Groom Expense (Private Goods)*Bride Expense (Public Goods) = Groom Expense 
(Public Goods)*Bride Expense (Private Goods): 0.6014 
 MP1 (Fuel)*Groom Expense (Private Goods) = MP1 (Private Goods)*Groom Expense 
(Fuel): 0.3842 
 MP1 (Fuel)*Bride Expense (Public Goods) = MP1 (Public Goods)*Bride Expense 
(Fuel): 0.1761 
 Groom Expense (Fuel)*Bride Expense (Public Goods) = Groom Expense (Public 
Goods)*Bride Expense (Fuel): 0.0729 
The equality of proportions is rejected at the 90% level of significance 4 combinations of 
demands and distribution factors, with one rejection at the 95% level. The full set of coefficients 
on the estimated demands given above is provided in the appendix. We note that the evidence for 
or against the Collective model is mixed from the proportionality tests.  
Exclusion of the effects of Distribution Factors from Conditional Demands 
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In Spec 6d, we condition every demand on the demand for staple; thus, there are two endogenous 
variables in each demand equation, staples and total expenses. The excluded instruments in this 
specification are the same as in spec 6c; additionally the prices of staple goods (rice, wheat, other 
cereals and pulses) are excluded in spec 6d. If prices enter through a unique exogenously 
determined index (bargaining power), they should not have any explanatory power in the 
conditioned demand. Moreover, included distribution factors should have no contribution in 
explaining conditioned demands. 
We notice that the over identification tests suggest failure of excluded instruments in the demand 
for fuel and private goods at the 95% level of significance. More importantly, distribution factors 
(individual incomes, marital expenses, custom of intra village marriage) still possess significant 
explanatory power in the conditioned demands.  The first stage statistics for Shea’s Partial R-
Squared are 0.0385 and 0.0667 for the instrumented variables Staples and Total Expenditure 
respectively.  
In Spec 6e, we additionally exclude a distribution factor from the conditioned demand system; 
income of spouse. The Collective Hypothesis proposes that such exclusion is valid, since 
distribution factors have no role whatsoever in conditioned demands. We notice that the 
exclusion restrictions fail at the 95% level of significance for Fuel, Private Goods and Other 
Food Items. Moreover, included distribution factors like Head’s Income, Marital expenses and 
custom of marriage in the village still retain their explanatory power in the conditioned demand 
system. The first stage statistics for Shea’s Partial R-Squared are 0.0404 and 0.0743 for the 
instrumented variables Staples and Total Expenditure respectively.  
The Collective model implies that information in all distribution factors are contained in a 
singular index, which is the bargaining power; this index is determined as an exogenous function 
of external parameters, including distribution factors. In conditioned demands, the information in 
this index is already contained in the conditioning good, and hence, no distribution factor will 
play a role in the conditioned demand system. Thus, the results from the conditioned demand 
system are unambiguous in rejecting the implications of the Collective framework. In contrast, 
the proportionality tests threw up a mixed bag of results.  
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It needs to be noted here that the proportionality tests on unconditional demands did not involve 
any test with individual incomes, which play a key role as distribution factors. Given total 
income, the proportionality test posits that the ratio of responses of individual incomes on a 
particular demand equation is constant across all demand equations under the Collective 
framework. We hold off on testing the evidence from individual incomes till later; as we would 
see at the end of the next part, individual incomes posit a stronger restriction than simple 
proportionality in response on demand systems. Indeed, an additional restriction of the Collective 
model is that for a given demand and controlling for total income, coefficients on individual 
incomes are  
a) Opposite in signs (weak restriction) 
b) Equal in magnitude, and opposite in signs (strong restriction) 
Section 6.3: Summary 
 
Clearly, the empirical evidence implies that the Collective model is insufficient to explain the 
demand functions for 2-adult households in the IHDS data-set, where the income sources are 
either salaried on non-labor. This rejection may happen due to the assumption of Pareto-
efficiency being violated, or the bargaining framework being insufficient, or a misspecification 
of the empirical equations. Clearly, the unitary model is also rejected; the pure distribution 
factors have a definite effect on the demands, and individual incomes have a statistically 
significant effect, after controlling for total income. 
We note that violation of Pareto Efficiency in consumption may be an exceptional situation, 
especially given the sample under consideration. In a long term institution like marriage, 
information asymmetry that causes distorted consumption allocations are unlikely. Even if such 
distortions occur, they may not show up in household surveys; the respondent would either be 
unaware of them (due to information asymmetry) or hide them (to preserve the asymmetry). The 
empirical specifications are also in line with the previous literature which has confirmed the 
Collective Hypothesis. This implies that the underlying bargaining framework may be of a 




Chapter 7: Reservation Utility Augmented Hypothesis 
 
Section 7.1: Dealing with Constraints  
 
As a first step in describing the bargaining process, it makes sense to assume that when a couple 
bargain inside the HH, they do so with an individual benchmark in mind, which signals how 
much better off they are inside the HH, as opposed to outside it. The most straightforward 
indicator of these benchmarks is their respective Reservation Utility (RU), the welfare level that 
each would enjoy, had they left the family. A point can be made that Reservation Utilities, 
essentially the welfare at divorce, may be too extreme a benchmark especially for developing 
countries. Indeed, divorces are extremely rare in rural India; however, separations are not. We 
attach the concept of RU to the welfare level in case the household dissolves, that is, end of 
cohabitation and sharing of public goods. Such a scenario is possible, and usual, without formal 
divorces. 
Do note that we said that Reservation Utilities are an indicator of the benchmark; in some cases, 
the RU may be the benchmark itself and in other cases, the benchmark might well be a 
monotonic transformation of the RU. This would nest non cooperative threat points as suggested 
by Lundberg and Pollack (1993). Obviously, if some change in external agencies causes the RU 
of any agent to increase above the non-cooperative welfare level (assuming that no changes 
occur to the RU of the partner) the agent could then use his RU as a credible threat in case his 
demands are not met, and thus raise his non cooperative welfare level.  
Note that in a dynamic setting, modeling the benchmark as a function of current RU is different 
from Basu’s approach (2006). He has proposed that current period benchmark of any agent is a 
function of the in-house welfare that she had received in the previous period. Assume, for any 
agent, that the current period RU is at a higher level than last period in-house welfare. Then the 
agent is worse off if she opts for a bargaining power determined by the previous period welfare, 
than that determined by the RU in the current period (assuming that bargaining power increases 
with either argument). On the other hand, if the current period RU is at a lower level than 
previous period welfare, and the agent demands a bargaining weight determined by the latter, 
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then this is a non-credible threat. The other agent can allot her lower resources and keep her 
inside the HH, since she would be worse-off if she opts out. 
The key point to understand here is that the RU is the primitive which determines the benchmark 
for bargaining. Thus any factors affecting the RU will have implications for bargaining, and thus, 
implications on the in house welfare of either individual. We thus recognize the primacy of the 
RUs in household decision making.  
To model the process, consider a HH made of individuals A and B, having well defined, convex 
preferences represented by UA and UB respectively. Further, let each earn incomes of YA and YB, 
while non-labor income is YNL. We allow for all possible interactions of preferences of the 
partners; hence, the consumption by each agent affects the welfare of the other. Furthermore, let 
the respective benchmarks be ФA and ФB, which of course are functions of the respective RUs
BA VandV . Note that RUs are indirect utility functions, independent of in-house consumption 
levels but dependent on individual incomes and other external factors. Thus the relevant 
arguments should include respective incomes and prices of goods which would form preferences 




  )(},,{ 321 AA
A VqqqU   
subject to   1) )(},,{ 321 BB
B VqqqU    [Participation Constraint]  
   2) NLBA YYYqp    [Budget Constraint] 
We recognize that the benchmark for participation may be a monotonic transformation of the 
RU. However, since we are interested to see how perturbations in any RU affect decision 
making, we suppress the symbol for benchmarks for clarity. Additionally, we generally look at 
the effect of changing B’s RU on A and B; without loss of generality, the RU of A is set to 0. 
Thus the utility function of A can be regarded as A’s in house welfare net of his RU. 
With these notational tweaks, we can write the Lagrangean as, 
][]},,{[},,{ 321321 qpYYYVqqqUqqqUL NLBAB
BA       (7) 
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We have our usual Income multiplier, plus an additional Lagrangean multiplier, µ (>0) which 
denotes the marginal effect of a change in B’s RU on the welfare of A. This is a variable which 
really captures the essence of this section, and deserves a few more words before we progress. 






           (8) 
Equation (8) implies that as the RU of B rises, A’s benefit from staying in the HH falls as 
resources need to be reallocated to satisfy the higher RU of B; given the levels of other variables, 
μ captures the marginal cost to A when B’s outside options improve. It is important to note that 
this multiplier does not denote the bargaining power of B. Bargaining power inside the HH 
should be a reflection of the importance attached by each HH member towards maintaining the 
HH. In the above program, A considers the cost implications of compensating B while 
optimizing; however, even if there are any changes in the status quo regarding bargaining 
strengths inside the household, A does not build that into his optimization. All that he cares about 
is the cost of compensation, without any consideration towards bargaining power. This situation 
would be re-visited later, and we would tweak the above program and see how bargaining 
powers (and concerns regarding them) are engendered.   
We briefly digress here to compare this program with the program of the Collective Household. 
Note that Chiappori (1992) and a host of other authors take a similar approach to model the 
individual’s choices and start with a Lagrangean similar to (7). However, instead of continuing to 
focus on the individual, they look at the weighted preferences of each individual, and construct 
the welfare function of the household out of the weighted preferences, subject to the budget 
constraint. This immediately assumes an initial equilibrium (for both individuals and the 
household) regarding the weights; these individual weights are precise indicators of respective 
bargaining power. Given the initial equilibrium, the Collective Hypothesis looks at perturbation 
caused by distribution factors, which affect the optimization program only through the 
bargaining weights. However, our approach tries to understand how this initial equilibrium is 
approached, from the point of any one individual. 
As of now, we look at the 1
st
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Thus, Corollary 1: Necessary and sufficient F.O.C.s imply that for interior solutions, the 
weighted sum of individual marginal utilities for each good should equal its price, deflated by 
the income multiplier. Additionally, each constraint should bind.  
It would be instructive to check if the 2
nd
 order conditions on the constrained optimization 
problem, given convex preferences and hence, concave utility functions for both A and B, lead to 




 leading principal minors alternate in sign, with the 5
th
 being negative. 
This implies that the FOCs implied by the above optimization program of A imply a maximum. 
The detailed proof is given in the Appendix, A2. 
 
As with all problems of optimization, it is an instructive exercise to see how exogenous 
parameters affect A’s choice-set. We note that in the above setting, an exogenous parameter like 
spousal income would have a dual effect through the budget and participation constraints. For 
the sake of simplicity, we ignore the simultaneous choice between labor supply and leisure (for 
both A and B), by assuming that hours of work are given. This implies that income is necessarily 
exogenous to the choice-set of either individual. To keep the theory and the empirics consistent, 
we would consider only salaried households in the empirical section. Note that this simplification 
is usually adopted by the literature on bargaining, especially when labor supply is not modeled. 
Later, we would consider questions of labor supply in a dynamic setting; however, the discussion 
would be centered on the individual’s strategies in the context of potential wages that his spouse 
could earn, not between the trade-off between spousal labor and leisure. 
Let us consider a change in A’s in-house welfare, due to a one-time, ceteris paribus, positive 














           (12) 
The first term is the multiplier on the income constraint, and points to the fact that as B’s income 
rises by a dollar, it provides an identical benefit had A’s income increased by a dollar; to see this 
equality, we can differentiate the Lagrangean w.r.t the income of A, YA. However, the 2
nd
 term is 
the marginal cost of a unit increase in B’s RU, multiplied by the marginal change in B’s RU 
brought about by a dollar change in B’s income. Thus the Left Hand Side is the net marginal 
benefit of A’s in house welfare when B’s income changes. We recollect a statement made some 
time ago: the program in (7) implies that all perturbations in B’s RU affect A as pure monetary 
costs/benefits.  
A should always operate at the range of YB where the above expression is non-negative; 
otherwise, increments in B’s income hurt A as the compensation required to satisfy the 
participation of B (2
nd
 term above) is higher than the benefit brought on by higher income (1
st
 
term above). The key question here is how the left hand side changes due to a ceteris paribus 
increase in B’s income. 
Consider the 2 FOCs relating to the budget and participation constraint. Totally differentiating 




































&1        (13) 
Next, we multiply both sides of the FOC w.r.t goods (equation 12) by the term Bi Yq  and sum 
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        (14) 
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The last term is always non negative. In case some goods are inferior, the negative contributions 
from the marginal of such goods w.r.t income should be swamped by those of the normal goods; 
otherwise the budget constraint would not bind. The above result reinforces the point made 
earlier that A would maintain the HH for those levels of YB where a marginal change in YB 
would yield a non-negative benefit to A.  
This brings us to the next point. How does A’s benefit change due to successive increments in 






































Differentiating the 3rd term above would yield 2nd derivatives of the utility function w.r.t any 
good i as well as cross partials between goods i and j. Comparative statics could be used to 
evaluate and sign the 2
nd
 term above. Both techniques would require some computations and 
assumptions. 
Let us assume that the demand for any good is linear in B’s income; this is not unusual, 
especially given the fact that in the empirical section, linear specifications (of demand w.r.t 








is constant for successive marginal increments of YB. However, with rising income, 
the quantity consumed of each good rises (if the good is not inferior); due to diminishing 







is continuously decreasing as consumption if 
good qi increases. This implies that the marginal welfare of A inside the HH diminishes as B’s 
income increases, ceteris paribus.  
Thus continuous positive changes in B’s income have two income effects; the regular income 
effect is due to the relaxation of the budget constraint, and diminishes in increasing income 
whether that income is generated by A or B. The other effect is actually a cost and reflects the 
compensation to B; as B’s RU rises, this cost gets amplified. 
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          (15) 
This level of B’s income generates a ‘bliss point’ for A, given the level of other parameters; any 
additional income introduced into the HH would imply a welfare level lower than L΄. We 
consider this welfare as the target level that is optimal for A to pursue, given the optimization 
problem he faces in a 2 person household. Note that we have not discussed bargaining power 
under the RU Augmented framework yet; µ measured the compensation that A has to provide for 
a unit change in B’s RU. λ, as usual, measured the value of an additional dollar to A. The net in-
house benefit to A was based on these multipliers only.  
We observe an obvious, but interesting implication. Starting from the some initial welfare level 
(say, the formation of the HH) ceteris paribus increases in B’s income takes A to his ‘bliss 
point’; however this ‘bliss-point’ is a 2
nd
 best compared to the bliss point that A would have 
reached if the HH started from the same initial level, and A experienced identical ceteris paribus 
changes in his own income.  
Immediately, we have the first rationale for subverting B’s income. Even driven by 
considerations of monetary costs and benefits, an individual may find it rational to limit income 
gains to his/her partner as the cost of compensation may wash out the benefits of higher 
resources at high levels of income. 
Proposition 1: Driven solely by considerations of economic costs and benefits, the dominant 
decision maker will face a ‘bliss point’ due to ceteris paribus changes in his partner’s income. 
Any increase in partner’s income beyond the ‘bliss point’ income level is against the decision 
maker’s interest as costs of compensation nullify and swamp any income benefits. 
With these initial findings, we now change the optimization program in (7) with the agenda of 




Section 7.2: Introducing Bargaining Power 
 
In the previous discussion, the multipliers did not point anything towards the relative importance 
that each agent attached to partner and self. The literature on the Collective bargaining usually 
derives the indices of bargaining power from this ‘relative importance’.  
Let us revisit the same agents facing the same optimization program from the previous section, 
and look at it from A’s perspective. Thus the Lagrangean is, once again,  
][]},,{[},,{ 321321 qpYYYVqqqUqqqUL NLBAB
BA    (7) 
We look at µ from a related, but different angle; it denotes a cost that A is willing to bear as long 
as he wants to maintain the household. Thus µ can be viewed as the absolute importance A 
attaches to B’s participation in the HH (the same way as λ illustrates the importance of a dollar to 
A). Thus an individual who assigns a greater importance to his partner’s presence inside the HH 
has to bear a higher cost of compensation as the partner’s outside options improve. The initial 
value of µ, given identical levels of parameters affecting the maximization program, depends on 
a variety of factors (and almost all such factors are beyond the scope of this study!) along social, 
economic, communal and psychological dimensions.  
Given an absolute importance of µ attached to B, A attaches an absolute importance of ‘1’ to his 
own participation in the HH. Recall that we had assumed the RU of A to equal 0. Thus ‘1’ is not 
the importance that A attaches to his utility; rather it is the importance index attached to self-
participation, that is, the value of the term, [
A
A VqqqU },,{ 321 ], where the last term is pegged at 
0.  
Along the lines of the Collective literature, we construct relative weights out of the two absolute 
weights (or importance indices) and deflate the utility functions of the two agents by their 
respective weights; the key difference is that we recognize that the RUs of the agents still play a 
role in determining the movements of these weights. Once again, we assume that external 
parameters that affect A’s RU do not change, and hence peg A’s RU at 0. Thus we can focus on 
the effect of perturbations in B’s RU on the in-house benefits.        






















































BA    (8΄) 
Corollary 2: Since both original and rescaled Lagrangeans address the same problem, the 
F.O.C.s are identical. See Appendix 2 for detailed proof.  
The coefficients on the welfare levels of each agent can now be viewed as their respective 
bargaining powers. The transformation of the objective function is automatic, as A attaches a 
relative weight to himself instead of an absolute weight of 1. The above treatment implies that 
when RUs are used in the bargaining process, bargaining weights are endogenous and should be 
treated as such. The very nature of the program allows us to map out the effect of bargaining 
power on the welfare of A explicitly. To see this, we once again consider a one-time, ceteris 









































    (9΄) 
[See Appendix 2 for detailed proof] 
The last two terms in the above expression denote similar income effects that appeared in 
relationship 13; each income effect is now discounted by the relative bargaining weights, since A 
views benefits in relative terms, instead of absolute terms. The 1
st
 term is a product of A’s in 
house net welfare and the response of a unit change in B’s income on the relative weight, that is, 
the bargaining power of A. Thus this is a substitution effect which maps out the effect on A’s 
welfare as the relative weights realign with an increase in B’s income. As the RU of B rises due 
to higher income, ceteris paribus, the cost of compensating B rises as A has to forego available 
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resources to meet the participation constraint. However, as the cost of compensation (the 
multiplier on the participation constraint) increases, this implies a reduction in the relative weight 












Hence, the substitution effect is always negative in B’s income. 
Finally let us re-examine how the left hand side of 9΄ change due to continuous increases in B’s 














































Once again, we multiply both sides of the above relationship by the term Bi Yq  and sum the 



























































































































































  (10΄) 
We are now at a place to discuss strategies that A could adopt, given the responses to his in 




Section 7.3: Aggregate Inefficiency 
 
Section 7.1 showed that at some YB=YB΄, A reaches his ‘bliss point’ in B’s income and the 
expression 14 equals 0. Once we introduce relative weighting into the RU Augmented 
framework in Section 7.2, the expression within the Σ sign in the last term of 10΄ (above) is 
identical to the right hand side of 14. However, A’s bargaining weight is the coefficient on this 
income effect now. An entirely new term denoting a substitution effect appears; together, these 
two terms determine the marginal impact of B’s income on A’s in house welfare. 
Instead of a one-time change in B’s income, we consider an alternative where B’s income could 
increase continuously, ceteris paribus. Let us allow the dependency of B’s income over time by 




and at t=t΄, YB=YB΄. Now 
consider that A has three options at time period t=t
0
. 
A) Not allow B to work, which is the status quo 
B) Allow B to work, but in a job that does not reward experience (YB is constant) 
C) Allow B to work, in a job that rewards experience (YB is increasing over time) 
It is important to note that the above options are about A examining time-paths with respect to 
the wage-rates faced by B, and not her supply of labor. For clarity, we may assume that all 
options of work are restricted to salaried jobs, with given hours of work. Option A can be viewed 
as the initial bench-mark, which applies when the household comes into existence. If a one-time 
increase in income expands the feasible set of consumption to A such that there is a positive 
marginal benefit to A after compensating B for her higher RU, it is sensible for A to go for 
option B. Note that option B excludes un-paid household work, as long as such work does not 
have any implication for the RU of B; indeed, un-paid household work would relax the budget 
constraint of the household, without affecting either reservation utilities. However, option B 
could subsume work performed on household agricultural plots; including temporary transfer of 
ownership of plots from A to B. Essentially we consider only those options which affect the 
reservation utility of B, given the reservation utility of A. Option B is a subset of these options 
where B’s RU experiences a discreet, one-time change.  
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However, if successive relaxations in the budget constraint yield positive (but progressively 
smaller) marginal benefits to A after compensating B, then it makes sense for A to go for option 
C, since this leads A towards the bliss point outcome. Indeed, option C should be the apparent 
choice as it leads to continuous welfare enhancements for both individuals and the household. 
Under option C, ceteris paribus, the income of B is time dependant; hence YB= YB (t) with 

























tY BB  
However, given 10΄, pursuing the previous bliss point level is irrational now. Say at t=t* (t* < t΄), 


















































Under the RU framework with relative weighting, and thus endogenous bargaining power, a 
strategy to allow B to work in a job which generates higher income over time leads to continuous 
erosion in A’s bargaining power. Eventually, this negative substitution effect is strong enough to 
wipe out the benefits of the income effect; any subsequent increase in B’s income may well lead 
to a positive net income effect for A, but the consequent reduction in A’s bargaining power 















At t=t*, A’s best strategy would be to swap B from a job with returns to experience into a job 
with similar income levels, but without any rewards to experience; essentially, make B’s income 
independent of time. This situation is decidedly unreal, as it assumes that A could effectively 
affect B’s RU; A could opt for a 2
nd
 best strategy, which is to pull B from the labor market 
altogether. However, even in the first scenario, HH income suffers due to income subversion 
tactics played by A. 
Proposition 2: When the dominant decision-maker derives welfare from his position (even 
though his position may not affect his preferences), the ‘bliss point’ in spouse’s income is at a 
lower welfare level compared to a ceteris paribus situation when the dominant decision maker is 
driven solely by monetary benefits and concerns. Hence, the spousal income level at which 
income subversion is optimal is always lower when the dominant decision maker is driven by 
concerns of preserving bargaining power. 
89 
 
However, let’s now look at B’s situation. If she does not pull out of the labor market, she enjoys a higher 
income level and a higher bargaining power in the next period t=t*+1; a higher bargaining power 
leads to a greater say in the allocation of her own income. Thus, it is a rational strategy for B to 
continue participation in her job. 
Moreover, note that we considered only ceteris paribus changes in B’s income; that is, no factors 
which could have affected A’s RU changed from t=t
0
 to t=t*. Let us assume that at t=t
0
, A’s net 
in-house welfare level was 0, that is  
0
321 0},,{ ttatVqqqU A
A   
Allowing B to participate in the labor market relaxes the budget constraint; A derives utility from 
consumption of public goods and the private consumption of B. Pushing B onto her RU level 
under such a situation would immediately generate a positive in-house welfare for A, net of his 
RU. As long as the change in A’s in-house welfare due to increase in B’s income is positive, A’s 
in-house net welfare level would keep increasing. Thus at t>t*, although the marginal response 
turns negative, A still enjoys a positive in-house welfare, net of his RU. Thus, it may seem that it 
is in A’s interest to allow B to retain her job till his Net Benefit itself turns negative. 
Given these facts, B knows that any threat by A to divorce if she does not pull out at t=t* is non-
credible. However, at t=t
0
, A knows that opting for strategy C would lead to B continuing labor 
market participation beyond period t*. Such an action by B would mean that A loses bargaining 
power continuously (recall that 1-θ is bound between 0 and 1, and decreases in YB); his net in-
house welfare, weighted by his bargaining power would start decreasing. Finally, at some t>t*, 
his net benefit from participation would be driven down to 0; essentially his role as the dominant 
decision maker would be completely reversed and he would be pushed onto his RU.  
To summarize, at t=t
0
, the optimal strategy for A is not to opt for strategy C and make his partner 
drop out at t=t*; at t=t*, B would respond by continuing participation. This would lead to a 
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gradual erosion of A’s position of dominance and eventually push him onto his Reservation 
Utility level.  Playing strategy B at t=t
0
 would lead to a one-time relaxation in budget constraint 
and one-time erosion in bargaining power. If the increase in B’s income from status quo to that 
under strategy B yields a positive value for expression 10΄, playing strategy B strictly dominates 
strategy C. But this puts the household on an Aggregate Inefficient path immediately, with 
deliberate subversion of higher future incomes. 
We note the extent of the problem here. Had A been able to pull B out of a job with returns to 
experience at t=t*, the strategy would have been inefficient for the HH, but optimal for A. Since 
A presumably cannot exercise such control on external agencies, his 2
nd
 best strategy is to pull B 
out of the labor market altogether at t=t*. This is a sub-optimal strategy for A too. The main 
complication is that it is in B’s interests to not respond to these strategies at t=t*, and continue in 
her job regime. Foreseeing that, A would not allow her to get into a job rewarding experience, 
even at t=t
0
, thus foregoing the entire income from t=t
0
 to t=t*. Hence, 
Proposition 3: Aggregate Inefficient behavior on the dominant decision maker’s part is 
inefficient for the dominant decision maker, his/her spouse and for the household altogether. 
However, it is a rational strategy when the dominant decision maker cares about his position of 
dominance. Hence, income subversion tactics by preventing participation in labor markets 
should be expected in societies where positions of dominance matter, due to socio-economic 
pressures.  
The above results are the prime motivation behind this paper. It shows that when people compare 
their in-house welfare levels to their next best options, bargaining power should be treated as 
endogenous to the system. Since bargaining power of an individual determines his welfare level, 
it is rational for him to preserve his control over decision making. Naturally, any change that 
erodes his control in favor of his partner would hurt him, especially when he faces social 
pressure in maintaining his dominant position. Until now, we have considered bargaining power 
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only as an idea with economic underpinnings; when we combine this with the fact that in most 
societies in the world, the male has to come off as the dominant agent inside the HH, the ‘weight 
on the  in-house welfare’ takes on an entirely new meaning. Indeed, it may be fair to say that 
bargaining power itself generates utility in such situations (instead of simply affecting welfare, as 
discussed above). The potential for Aggregate Inefficient behavior would be amplified then. In 
any case, preservation of bargaining power is incentive for individuals to promote actions which 
prevent their partners from adopting actions that enhance bargaining power. To diversify the 
focus from effect of income on bargaining power let us look at the effect of a non-monetary 
parameter which changes the RU of B. Consider an improvement in divorce laws towards 
women, say, in the form of higher alimony payments. Relation (10΄) clearly outlines how this 
change affects HH bargaining, even though it could affect B only if she opted out. A has to 
reallocate resources to B to compensate her for better opportunities outside (since she is better 
off than before if she opts out now). However, such legislation would simultaneously lower the 
RU of A as he would need to pay her higher alimony, leaving him with fewer resources to 
finance his stand alone consumptions. The importance of keeping B in the household has 
increased (since the cost of separation is much greater),thus allowing the bargaining power to 
realign towards B; she enjoys a greater say in the allocation of resources along with a better 
allocation of the given resources. 
It is worth pointing out here that none of the results derived above are in conflict with Pareto 
efficiency in consumption. Indeed this discussion rationalizes Udry’s findings in Burkina Faso 
with Pareto efficiency; sub optimal level of inputs were used in women controlled plots so that 
men retain ‘optimal’ control over the generation, and subsequent allocation of resources (and this 
allocation may have been Pareto efficient). This discussion also ties in the Lundberg-Pollack 
threat point of non-cooperation, but not divorce, in the family. The RU Augmented model 
accounts for this, by pointing out that the benchmark in this case is not the RU, but the non-
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cooperative welfare level; however, any changes in the RU would still cause changes in the non-
cooperative welfare level, and thus realign bargaining weights.  
Cross section data can convey information about whether the possibility of Aggregate 
Inefficiency exists. We have already argued that a prime motivation for such behavior is the 
preservation of bargaining power. We would need to back out the implications of endogenous 
bargaining power in cross sectional data; we need to see how the presence of RUs affects the 
demand systems. Thus we are testing a necessary condition for Aggregate Inefficiency, by 
empirically testing for the implications of the presence of RUs in HH bargaining. Non rejection 
of these tests, if they could be designed, would imply that benchmarks are being used while 
making optimization decisions. And that is a strong motivation to indulge in behaviors that 
generate Aggregate Inefficiency.  
Section 7.4: Testable Implications of RU Augmented Hypothesis 
 
Proportionality and Conditional Demand Tests 
In Section 5.1, we examined the two implications of the Collective model;  
a) The ratio of marginal response to unit change in ANY distribution factor on two given 
goods is the same across ALL distribution factors.  
b) Once the demand for any good is conditioned on any other good, the effect of distribution 
factors on the conditioned demand is nil.  
It would be instructive to see how these implications change under the RU framework. Given the 
primacy of RUs in this framework, the reduced form demand function for any good i can be 
written as,  
));,,(),,,(,,( XZYpVZYpVYpfq BBBAAAii        (15) 
A cursory comparison of (3) with (15) reveals some salient differences of the demand function 
under the Collective and RU Augmented; in the latter case, individual incomes affect demands 
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by their effect on the individual RU. Additionally, distribution factors affect demands by 
recalibrating individual RUs. It is entirely possible that the vectors of distribution factors that 
affect A and B’s RUs share some common entities; of course, they can also share common 
elements with the vector of taste shifters, X. With these thoughts, we look at the implications 
from the proportionality test under the RU Augmented framework. Given any two goods, 1and 2, 









































































       (16) 
The above condition shows that in the RU framework, there is no reason for the ratio of marginal 
impacts of one factor across two goods to be equal across all distribution factors for the given 
pair of goods. In fact, there is only one situation where the ratio of coefficients should be equal to 
each other; consider a pair of distribution factors which affect only one RU and not the other. 
WLOG let us assume that ZK and ZL affect the RU of A but have no impact whatsoever on that 
for B. It is easy to see from relation (16) that the ratio of responses of good 1 and good 2 to a 
change in ZK is independent of the index K. Thus, this ratio will be equal for the given pair of 
goods across all distribution factors which only affect the RU of A.  
We now look at the implication of the RU Augmented model on conditional demands. On lines 
similar to section 3.1, we can write the demand for, say, good 2 as,  
));,,(),,,(,,(22 XZYpVZYpVYpfq BBBAAA 
 
The key difference is that there is no θ to be inverted in the expression above; naturally so, as 
bargaining powers are now determined inside the system, and are not exogenous to demands. We 












1 XZYpVqYpfq BBB         (17) 
All distribution factors which affect RU of B will still show up in a conditioned demand 
framework, and thus the proposed exclusion restriction of distribution factors as proposed by the 
Collective model will fail under the RU scenario. 
If the RU approach is indeed being used in a HH, and bargaining powers are determined 
endogenously, the ratio of responses on a pair of goods due to a change in any distribution factor 
need not be equal; further, distribution factors will still affect conditional demand. However, a 
rejection of the implications of the Collective Model on these tests does not validate the RU 
Augmented framework. It implies that the effects of distribution factors are not channeled 
through an exogenously determined bargaining power, θ.  
Income Identity Test  
The motivation for this test is that in a usual regression equation estimating effects of parameters 
on demand, we look at the coefficients on individual incomes. If the regression equation also has 
total HH income as a regressor, then the coefficient on individual income is considered as the 
distributional effect of individual income on demand. However, if total income is included as a 
regressor, then when we consider the coefficient on individual income, we should treat total 
income as held constant. This econometric restriction opens up the possibility of another testable 
implication. 
Note that whatever model of HH bargaining we may consider, an identity involving incomes 
must hold. Usually, we have 3 possible components; the individual salaries/wages of the head 
and the spouse, and unearned income which must add up to total income; Y = YA + YB + YNL 
We should recognize that each unit of YNL accrues to either A or B; that is, if the HH splits the 
unearned income stream would split up according to each individual’s entitlement. After 
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recognizing that each additional dollar of non-labor income is controlled by the individuals in the 
same way as an additional dollar of salary, we could rewrite the above identity as Y = YA + YB 
We now consider a regression equation where we are looking at the coefficient on, say, A’s 
income while total income is also included on the right hand side. To rationalize the change in 
A’s income holding HH income constant, we can consider a simulation where B’s income has 









Of course, this does not imply that there is a one to one relationship between individual incomes; 
it is just an implication of treating total income as constant. Let us re-consider the demand 
systems from the Collective and RU approach once again.  
For any good I, the Collective model implies the following demand equation,
 
)),,,(,,( ZYYpYpfq BAii    





















































      (18) 
A similar implication has been made in Browning et al, 1994 where the authors propose that 
individual incomes have an equal (in value) and opposite (in sign) effect on the sharing rule, 
once total income is controlled for. This implies that the responses of individual incomes on each 
demand (provided we are looking at a normal good for either individual) should sum to 0. This is 
a stronger test than that of proportionality since now we do not need to go across equations, and 
neither do we need to take ratios to make a judgment.  
96 
 
It is clear why the responses should be equal and opposite. A unit increase in the income of say, 
A, increases his bargaining power at the cost of B’s. This change is similar to a situation where 
B’s income decreased by a unit, causing her weight to go down and allowing A’s importance to 
rise. Had we considered an unit increase in B’s income, the change would have gone the opposite 
way, since bargaining weights would now move in favor of B at the cost of A’s. The opposite 
changes in θ drive the above result.  
A case could be made that the marginal response of A’s income on the bargaining weight may 
not be the same as that of B’s income. But even under this weaker assumption, it is clear that the 
response of the weight to an increase in either individual income should have opposite signs. As 
long as the good under study is a normal good for either agent, the signs of the observed partial 
derivatives should be opposite. Bourguignon et al, 2009 propose a test based on a similar logic, 
which posits that individual income effects are of opposite signs.  
Under the RU Augmented framework, effect on demand due to changes in individual income, 
keeping total income constant, would materialize through responses in RU. Given that the 
response on demand would act through such a route, it is worth examining the mechanics before 
the implication of the Income Identity test under the RU Augmented framework is established.  
Let us consider a thought experiment by which we give money to a partner and take away the 
same amount from the other partner, keeping total income constant during the exercise. This is 
the most ‘realistic’ simulation we can think of to study the effects on demand from a change in 
individual income, while keeping total income constant. The demand function for the good qi 
under RU Augmented framework is expressed as 
));,,(),,,(,,( XZYpVZYpVYpfq BBBAAAii   
The good is a normal good for both individuals (A and B); thus standard price effects and 
income effects hold. Moreover, we cannot observe the initial or final allocation of the good for 
each individual; all we can see is the aggregate change in quantity demanded by the household 
.Let qiA and qiB be the individual amounts of the good consumed at the initial equilibrium.  
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Let A’s income increase by X$. The observed change in HH demand can be split into two 
components; the coefficient on total income (Y) provides the income effect. Controlling for this 
effect simulates a situation where B’s income has fallen by X$. However there are two 
substitution effects at play here. The first substitution effect is when both partners substitute 
towards (or away) a normal good (inferior good) when their respective incomes change; this is 
similar to the S.E. found in individual optimization problem. 
The 2
nd
 substitution effect is the reallocation of the good between the two partners, and is the 
crux of bargaining. The coefficient on A’s income (YA) provides us with this substitution effect. 




















Given the income reallocation is a ceteris paribus change, the change in the HH demand for good 
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Given the assumption that a positive amount X$ was given to A, and qi is a normal good for 


































       (20) 
The real income (RU) of A changes due to a rise in income, and he teases out a higher allocation 
of the good qi. The real income of B falls, and so does her demand for good qi. The net change in 
HH demand is contingent on the individuals’ marginal utility from consuming the good. In fact 
let us make an assumption about the desirability of Q1 to A and B, at the initial levels. WLOG, 
let MU of q1 (at q1A) be higher for A than the MU of q1 for B (at q1B). An increase in A’s income 
raises his demand for good 1, while B lowers hers due to lower income. However, in absolute 
terms, A’s change in demand is greater than B’s change in demand. Thus 
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)]()([0 11211 BBAAAA qatMUqatMUqqq        (21) 
Let us now consider the regression coefficient on B’s income, while total income is held 
constant; let B’s income increase by X$. We work through absolutely similar logic, and split up 

































       (22) 
Given the initial assumption of Marginal Utilities at the initial equilibrium, we must have, 
)]()([0 11211 BBAAAA qatMUqatMUqqq        (23) 
It is clear that the expressions in 20 and 22 (or, 21 and 23) are opposite in signs. Once we 
consider marginal perturbations in income, smoothness of utility functions would imply that the 
expressions are equal in absolute value (as individual responses on demand due to a marginal 
income change around the initial equilibrium should be equal and opposite). Let the expression 



















We know that if expression in 20 equals Y, the expression in 22 is equal and opposite. Also, the 
change in demand in 22 was triggered by an income allocation which was equal and opposite to 





























For a given level of HH income, reassigning money between the constituent individuals change 
their RUs and hence, their demands. Indeed, depending on the direction of reassignment, the 
individuals have to raise or lower their individual demand. However, the coefficients on 
individual income capture the ratio of demand change to that of income reassignment; for either 
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coefficient, the numerator and denominator in the ratio are equal and opposite to that in the other 
ratio. Hence, the coefficients come out with equal sign and value.  
We notice that the implication of the income identity test under the RU Augmented framework is 
opposite to that of the Collective Hypothesis. This provides an avenue to check which 
framework is validated by the data. As mentioned earlier, if the empirics point towards a demand 
system generated by the RU Augmented framework, then the scope of Aggregate Inefficient 
behavior is present in the system. Such behavior cannot be tested by cross sectional data since 
the behavior concerns the path taken by HHs over multiple time periods. However, the tests on 
Proportionality, Conditional Demands and Income Identity can be performed using cross-
sectional data. In the next chapter, we consider the same sample from the IHDS dataset to 
















Chapter 8: Evidence for or against the RU Augmented Hypothesis 
 
Due to the similarity between the Collective and the RU Augmented frameworks, we note that 
much of the empirical analyses done to test the implications of the Collective model 
automatically carry over to the RU Augmented setting. The demand system under the RU 
Augmented setting are amenable to tests of proportional responses by distribution factors and the 
independence of conditional demands from distribution factors.  
We use the same dataset and the same specifications to test the RU Augmented approach. Thus, 
we once again consider households which report some flow of salaried income and are made up 
of 2 adults. In essence the sample under study in this section is same as the sample studied for 
the empirical analysis of the Collective model. Shares of expenditure on staple food, other food, 
public goods, clothing, fuel and other (private, unassigned) goods are considered for our present 
purposes. We do not repeat the considerations that were made while specifying the demand 
equations for Specifications 6a-6e; indeed, there is no change in those specifications. 
Equation (16) points out that the coefficients of distribution factors need not be proportional 
when we consider any demand and a pair of distribution factors, unlike the Collective model. 
Indeed, the RU Augmented posits no restrictions on the proportionality tests, as long as we do 
not find a pair of distribution factor that affects the RU of one of the agent and not the other. 
None of the distribution factors (Expenses during marriage and practice of intra-community 
marriage) considered for the proportionality tests has such a characteristic.  
The RU Augmented framework proposes that the bargaining power is determined endogenously, 
and distribution factors enter through respective Reservation Utilities. Conditioning on one good 
does not prevent distribution factors from affecting conditioned demands, as the channel of 
causality is not through a singular index. Thus, relation (17) points out that under such a 
scenario, conditioned demands would still be affected by distribution factors. 
For both tests we note that the Collective model is rejected, while the RU Augmented model is 
not; we now turn to a detailed discussion on the income identity tests, which posit strong 
restrictions for either model. 
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Section 8.1: The Income Identity Test 
 
The first criteria to perform this test is to assure that total income can be treated as constant; 
econometric restrictions provide an excellent scope to impose this naturally. The most obvious 
route is to use total income as a regressor in the demand system, along with individual demands. 
Since the coefficient on any regressor is a partial derivative, considering the coefficient on 
individual income along with the fact that the effect of total income is controlled for insures that 
the 1
st
 criteria for the Income Identity test is fulfilled. Note that in the unconditional demand 
system (especially spec 6c), the effect of total income can be controlled for through the 
instrumented variable, logged total expenses. The projection of total income in the first stage (on 
total expenditure) enters the 2
nd
 stage for all the demands, via the coefficient on total expenses. 
Once again, this implies that total income can be held constant when we consider the effect on 
individual income. Under the Collective framework, the proposed Income Identity test can be 
executed with the specifications discussed for the proportionality tests. We could look at either 
Spec 6b (Total Income included instrument) or Spec 6c (Total Income excluded instrument) and 
use the coefficients on individual incomes to test if they are equal in value and opposite in sign. 
However, a slight change in specification is required in the RU Augmented Framework for the 
mechanics to be completely sensible. The implication of the income identity test proposes that 
once we control for total income, individual incomes should have the same coefficient; each 
coefficient contains both marginal responses in demand due to changes in individual incomes of 
the two agents. To perform this test, we take any demand, drop one of the two individual 
incomes (from each demand equation; both incomes are still part of the equation estimating total 
expenditure) and run the estimation. Thus in one specification, we have, say, A’s income on the 
right hand side; the Income Identity test posits that if total income is controlled for the coefficient 
on A’s income would include the response of both A and B’s demands due to income 
reallocation towards  A. In the 2
nd
 specification we drop A’s income but include B’s income; the 
coefficient on B’s income would include the demand response of both individuals. The test 
implies that under the RU Augmented, the two coefficients are identical in sign and value.  Note 
that dropping any one of the individual income does not cause any loss of information, since the 




It is worth noting here that if individual incomes do have significant effects as distribution 
factors, dropping one or the other from the demands would cause the over identification tests to 
fail. This would be a serious problem for the test if excluding, say, head income biases the 
coefficient on spouse income. We have two checkpoints to see if this bias occurs. 
First, we note that apart from dropping individual income coefficient, there is absolutely no 
difference between the specifications suggested here and Spec 6c; hence, the obvious check is to 
see how robust the coefficient on the included income coefficient is, across specifications. For 
example, say we are considering staples demand for the income identity test; we drop the income 
of the head, but include the income of the spouse. We can compare the coefficient on spouse’s 
income in this specification with that (in Staples demand) from Spec 6c, where there were no 
problems of exclusion restrictions being rejected. If the coefficients are robust, then we can claim 
that the failure of the exclusion restriction does not cause the coefficient of the included income 
coefficient to be biased; and this is what the RU Augmented framework proposes. After all, it 
argues that information on both marginal responses in a demand due to income reallocation 
between two individuals (while total income is held constant) is contained in the coefficient of 
either individual income coefficient. Hence including one and not the other should not make any 
difference. The 2
nd
 checkpoint is of course, the test itself. If the individual coefficients get 
biased, then there is no reason for them to be equal in value and sign, as the RU Augmented 
framework predicts. 
We also use another specification where total income is an included instrument; this 
specification is very similar to Spec 6b, apart from the fact that one or the other individual 
income is dropped. To sum up, the two specifications used to run the Income Identity tests are: 
Spec 8a) Excluded instruments from demand equation: Total Income, HH Assets and 
General CPI.  
Spec 8b) Excluded instruments from demand equation: HH Assets and General CPI. Total 
Income is an included instrument in the demand system 
For each demand, one of the individual incomes is dropped (say, B’s) and the other is included 




 stages) and estimation is performed. Then B’s 
income is included, A’s is dropped, estimation is done again; finally, we compare the coefficient 
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on A’s income form the 1
st
 run with that on B’s income from the 2
nd
 run for each demand. To 
compare coefficients across equations, we use a 3sls setting just for the tests. 
Results from the Income Identity Tests 
Given any demand D, the propositions from the two frameworks are as follows 
 Under the Collective Framework, Head Income(D) + Spouse Income(D)=0 
 Under the RU Augmented framework, Head Income(D) – Spouse Income(D)=0 
Once again we note that if both individual incomes are insignificant in the given demand, both 
tests mentioned above cannot be rejected. Thus we perform the tests only on those demands 
where at least one of the individual income coefficients are significant. We consider Spec 8a and 
Spec 6c to first look at the robustness of the estimated individual income coefficients. The p-
values from the over identification tests are provided for each specification. If the coefficients 
look reasonably robust across specifications, we perform the above tests across the two equations 
estimated under spec 8a. We repeat the procedure before performing the tests from spec 8b 
(which is first compared with spec 6b). The results on the main coefficients and tests are 
provided below. We remember that for the purpose of testing across equations, we run absolutely 
the same specifications under a reg3 routine of STATA, specifying 2sls. The detailed estimation 










Table 8.1 Dependence of Staple Demand on Individual Incomes  
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
VARIABLES ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.105*** -0.100*** -0.0845*** -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.0998*** 
 (0.00728) (0.00652) (0.00440) (0.00797) (0.00775) (0.00780) 
Log_Tot_Inc    -0.000547 0.00129 0.00723** 
    (0.00363) (0.00343) (0.00300) 
Head_Income 1.51e-07*** 1.34e-07***  1.54e-07*** 1.28e-07***  
 (3.37e-08) (3.01e-08)  (4.10e-08) (3.52e-08)  
Spouse_Income 1.35e-07***  8.55e-08** 1.37e-07***  7.53e-08** 
 (3.91e-08)  (3.36e-08) (4.12e-08)  (3.51e-08) 
Constant 0 0 0.463* 0 0 0.573** 
 (0) (0) (0.264) (0) (0) (0.268) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.575 0.581 0.594 0.576 0.578 0.580 
       
p-value Over ID Test 0.3881 0.0007 0.0000 0.1687 0.0004 0.0000 
 
Note that the over identification tests imply that exclusion restrictions in Specs 6C and 6B were 
not rejected; that is, we can assume that the estimates of the individual income coefficients from 
those specifications can be considered as benchmarks. A look at the individual income 
coefficients across Spec 6C and 8A and those across Specs 6B and 8B reveal that the estimates 
are reasonably robust. We can now conduct the income identity tests with considerable 
confidence. 
Spec 8A 
 Head Income (Staples) + Spouse Income (Staples) = 0: p-value = 0.0000 
 Head Income (Staples) - Spouse Income (Staples) = 0: p-value = 0.2031 
Spec 8B 
 Head Income (Staples) + Spouse Income (Staples) = 0: p-value = 0.0000 




Table 8.2 Dependence of Food Demand on Individual Incomes  
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
VARIABLES ShareFood ShareFood ShareFood ShareFood ShareFood ShareFood 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.0302*** -0.0401*** -0.0598*** -0.0369*** -0.0415*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00962) (0.00692) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0122) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.00490 0.000987 -0.00172 
    (0.00525) (0.00501) (0.00461) 
Head_Income -1.74e-07*** -1.39e-07***  -1.97e-07*** -1.43e-07***  
 (4.96e-08) (4.50e-08)  (5.64e-08) (4.89e-08)  
Spouse_Income -2.75e-07***  -1.92e-07*** -2.92e-07***  -1.90e-07*** 
 (7.45e-08)  (7.20e-08) (7.55e-08)  (7.24e-08) 
Constant 0 0 1.337*** 0 0 1.311*** 
 (0) (0) (0.431) (0) (0) (0.437) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.329 0.341 0.364 0.339 0.343 0.361 
       
p-value Over ID Test 0.5478 0..0160 0.0028 0.8481 0.0061 0.0009 
 
Note that the over identification tests imply that exclusion restrictions in Specs 6C and 6B were 
not rejected; that is, we can assume that the estimates of the individual income coefficients from 
those specifications can be considered as benchmarks. A look at the individual income 
coefficients across Spec 6C and 8A and those across Specs 6B and 8B reveal that the estimates 
are reasonably robust. We can now conduct the income identity tests with considerable 
confidence. 
Spec 8A 
 Head Income (Food) + Spouse Income (Food) = 0: p-value = 0.0005 
 Head Income (Food) - Spouse Income (Food) = 0: p-value = 0.3818 
Spec 8B 
 Head Income (Food) + Spouse Income (Food) = 0: p-value = 0.0006 




Table 8.3 Dependence of Fuel Demand on Individual Incomes  
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Both Ind Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Head Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
VARIABLES ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.00899 -0.0137** -0.0306*** -0.00927 -0.0114 -0.0210*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00610) (0.00417) (0.00813) (0.00798) (0.00789) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.000206 -0.00157 -0.00451 
    (0.00341) (0.00330) (0.00293) 
Head_Income -1.31e-07*** -1.14e-07***  -1.32e-07*** -1.07e-07***  
 (3.46e-08) (3.15e-08)  (3.99e-08) (3.50e-08)  
Spouse_Income -1.32e-07***  -7.27e-08** -1.33e-07***  -6.63e-08* 
 (4.05e-08)  (3.67e-08) (4.10e-08)  (3.64e-08) 
Constant 0 0 0.777*** 0 0 0.709*** 
 (0) (0) (0.263) (0) (0) (0.266) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.214 0.224 0.248 0.215 0.218 0.237 
       
p-value Over ID Test 0.1413 0.0039 0.0000 0..0494 0.0013 0.0000 
 
Note that the over identification tests imply that exclusion restrictions in Specs 6C is not 
rejected; however, the one for Spec 6B is rejected at the 95% level. It can be noticed that 
accordingly the estimate of the coefficient on spouse’s income is reasonably divergent across 




 Head Income (Fuel) + Spouse Income (Fuel) = 0: p-value = 0.0007 
 Head Income (Fuel) - Spouse Income (Fuel) = 0: p-value = 0.5748 
Spec 8B 
 Head Income (Fuel) + Spouse Income (Fuel) = 0: p-value = 0.0021 




Unfortunately, for the other demands on Public, Private and Clothing goods, the individual 
income coefficients are insignificant. As mentioned before, income identity tests would be 
trivially not rejected for either framework under these circumstances. We provide the estimates 
for all the demands in the appendix, but we do not perform any further tests; we do note 
however, that even with insignificant coefficients, the signs on individual incomes are rarely 
opposite to each other. 
The income identity tests for Staples, Food Items and Fuels prove conclusively that the 
implications from the Collective framework are rejected by the data; however, the RU 
Augmented framework, which makes an equally strong but very different claim, is never rejected 
by the data. Since we considered only statistically significant coefficients to perform the tests, we 
can claim that the income identity tests point to a demand system under the RU Augmented 
framework. 
When we consider the previous tests on proportionality, we recall that the evidence for (or 
against) the Collective framework was mixed. However, since the RU Augmented framework 
made no stringent claims for any relationship between the proportions of responses on demands 
due to variation in distribution factors, we cannot reject the RU Augmented framework; 
however, neither can we say that it is the RU Augmented framework at work. 
The same problem crops up when we consider the conditional demand system. The evidence is 
overwhelmingly against the implications from the Collective Model; however, the RU 
Augmented model claims that distribution factors cannot be excluded from conditioned demands 
and nothing more. Once again, non-rejection of such results does not immediately point out that 
the RU Augmented framework is generating the conditional demand system. 
The results from the conditional demand system imply that distribution factors do not enter 
through a single index; it points to a more complex avenue through which effects of distribution 
factors are manifested. 
The Income Identity tests are of use here, since either hypothesis makes strong claims under such 
a scenario. The results from the data prove, with confidence, that the implications of the RU 
framework are never rejected. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The discussions in the previous chapters are an attempt to provide a better understanding of the 
nature of bargaining inside a household. We recognize that there would be variety in this, given 
the socio-economic environment each agent would find themselves in. Assuming a rigorous 
model of bargaining may not be broadly applicable. We ideally require a framework that makes 
minimal assumptions and is still able to generate testable implications. The Collective 
Hypothesis was an important step in this direction.  
However, the Collective framework does not allow household choices to affect bargaining 
powers; distribution factors, which are outside the ambit of the household and individuals’ 
control, play a key role in the Collective framework by redistributing bargaining weights inside 
the household. We propose the Reservation Utility Augmented Hypothesis, a minimalistic 
framework which preserves the assumption of Pareto Efficient consumption allocations but 
allows bargaining power to be determined as an endogenous outcome of the household decisions 
on resource generation and allocation. We note that this raises the chance of an apparently 
irrational behavior, whereby the generation of resources is deliberately subverted. 
Income subversion tactics can coexist with Pareto Efficiency in consumption; we further note 
that such tactics are not irrational under the RU Augmented framework. In fact, it is a rational 
strategy for agents who care about their relative welfare levels inside the household. In short, we 
all know that improved economic outcomes lead to enhancements in empowerment. However, 
empowerment is a ‘scarce good’ in a household, in the sense that increases in the empowerment 
of one partner comes at the cost of empowerment of the other partner. When social norms 
amplify the requirement to come off as the dominant partner, the motivations for such Aggregate 
Inefficient strategies become stronger.  
Up until now, we have recognized that bargaining weights may be a function of social norms, but 
have not explicitly modeled how such norms may enter the framework. A simple modification is 
now suggested as a first step to introduce the effect of social norms into the RU Augmented 
framework. We note that individuals’ welfare levels are contingent on the environment that the 
individuals find themselves in. In the RU Augmented model, social norms dictating ‘proper 
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behavior’ for individuals, when they are part of the household, enter the in-house welfare levels 
of the respective individuals. The same social norms affect individual reservation utilities, even 
if the individuals are part of the household. For example, the RU of a married woman is 
invariably lower than that of an unmarried woman, even if they are identical in all other respects; 
the social sanction imposed by loss of networks and a sense of taboo under divorce or separation 
cause the RU of the married woman to fall as soon as she joins the household. The stronger the 
sanction, the greater is this reduction; which might be leveraged easily by the dominant decision 
maker to extract a larger surplus without violating his partner’s participation constraint. Once we 
recognize that social norms affect reservation utilities, the RU Augmented framework implies 
that changing norms would recalibrate RUs; this would in turn affect the bargaining weights, 
outcomes and individual welfares. 
In our theoretical framework, we observe that purely economic considerations rationalize 
strategies to cap spousal income beyond the ‘bliss point’, given that the income of the decision 
maker has stayed constant. Essentially, at this bliss point, the cost of compensating the spouse for 
the extra dollar she earns is exactly equal to the benefit that the extra dollar brings to the 
individual. Any subsequent increase in spousal income will generate a net negative benefit to the 
individual. We then introduce bargaining power into the system by arguing that rescaled 
transformations of the Lagrangean on the participation constraint of the spouse are essentially the 
bargaining weights. This allows bargaining weights be determined endogenously as an outcome 
of the decision making process, without making them a choice variable in individual preferences. 
Once we allow bargaining powers to be determined by current decisions, we see that incentives 
towards income subversion strategies are stronger. Given individual income, continuous increase 
in spousal income will continually raise the economic cost of compensation; simultaneously, the 
individual would face erosion in his bargaining weight (which is bound between 0 and 1) while 
his spouse would gain more and more control over decision making. Any threats to divorce 
would become increasingly non-credible, as increments to spousal income would make her 
reservation utility more and more attractive. Indeed, with constant individual income and 
increasing spousal income, the dominant individual will gradually lose his position of dominance 
with the household and be subsequently pushed onto his own reservation utility level. Naturally, 
limiting spousal income is a rational strategy under such considerations. As we note in 
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Proposition 3, such income subversion tactics are not only inefficient for the spouse or the 
household, it is also inefficient for the individual who resorts to such tactics. 
This position of dominance could be eroded or improved by avenues other than spousal income. 
For example, a reform in divorce laws proposing alimony payments makes separation 
unattractive to the dominant partner (who is usually the husband). The situation is worsened by 
the fact that alimony payments reduce the reservation utility of the husband. It is a rational 
strategy for a patriarchal society to implement norms that make divorced women more 
segregated; this reduces the reservation utility of the woman, and her incentives to leverage 
divorce laws to improve her bargaining position. Such rational strategies also explain the stricter 
‘Purdah’ norms implemented at communities in Bangladesh by religious leaders (Agarwal, 1997) 
in response to the formation of BRAC cooperatives for women.
 
The key point is to note the primacy of the individual reservation utility levels in the 
determination of bargaining power, and subsequent allocation of resources. Even if neither 
individual can affect the RU of his or her partner directly, the individual could adopt strategies 
(either by himself or by leveraging social norms) to limit the RU of his partner in future time 
periods; thereby maintaining the position of dominance in the household. Using dowry as an 
instrument to reduce the wealth level of the bride’s family is an example of leveraging social 
norms to subvert the post-divorce reservation utility of the woman. Enacting an informal 
agreement such as using self-income for investment while using spousal income for consumption 
is another strategy to prevent the spouse from possessing assets with clear property rights in case 
of a divorce. 
While summing up the theoretical findings, it is important to note that these are not in conflict 
with Pareto Efficiency in consumption allocation. Under Aggregate Inefficiency, total resources 
and hence, total consumption may well be at sub-optimal levels; but given resources, allocations 
between individuals are such that one cannot be made better off without making the other worse 
off. For example, Udry (1996) finds evidence of inefficient allocation of resources towards the 
agricultural plots controlled by women. This is not evidence in favor of Pareto Inefficiency in 
consumption allocation. Rather, this is a situation where the dominant decision maker opts for 
option B (page 93). Although property rights to land have been temporarily transferred, the input 
allocation has been restricted on purpose so that the woman does not enjoy substantial, 
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continuous gains to her income. Indeed if the input allocation was optimal, it would imply that 
the dominant decision maker had chosen option C. Such a strategy would have been efficient for 
every entity; however, it would have been an irrational strategy in the long run for the decision 
maker, leading to increasing returns of income to his spouse and consequent erosion in his 
position as the dominant individual in the household.  
We consider data from the ‘India Human Development Survey 2005’ to look for empirical 
evidence for or against the RU Augmented Collective Framework. We use a subset of this data; 
we consider 2 adult households who report income via salaried jobs or non-labor sources or a 
combination of both. This allows us to avoid the simultaneity between labor supply and demand 
functions and allow us to use incomes as key explanatory variables in our demand equations. We 
note that we do not attempt to empirically validate or disprove the implication of Aggregate 
Inefficiency; rather we look for properties of the demand system implied by the RU Augmented 
framework. Essentially, if these implications are validated by the data, then the RU Augmented 
framework is at work. The subsequent leap of faith is in saying that since this framework 
rationalizes Aggregate Inefficient behavior, existence of this framework implies the presence of 
Aggregate Inefficiency; at the very least, validation of implications of the demand system raises 
the chances of households engaging in Aggregate Inefficient strategies. 
We study the shares of expenses on a variety of goods. We note that the proportionality tests and 
conditional demand tests have different implications for the Collective and the RU Augmented 
framework; the data rejects the implications that should have been manifested if the Collective 
framework was at play. However, we recognize that the RU Augmented model does not make 
strong implications for these tests; non-rejection of these weak implications does not really prove 
the RU Augmented framework. However, both frameworks make strong and qualitatively 
opposite claims when income identity tests are conducted on the demand system. Econometric 
analyses show that the data rejects the implications of the Collective framework, but never 
rejects those of the RU Augmented framework. Indeed, the coefficients on the individual 
incomes are always equal to each other in size and sign, which confirms the implications of the 
RU Augmented Collective framework. It would not be out of place here to mention that in 
several previous studies supporting the Collective Hypothesis, similar findings have been 
reported by the authors. For example, Bourguignon et al (1993) and Thomas and Chen (1994), 
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given total income, the signs of the coefficients on individual incomes are always similar 
especially when the coefficients are significant. Additionally, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are also similar, although the statistical test for this is not performed by the authors. Given the 
fact that these studies test very similar demand equations on Canadian and Taiwanese data, it can 
be argued that bargaining processes conforming to the RU Augmented Hypothesis is perhaps 
more widespread than apparent. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence in Chapter 8 of the current research provides significant proof 
of household optimization processes as predicted by the RU Augmented framework. The same 
framework proposes income subverting strategies as a rational ploy to maintain dominance in the 
household in Chapter 7; this is a troubling aspect, as there are no clear policies to crack this 
conundrum. It is to be noted that although Aggregate Inefficiency is an implication of the RU 
Augmented framework, the reverse is not necessarily true. The RU Augmented framework 
proposes Aggregate Inefficiency as a rational outcome when the dominant decision maker faces 
interventions that target benefits exclusively to his partner. However, we can see that if these 
benefits cause a ‘spillover’ for the dominant decision maker himself, the rationale for a strategy 
leading to inefficient generation of benefits is weakened. 
Several programs have proposed that improved empowerment levels are an objective of their 
interventions. The present research adds value to the current knowledge by proposing that any 
program which affects bargaining positions of women (thereby affecting her empowerment 
levels) needs to build in incentives for the male to allow his spouse to participate and/or 
disincentives to prevent non participation. Note that the man’s incentives to prevent participation 
are also a function of the social pressures to maintain dominant positions, especially in 
patriarchal societies. Restrictive ‘dos and don’ts’ on women can be viewed as the price that a 
woman has to bear, in a perfectly competitive market. Additionally, there exists peer pressure on 
the husband to ensure that she meets those restrictions. If these restrictions relax, the pressure on 
males to make their wives adhere to these norms would relax too. We have seen how the need to 
maintain a position of dominance amplifies Aggregate Inefficient behavior; socio-economic 
incentives to pursue such strategies could be greatly weakened by reforming such restrictions, 
thereby ameliorating the need for dominance.  
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Thus a two pronged policy, essentially a ‘pincer move’, is needed to weaken social norms and 
incentivize the male to allow the woman to participate in development programs. However, this 
is easier said than done. Social norms have stood for years and have shown considerable inertia 
against laws/policies/programs which propose to improve women’s empowerment. Indeed, such 
norms are perhaps best weakened by starting at the bottom, instead of a top down approach.  
The JEEViKA model has, wittingly or otherwise, suggested potential solutions to the tension 
between poverty reduction and individual empowerment. The provision of cheap credit to SHG 
members opens up an avenue for the budget constraint of the household to relax. Indeed, if we 
recall some of the key results from Chapter 5, the debt portfolio of the beneficiary households 
suggest that uptake of credit for productive purposes is significantly higher. We note that the 
income generated through such productive ventures need not accrue to the woman only; in a 
substantial number of households, such loans are used as investment towards livelihoods of the 
male member(s) in the household. Thus leveraging cheap credit to relax the budget constraint 
does not lead to a ceteris paribus change in women’s income; we have already seen that such 
changes rationalize strategies geared towards Aggregate Inefficiency. Rather, the ability to raise 
credit via the SHG network raises the man’s relative welfare levels in the household, thereby 
increasing his tolerance levels for the woman to improve her relative welfare level. More 
importantly, not allowing his spouse to participate dries up this cheap credit, which directly 
affects his own welfare. Thus, the personal incentive for the male to discourage the woman from 
participating in such programs is weakened, as the potential benefits could improve his welfare 
levels directly.  
However, the social pressures remain; once the woman participates in this ‘SHG movement’, she 
controls the credit inflow into the household to a substantial extent. Quite obviously, even with 
this credit leading to productive investments by the male, such situations increase the woman’s 
say in the household. Evidently the male has to relax his dominance to an extent, which might be 
a deal-breaker under social pressures.  
Recall that JEEViKA rolls out every intervention through women’s institutions; none of the 
benefits go from the project to a member directly. These institutions are based in the woman’s 
community and range from strengths of 10-15 women in an SHG to 150-160 women in the VO. 
This institutional framework creates a platform for the woman to air her demands with respect to 
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the community and her own household. As these demands are voiced by more and more women, 
less and less households view this as an improper practice; the social norms that encourage male 
dominance lose popular support at the grassroots level.  
Thus, the presence of JEEViKA institutions in the village raises the RU of a woman, even if she 
is not a participant. She now has the option of leveraging JEEViKA networks in case her 
household dissolves. The popularity of women’s participation in JEEViKA institutions reduces 
the social pressure on the man to preserve, or rather, project dominance. Finally, the prospect of 
cheap credit, which could be leveraged by the woman for the purposes of the man, allows the 
man to consider the possibility of increasing his in-house welfare by allowing his spouse to 
participate. In essence, the JEEViKA model provides the male dominant decision makers with a 
‘Carrot and Stick’ policy. Preventing participation is less attractive, given that the RU of women 
are increased by JEEViKA’s presence and the unavailability of the benefits that she could have 
accessed if she was able to participate. Allowing participation is more attractive, as the man 
could now leverage the economic benefits to drive a wedge between his in-house welfare and his 
RU. We now consider if the RU Augmented framework has any implication to further accelerate 
socio-economic changes by leveraging the JEEViKA model.  
We consider the 2-adult household of A and B again, retaining the full flavor of the model that 
was considered in Chapter 7. We assume a program which targets B for household poverty 
reduction via a basket of interventions. Let the program intensity for B be denoted by PB and the 
corresponding income that B would earn be denoted by YB(PB), where B’s income is increasing 
with respect to the program intensity. Equation 9' points out that such a design would put A’s 
position of dominance under threat; if PB is accessible only on participation, then A would 
rationally bar B from participating. The JEEViKA model differs from the above design by 
allowing the man to access benefits, for example, cheap credit when his spouse participates. 
However, JEEViKA does not have an incentive design which encourages men to allow their 
spouses to engage with the program more intensively.  
Let us now consider a mechanism where program intensity PA is directed at A. However, A 
would be able to access any positive program intensity only when he allows B to participate and 
continue participation; non-participation by B or suspension of participation would immediately 
discontinue PA. Additionally, PA is increasing with respect to PB. Let the income that A earns by 
115 
 
accessing such benefits be given by YA(PA), which is increasing with respect to PA. The program 
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This design builds in incentives for A to allow participation for B, by allowing A to access 
greater in-house welfare. We can re-write the in-house welfare levels as indirect utility functions 
and observe how such welfare levels are contingent on the program intensities of either 
individual.  
We consider the design closely to see how the ‘carrot and stick’ policy is built into it. As B 
participates more intensively A is able to access higher program benefits, which in turn increases 
his in-house welfare continuously; thus the program drives an increasing wedge between A’s in-
house utility and his RU, thereby increasing his tolerance for increasing benefits to B. 
Additionally, any measure to discourage B’s participation is unambiguously welfare reducing for 
A. Since B’s benefits are still available to her if the household dissolves (while A loses all 
benefits), any threats and measures towards income subversion by A are irrational and non-
credible.  
Thus, programs like JEEViKA can be used as a policy tool to relax tendencies towards 
subverting female participation in income generation activities. The clearest sign is the increased 
voice of women under JEEViKA’s ambit in matters related to their own livelihood activity, as 
evidenced by the data. A disconcerting sign is that indicators which signal the capability of a 
woman to deal with her environment are usually at a lower level than indicators that signal her 
control over her own preferences. However, we should recall that in the context of Bihar, the 
rural woman faces an array of hurdles before she can have a semblance of self-sufficiency on 
socio-economic parameters. It may be an interesting innovation for programs like JEEViKA to 
design some interventions along the lines discussed above. The RU Augmented framework 
116 
 
proposes that such designs should accelerate changes by aligning individual interests towards the 
joint goals of poverty reduction and individual empowerment, without threatening any individual 
with a complete loss of position.  
On the agenda of further research, we should note that this attempt was not able to prove the 
extent or existence of Aggregate Inefficiency; frankly, this was beyond the scope of the study. 
However, this problem of income subversion could be tackled scientifically only with a clear 
understanding of the social and economic factors that affect bargaining power; in essence, we 
need to know how the extent of Aggregate Inefficiency is affected by distribution factors. 
Subsequently, with these insights, sustainable policies to encourage empowerment and 








Appendix 1: Impacts due to JEEViKA 
Table A3.5: TIME CONSTANT VARIABLES measured at VILLAGE LEVEL 
HC_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a HEALTH CENTER 
PDS_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a PDS 
School_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a SCHOOL 
TargetPopLevel1 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 1 of Target Population [0 < (SC+ST) < 660] 
TargetPopLevel2 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 2 of Target Population [661 < (SC+ST) < 1320] 
TargetPopLevel3 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 3 of Target Population [1321 < (SC+ST) < 1980] 
TargetPopLevel4 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 4 of Target Population [1981 < (SC+ST) < 2640] 
TargetPopLevel5 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 5 of Target Population [2641 < (SC+ST) ] 
 
Table A3.6: TIME CONSTANT VARIABLES measured at HH LEVEL 
Caste_SC Percentage of SC Households  
Caste_ST Percentage of ST Households 
Caste_EBC Percentage of EBC Households 
Caste_BC Percentage of BC Households 
Caste_GEN Percentage of GENERAL Households 
Hindu Percentage of HINDU Households 
Muslim Percentage of MUSLIM  Households 
Buddhist Percentage of BUDDHIST Households 
Jain Percentage of JAIN Households 
NAdultMales No. of adult males in HH 
NAdultFemales No. of adult females in HH 
TotChildren_SchoolAge No. of children in HH of school going age , 5-18 years 




Table A3.7: OUTCOME VARIABLES measured at HH LEVEL at PRE-INTERVENTION VALUES 
Tot_Earner_past No. of individuals engaged in any livelihood activity at some point during 2007 
Tot_PermEarner_past No. of individuals engaged in any livelihood activity all year during 2007 
Roof_Past_pucca Percentage of HHs with Pucca Roof in 2007 
Floor_Past_pucca Percentage of HHs with Pucca Floor in 2007 
Wall_Past_pucca Percentage of HHs with Pucca Wall in 2007 
Field_Toilet_past Percentage of HHs using FIELDS for toilet in 2007 
PvtToilet_past Percentage of HHs using PRIVATE FACILITIES for toilet in 2007 
PubToilet_past Percentage of HHs using PUBLIC FACILITIES for toilet in 2007 
rooms_past No. of rooms in 2007 
Land_2007 Land holding in Kathas in 2007 
Chair_2007 No. of chairs in 2007 
Cot_2007 No. of cots in 2007 
Mobile_2007 No. of mobiles in 2007 
Watch_2007 No. of watches in 2007 
Cycle_2007 No. of cycles in 2007 
Cows_2007 No. of cows in 2007 
Buffalo~2007 No. of buffaloes in 2007 
Bullock~2007 No. of bullocks in 2007 
Goats_2007 No. of goats in 2007 
months_insecurity_past No. of months in 2007 during which HH faced food shortage 
Act_Beating_Past (in 2ndand 4th spec) Percentage of respondents capable of any action in 2007 due to issue: woman being beaten 
Act_PDS_Past (in 2ndand 4th spec) Percentage of respondents capable of any action in 2007 due to issue: PDS 
Act_School_Past (in 2ndand 4th spec) Percentage of respondents capable of any action in 2007 due to issue: SCHOOL 





Table A3.8 Balance in Pre-Intervention Levels of Household Outcome Variables, across matching modules 
 NN, with replacement CALIPER RADIUS KERNEL 
Variable Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control      t         p>t Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t 
Tot_Earner_past 1.7336   1.7542 -0.85  0.396 1.7336   1.7542 -0.85  0.396 1.7336   1.7542 -0.85  0.396 1.7336   1.7542 -0.85  0.396 
 
1.7361   1.7278 0.34  0.732 1.7255   1.7337 -0.32  0.749 1.7255   1.7196 0.23  0.818 1.7361   1.7191 0.71  0.480 
 
                
Tot_PermEarner_past 1.6342   1.6995 -2.60  0.009 1.6342   1.6995 -2.60  0.009 1.6342   1.6995 -2.60  0.009 1.6342   1.6995 -2.60  0.009 
 
1.6376   1.6294 0.32  0.746 1.654   1.6663 -0.46  0.643 1.654   1.6479 0.23  0.820 1.6376   1.6242 0.53  0.594 
 
                
Roof_Past_pucca .26999   .24272 1.96  0.051 .26999   .24272 1.96  0.051 .26999   .24272 1.96  0.051 .26999   .24272 1.96  0.051 
 
.26959   .29175 -1.54  0.125 .25748   .26745 -0.66  0.508 .25748   .25208 0.36  0.718 .26959   .26928 0.02  0.983 
 
                
Floor_Past_pucca .07081   .04241 3.85  0.000 .07081   .04241 3.85  0.000 .07081   .04241 3.85  0.000 .07081   .04241 3.85  0.000 
 
.0701   .06907 0.13  0.900 .05455   .05044 0.54  0.591 .05455   .04973 0.63  0.528 .0701   .07012 -0.00  0.998 
 
                
Wall_Past_pucca .27509   .26367 0.81  0.420 .27509   .26367 0.81  0.420 .27509   .26367 0.81  0.420 .27509   .26367 0.81  0.420 
 
.27423   .27629 -0.14  0.886 .26334    .2563 0.47  0.639 .26334    .2667 -0.22  0.824 .27423   .27411 0.01  0.994 
 
                
Field_Toilet_past .91238   .93051 -2.11  0.035 .91238   .93051 -2.11  0.035 .91238   .93051 -2.11  0.035 .91238   .93051 -2.11  0.035 
 
.91443   .91134 0.34  0.733 .92727   .92199 0.58  0.559 .92727   .91947 0.86  0.392 .91443   .91377 0.07  0.941 
 
                
PvtToilet_past .04381   .03321 1.72  0.085 .04381   .03321 1.72  0.085 .04381   .03321 1.72  0.085 .04381   .03321 1.72  0.085 
 
.04278   .03918 0.57  0.571 .0346   .03578 -0.19  0.853 .0346   .04176 -1.09  0.276 .04278   .04184 0.15  0.884 
 
                
rooms_past 1.8467   1.8186 0.85  0.393 1.8467   1.8186 0.85  0.393 1.8467   1.8186 0.85  0.393 1.8467   1.8186 0.85  0.393 
 
1.8464   1.8459 0.02  0.988 1.8217   1.8393 -0.50  0.614 1.8217   1.8111 0.31  0.758 1.8464   1.8297 0.51  0.611 
 
                
Land_2007 10.097   10.561 -0.44  0.660 10.097   10.561 -0.44  0.660 10.097   10.561 -0.44  0.660 10.097   10.561 -0.44  0.660 
 
10.113    12.32 -2.12  0.034 9.2373   11.262 -2.08  0.038 9.2373   10.135 -1.03  0.302 10.113   11.325 -1.21  0.227 
 
                
Chair_2007 .60316   .51865 2.70  0.007 .60316   .51865 2.70  0.007 .60316   .51865 2.70  0.007 .60316   .51865 2.70  0.007 
 
.5933   .55619 1.18  0.238 .5607   .53842 0.67  0.501 .5607   .56975 -0.27  0.788 .5933   .58934 0.12  0.901 
 
                
Cot_2007 1.7718   1.8007 -0.72  0.474 1.7718   1.8007 -0.72  0.474 1.7718   1.8007 -0.72  0.474 1.7718   1.8007 -0.72  0.474 
 
1.7747   1.7397 0.86  0.388 1.7548   1.7196 0.83  0.409 1.7548   1.7476 0.17  0.865 1.7747    1.776 -0.03  0.975 
 
                
Mobile_2007 .35507   .25652 6.10  0.000 .35507   .25652 6.10  0.000 .35507   .25652 6.10  0.000 .35507   .25652 6.10  0.000 
 
.34639    .3634 -1.06  0.290 .31613   .32727 -0.68  0.499 .31613   .32655 -0.63  0.531 .34639   .35963 -0.81  0.416 
 
                
Watch_2007 .32094   .23761 5.16  0.000 .32094   .23761 5.16  0.000 .32094   .23761 5.16  0.000 .32094   .23761 5.16  0.000 
 
.31753   .31959 -0.12  0.905 .28211   .27155 0.62  0.534 .28211   .28469 -0.15  0.881 .31753   .32113 -0.21  0.837 
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 NN, with replacement CALIPER RADIUS KERNEL 
Variable Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control      t         p>t Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t 
Cycle_2007 .36882   .30301 4.11  0.000 .36882   .30301 4.11  0.000 .36882   .30301 4.11  0.000 .36882   .30301 4.11  0.000 
 
.36495   .36546 -0.03  0.975 .34076   .34721 -0.38  0.702 .34076   .33244 0.49  0.622 .36495   .36299 0.12  0.905 
        
Cows_2007 .30056   .28615 0.72  0.473 .30056   .28615 0.72  0.473 .30056   .28615 0.72  0.473 .30056   .28615 0.72  0.473 
 
.29897   .30876 -0.48  0.631 .28328   .31789 -1.60  0.109 .28328   .28266 0.03  0.976 .29897   .28511 0.70  0.483 
 
                
Buffalo~2007 .24452   .23352 0.59  0.554 .24452   .23352 0.59  0.554 .24452   .23352 0.59  0.554 .24452   .23352 0.59  0.554 
 
.2433   .28454 -2.09  0.037 .24223   .28856 -2.17  0.030 .24223   .27327 -1.50  0.133 .2433   .25959 -0.87  0.386 
 
                
Bullock~2007 .20122   .23301 -1.70  0.090 .20122   .23301 -1.70  0.090 .20122   .23301 -1.70  0.090 .20122   .23301 -1.70  0.090 
 
.20258   .22577 -1.26  0.207 .20645   .23109 -1.25  0.211 .20645   .21003 -0.19  0.853 .20258   .20787 -0.29  0.772 
 
                
Goats_2007 .56139   .56975 -0.22  0.823 .56139   .56975 -0.22  0.823 .56139   .56975 -0.22  0.823 .56139   .56975 -0.22  0.823 
 
.56392   .56546 -0.04  0.968 .57302   .59765 -0.57  0.567 .57302    .5744 -0.03  0.974 .56392    .5612 0.07  0.945 
 
                
months_insecurity_past 1.1885   1.3388 -2.51  0.012 1.1885   1.3388 -2.51  0.012 1.1885   1.3388 -2.51  0.012 1.1885   1.3388 -2.51  0.012 
 
1.1979   1.1876 0.17  0.863 1.2188   1.2897 -1.10  0.273 1.2188   1.2325 -0.21  0.830 1.1979   1.1314 1.14  0.255 
 
                
PubToilet_past .04381   .03628 1.20  0.229 .04381   .03628 1.20  0.229 .04381   .03628 1.20  0.229 .04381   .03628 1.20  0.229 











Table A4.1: ATTs, across NN, Radius and Kernel Algorithms: All households reporting women’s modules considered 
 
 
Nearest Neighbor, with Replacement Radius Matching, Caliper=0.0005 Kernel Matching, Bandwidth=0.0302 
Variable Controls Difference T-stat 
 
Controls Difference T-stat 
 
Controls Difference T-stat 
 
             land_owned 10.85 -0.77 -0.63 
 
10.65 -1.28 -1.18 
 
10.95 -0.87 -0.86 
 Del_Land 0.02 -0.04 -0.55 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.47 
 
-0.06 0.04 1.01 
 leased_in_2010 4.64 0.98 1.57 
 
4.68 0.67 1.24 
 
4.92 0.70 1.42 
 Del_LeaseIn 0.36 -0.46 -1.87 ** 0.15 -0.30 -1.17 
 
0.18 -0.27 -1.21 
 chair_current 0.74 0.01 0.29 
 
0.70 -0.02 -0.38 
 
0.74 0.01 0.23 
 cot_current 2.05 -0.09 -1.58 
 
2.00 -0.05 -1 
 
2.01 -0.05 -1.05 
 mobile_current 0.53 0.03 1.23 
 
0.47 0.06 2.57 *** 0.52 0.04 2.14 ** 
watch_current 0.41 0.00 -0.18 
 
0.36 0.01 0.6 
 
0.39 0.02 0.78 
 cycle_current 0.48 -0.03 -1.27 
 
0.44 -0.02 -0.74 
 
0.44 0.00 0.14 
 cows_current 0.34 0.01 0.29 
 
0.34 -0.01 -0.29 
 
0.32 0.03 1.1 
 buffaloes_curr~t 0.27 0.02 0.59 
 
0.30 -0.02 -0.89 
 
0.30 -0.02 -0.76 
 bullocks_current 0.20 0.03 1.02 
 
0.22 0.02 0.74 
 
0.22 0.01 0.29 
 goats_current 0.54 0.04 0.72 
 
0.59 0.01 0.29 
 
0.57 0.00 0.13 
 Del_Chair 0.16 0.01 0.41 
 
0.17 -0.02 -1.1 
 
0.15 0.02 0.98 
 Del_Cot 0.20 -0.01 -0.42 
 
0.22 -0.04 -1.61 
 
0.22 -0.03 -1.42 
 Del_Mobile 0.17 0.04 2.21 ** 0.16 0.05 3.29 *** 0.16 0.06 3.91 *** 
Del_Cycle 0.09 0.00 -0.16 
 
0.08 0.00 -0.19 
 
0.08 0.01 0.73 
 Del_Watch 0.07 0.02 1.27 
 
0.07 0.02 1.74 ** 0.07 0.02 2.39 *** 
Del_Cows 0.03 0.02 1.38 
 
0.03 0.01 0.6 
 
0.03 0.02 1.95 ** 
Del_Buffaloes 0.04 0.00 0.2 
 
0.05 -0.01 -1.26 
 
0.05 -0.01 -1.24 
 Del_Bullocks 0.01 0.01 0.92 
 
0.01 0.01 1.45 
 
0.01 0.01 1.88 ** 
Del_Goats 0.02 -0.01 -0.32 
 
0.03 -0.02 -0.65 
 
0.01 0.01 0.39 
 Roof_Pres_Pucca 0.28 0.02 1.16 
 
0.28 0.01 0.29 
 
0.30 0.01 0.58 
 Del_Roof 0.03 0.00 0.19 
 
0.03 0.01 1.01 
 
0.03 0.01 1.43 
 Floor_Pres_Pucca 0.07 0.00 -0.09 
 
0.06 -0.01 -0.89 
 
0.08 -0.01 -0.92 
 Del_Floor 0.01 -0.01 -2 ** 0.01 -0.01 -2.01 ** 0.01 -0.01 -1.29 
 Wall_Pres_Pucca 0.32 0.00 -0.17 
 
0.31 -0.01 -0.54 
 
0.31 0.00 0.04 
 Del_Wall 0.04 -0.01 -0.58 
 
0.04 0.00 -0.04 
 




Variable Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  
             
Field_Toilet_~nt 0.90 -0.01 -0.86 
 
0.91 -0.01 -0.64 
 
0.90 -0.01 -0.91 
 Del_Field -0.02 -0.01 -1.72 ** -0.02 -0.01 -1.88 ** -0.01 -0.02 -2.68 *** 
Common_Toilet~nt 0.05 0.01 0.73 
 
0.05 0.00 0.44 
 
0.05 0.00 0.33 
 Del_Common 0.01 0.01 1.63 
 
0.01 0.01 1.44 
 
0.01 0.01 1.52 
 Private_Toile~nt 0.05 0.00 0.46 
 
0.04 0.00 0.45 
 
0.05 0.01 0.94 
 Del_Private 0.01 0.00 0.64 
 
0.01 0.00 1.1 
 
0.01 0.01 2.17 *** 
rooms_present 1.89 0.01 0.13 
 
1.90 -0.02 -0.6 
 
1.88 0.02 0.53 
 food_secure_pr~t 0.32 0.03 1.17 
 
0.35 -0.01 -0.27 
 
0.34 0.00 0.11 
 Del_Insecure -0.02 -0.01 -0.82 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -2.16 ** -0.01 -0.02 -2.15 ** 
months_insecu~nt 0.80 0.08 1.19 
 
0.91 -0.02 -0.33 
 
0.89 -0.01 -0.2 
 Del_Month -0.26 -0.05 -1.13 
 
-0.24 -0.07 -1.59 
 
-0.24 -0.06 -1.73 ** 
Del_Intensity1 0.68 -0.01 -0.57 
 
0.67 -0.01 -0.33 
 
0.68 -0.01 -0.46 
 Del_Intensity2 0.14 -0.01 -0.81 
 
0.15 -0.02 -1.31 
 
0.14 -0.01 -1.04 
 Del_Intensity3 0.18 0.03 1.39 
 
0.18 0.02 1.52 
 
0.19 0.02 1.44 
 Tot_Earner_Pre~t 1.71 0.03 0.88 
 
1.74 0.00 0.06 
 
1.72 0.02 0.75 
 Del_Earner 0.01 0.00 -0.73 
 
0.01 0.00 -0.42 
 
0.01 0.00 -0.38 
 Tot_PermEarne~nt 1.62 0.03 0.84 
 
1.67 0.00 -0.02 
 
1.63 0.02 0.66 
 Del_Perm_Earner 0.01 0.00 -0.16 
 
0.01 0.00 0.17 
 
0.01 0.00 0.21 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_Ag_Own -0.01 0.01 1.09 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.71 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Ag_Own 0.00 0.00 0.85 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.07 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.38 
 HH_Net_In_Zaid_Ag_Own 0.00 -0.01 -1.32 
 
0.00 -0.01 -1.95 ** 0.00 -0.01 -1.41 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_Ag_Rent 0.00 0.00 -0.69 
 
0.00 0.00 -1.38 
 
0.00 0.00 -1.17 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Ag_Rent 0.00 0.00 -1.01 
 
0.00 -0.01 -1.56 
 
0.00 0.00 -1.48 
 HH_Net_In_Zaid_Ag_Rent 0.00 0.00 -0.38 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.79 
 
0.00 0.00 -1.58 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_Ag_Lab -0.01 0.01 1.34 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.82 
 
-0.01 0.01 1.55 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Ag_Lab -0.01 0.01 1.42 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.9 
 
-0.01 0.01 1.69 ** 
HH_Net_In_Zaid_Ag_Lab 0.00 0.00 -1.05 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.44 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.11 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_A_Husb 0.00 0.00 0.93 
 
0.00 0.00 1.02 
 
-0.01 0.00 2.11 ** 
HH_Net_In_Rabi_A_Husb -0.01 0.01 1.69 ** -0.01 0.00 1.78 ** -0.01 0.01 2.13 ** 
HH_Net_In_Zaid_A_Husb 0.00 0.00 1.61 
 
0.00 0.00 1.75 ** 0.00 0.00 1.73 ** 
HH_Net_In_Kharif_Nfarm 0.00 0.00 0.18 
 
0.00 0.01 1.92 ** 0.00 0.00 -1.21 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Nfarm 0.00 0.00 0.35 
 
0.00 0.01 2.1 ** 0.00 0.00 -0.98 




Variable Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  
             
HH_Net_In_Kharif_Lab_Urban 0.00 0.01 1.29 
 
0.00 0.00 1.14 
 
0.00 0.01 1.77 ** 
HH_Net_In_Rabi_Lab_Urban 0.00 0.01 1.08 
 
0.00 0.00 0.65 
 
0.00 0.00 1.25 
 HH_Net_In_Zaid_Lab_Urban 0.00 0.00 0.12 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 
 
0.00 0.00 0.15 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_Lab_Rural 0.00 -0.01 -1.31 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.65 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Lab_Rural 0.00 -0.01 -1.2 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.34 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.24 
 HH_Net_In_Zaid_Lab_Rural -0.01 0.01 1.26 
 
-0.01 0.01 1.35 
 
0.00 0.00 0.81 
 HH_Net_In_Kharif_Sal 0.01 -0.01 -1.69 ** 0.01 -0.01 -2.48 *** 0.01 0.00 -1.47 
 HH_Net_In_Rabi_Sal 0.01 -0.01 -1.54 
 
0.01 -0.01 -2.43 *** 0.01 0.00 -1.49 
 HH_Net_In_Zaid_Sal 0.00 0.00 -0.82 
 
0.01 -0.01 -2.33 *** 0.00 0.00 -0.27 
 Tot_Boy_in_Sch~l 1.06 0.01 0.22 
 
0.99 0.06 1.52 
 
1.04 0.04 1.09 
 Tot_Girl_in_Sc~l 0.90 0.02 0.34 
 
0.84 0.05 1.24 
 
0.87 0.04 1.12 
 savings_2010 0.24 0.71 39.59 *** 0.22 0.73 51.74 *** 0.24 0.71 57.01 *** 
Del_Saving 0.13 0.58 32.73 *** 0.12 0.59 37.51 *** 0.13 0.58 40.76 *** 
NFormal_present 0.01 -0.01 -2.71 *** 0.01 -0.01 -3.39 *** 0.01 -0.01 -2.82 *** 
Del_NFormal 0.00 -0.01 -2.5 *** 0.00 -0.01 -2.88 *** 0.00 -0.01 -2.67 *** 
Formal_present 0.09 -0.06 -5.24 *** 0.08 -0.06 -6.47 *** 0.09 -0.06 -7.82 *** 
Del_Formal 0.03 -0.02 -2.8 *** 0.02 -0.02 -2.83 *** 0.02 -0.02 -2.79 *** 
SHG_present 0.10 0.82 59.76 *** 0.10 0.82 70.54 *** 0.11 0.81 77.47 *** 
Del_SHG 0.09 0.63 38.9 *** 0.08 0.63 43.4 *** 0.09 0.62 46.94 *** 
IndebtedOldHC 0.05 -0.02 -1.88 ** 0.06 -0.02 -2.65 *** 0.06 -0.02 -2.72 *** 
HC_OldLoan_Total 1346.79 129.43 0.16 
 
1207.54 355.87 0.46 
 
1319.10 157.11 0.23 
 IndebtedNewHC 0.44 -0.19 -8.49 *** 0.43 -0.18 -9.84 *** 0.44 -0.19 -11.16 *** 
HC_NewLoan_Total 7749.35 -3525.65 -2.38 *** 8073.77 -3955.76 -3.73 *** 7927.87 -3704.17 -3.98 *** 
N_Loan 0.69 0.48 13.07 *** 0.69 0.48 15.34 *** 0.69 0.49 17.17 *** 
Total_Borrowed 11031.02 813.00 0.47 
 
11077.16 690.71 0.51 
 
11041.88 802.14 0.68 
 Tot_Loan_Health 0.29 0.15 5.45 *** 0.28 0.17 7.08 *** 0.27 0.17 7.73 *** 
Tot_Amt_Health 3965.45 529.23 0.34 
 
3910.79 804.09 0.71 
 
3449.09 1045.58 1.07 
 Tot_Loan_Marital 0.15 -0.01 -0.38 
 
0.15 -0.01 -0.42 
 
0.15 -0.01 -0.58 
 Tot_Amt_Marital 2897.10 -782.93 -1.54 
 
2742.44 -664.76 -1.6 
 
2834.64 -720.48 -1.94 ** 
Tot_Loan_Food 0.07 0.04 2.85 *** 0.07 0.04 2.87 *** 0.07 0.04 3.33 *** 
Tot_Amt_Food 544.22 48.00 0.31 
 
833.34 -269.18 -0.83 
 
693.56 -101.34 -0.35 
 Tot_Loan_House 0.06 0.05 3.82 *** 0.06 0.03 3.04 *** 0.06 0.04 4.3 *** 
Tot_Amt_House 1048.61 127.86 0.47 
 
1059.81 -40.54 -0.17 
 




Variable Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  
             
Tot_Loan_Durab~s 0.03 0.04 3.37 *** 0.03 0.03 3.6 *** 0.04 0.03 3.68 *** 
Tot_Amt_Durables 539.73 -52.69 -0.29 
 
613.84 -119.20 -0.63 
 
560.66 -73.63 -0.44 
 Tot_Loan_School 0.01 0.01 0.76 
 
0.01 0.00 0.78 
 
0.01 0.00 0.13 
 Tot_Amt_School 48.61 83.85 1.16 
 
56.15 91.83 1.57 
 
76.28 56.18 1.1 
 Tot_Loan_Debt 0.01 0.08 9.96 *** 0.01 0.08 10.61 *** 0.01 0.08 11.38 *** 
Tot_Amt_Debt 52.85 673.44 7.16 *** 43.63 708.99 7.22 *** 46.56 679.73 7.85 *** 
Tot_Loan_Lives~k 0.01 0.06 7.53 *** 0.01 0.06 7.67 *** 0.01 0.05 7.97 *** 
Tot_Amt_Livest~k 132.25 426.42 3.68 *** 174.14 394.61 4.07 *** 165.63 393.05 4.52 *** 
Tot_Loan_Shop 0.02 0.04 3.86 *** 0.02 0.03 3.88 *** 0.02 0.04 5.43 *** 
Tot_Amt_Shop 380.29 228.86 1.26 
 
318.74 231.75 1.68 
 
302.59 306.56 2.46 *** 
Tot_Loan_Machine 0.00 0.01 1.77 ** 0.00 0.01 1.78 ** 0.01 0.01 1.77 ** 
Tot_Amt_Machine 538.42 -328.49 -0.69 
 
485.11 -273.77 -0.95 
 
628.94 -419.01 -1.67 ** 
Self_Response 0.73 0.17 8.8 *** 0.73 0.17 10.72 *** 0.74 0.16 11.65 *** 
age_marriage 15.88 -0.08 -0.29 
 
15.76 -0.08 -0.33 
 
15.89 -0.09 -0.4 
 son_education 9.34 0.50 2.26 ** 9.22 0.46 2.43 *** 9.37 0.47 2.71 *** 
daughter_educa~n 7.94 0.42 1.96 ** 7.94 0.22 1.2 
 
8.10 0.25 1.52 
 signature_lite~e 0.35 0.33 13.33 *** 0.34 0.33 16.41 *** 0.35 0.33 18.79 *** 
sign_literate 0.19 0.03 1.84 ** 0.17 0.04 2.37 ** 0.18 0.04 3.16 ** 
job_card 0.24 0.00 -0.08 
 
0.25 0.00 0.16 
 
0.24 0.00 -0.23 
 kirana_present 0.83 0.04 2.09 ** 0.83 0.04 2.73 *** 0.84 0.03 2.28 ** 
Del_Kirana 0.05 0.01 1.23 
 
0.06 0.01 0.83 
 
0.06 0.01 1.33 
 pds_present 0.65 0.00 0.21 
 
0.66 -0.01 -0.36 
 
0.65 0.00 0.06 
 Del_PDS 0.04 0.02 1.55 
 
0.04 0.02 2.22 ** 0.04 0.02 2.42 *** 
health_present 0.81 0.06 3.53 *** 0.82 0.05 3.09 *** 0.82 0.05 4.09 *** 
Del_Health 0.06 0.03 2.02 ** 0.06 0.02 1.8 ** 0.06 0.03 2.58 *** 
neighbor_present 0.95 0.02 2.55 *** 0.96 0.02 2.39 *** 0.96 0.01 2 ** 
Del_Neighbor 0.04 0.02 2.09 ** 0.05 0.01 1.43 
 
0.06 0.01 1.08 
 relative_present 0.85 0.05 3.19 *** 0.85 0.04 2.93 *** 0.86 0.03 2.78 *** 
Del_Relative 0.04 0.03 2.76 *** 0.05 0.03 2.49 *** 0.05 0.02 2.07 ** 
panchayat_pres~t 0.03 0.05 5.84 *** 0.03 0.06 6.68 *** 0.04 0.05 6.47 *** 
Del_Panchayat 0.00 0.02 3.92 *** 0.00 0.02 3.69 *** 0.00 0.02 4.05 *** 
decision_cook~nt 0.93 0.00 -0.4 
 
0.93 0.00 0.08 
 
0.93 0.00 0.02 
 Del_Cook 0.04 -0.01 -0.69 
 
0.04 0.00 -0.24 
 




Variable Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  
             
decision_dura~nt 0.43 0.08 3.56 *** 0.41 0.09 4.48 *** 0.44 0.07 4.18 *** 
Del_Durable 0.03 0.01 0.68 
 
0.03 0.01 0.94 
 
0.02 0.02 2.25 ** 
decision_pers~nt 0.92 0.01 0.99 
 
0.93 0.00 0.45 
 
0.93 0.01 0.64 
 Del_Personal 0.05 -0.01 -0.93 
 
0.05 -0.01 -0.98 
 
0.05 0.00 -0.27 
 decision_heal~nt 0.70 0.04 2.09 ** 0.70 0.03 1.55 
 
0.71 0.04 2.16 ** 
Del_Health 0.06 0.03 2.02 ** 0.06 0.02 1.8 ** 0.06 0.03 2.58 *** 
decision_educ~nt 0.70 0.10 4.54 *** 0.69 0.09 4.83 *** 0.71 0.09 5.33 *** 
Del_Education 0.06 0.01 1.27 
 
0.06 0.02 1.6 
 
0.06 0.02 2.26 ** 
dec_live_pres 0.50 0.05 2.25 ** 0.50 0.06 2.78 *** 0.49 0.05 3.04 *** 
Del_Livelihood 0.02 0.02 2.59 *** 0.02 0.02 2.37 *** 0.02 0.02 2.98 *** 
dec_employ_pres 0.53 0.06 2.78 *** 0.52 0.08 3.81 *** 0.52 0.08 4.21 *** 
Del_Employment 0.03 0.02 1.85 ** 0.02 0.01 2.07 ** 0.02 0.02 3.06 ** 
decision_loan~nt 0.58 0.23 10.32 *** 0.58 0.23 12.58 *** 0.58 0.23 14.22 *** 
Del_Loan 0.03 0.07 7.09 *** 0.03 0.06 6.45 *** 0.02 0.07 8.37 *** 
decision_poli~nt 0.20 0.09 4.61 *** 0.19 0.10 6.01 *** 0.21 0.09 5.73 *** 
Del_Politics 0.01 0.04 5.78 *** 0.01 0.03 5.24 *** 0.01 0.04 5.66 *** 
beating_actio~nt 0.72 0.11 5.43 *** 0.74 0.09 5.67 *** 0.75 0.08 5.63 *** 
Del_Beat_Act 0.16 0.06 3.61 *** 0.15 0.08 5.22 *** 0.15 0.07 5.3 *** 
pds_action_pre~t 0.38 0.05 2.33 ** 0.39 0.03 1.62 
 
0.38 0.05 3.06 *** 
Del_PDS_Act 0.10 0.05 3.45 *** 0.10 0.05 3.76 *** 0.09 0.06 4.75 *** 
school_action~nt 0.35 0.06 2.73 *** 0.34 0.05 2.62 *** 0.36 0.06 3.26 *** 
Del_School_Act 0.09 0.06 4.17 *** 0.10 0.05 4.19 *** 0.10 0.06 4.86 *** 
mukhiya_actio~nt 0.26 0.03 1.52 
 
0.26 0.02 1.35 
 
0.26 0.03 1.78 ** 
Del_Mukhiya_Act 0.06 0.04 3.16 *** 0.06 0.03 2.45 *** 0.06 0.03 3.31 *** 
ASelfBPres 0.36 0.11 4.68 *** 0.36 0.09 4.52 *** 0.38 0.08 4.58 *** 
Del_Self_beat 0.08 0.07 4.22 *** 0.08 0.05 4.01 *** 0.09 0.05 4.25 *** 
AWomBPres 0.39 0.16 6.93 *** 0.40 0.14 6.88 *** 0.40 0.15 8.72 *** 
Del_Wom_beat 0.10 0.12 7.22 *** 0.10 0.12 8.3 *** 0.09 0.13 10.14 *** 
ASelfPDSPres 0.18 0.01 0.66 
 
0.17 0.02 1.05 
 
0.18 0.02 1.14 
 Del_Self_pds 0.05 0.01 0.95 
 
0.05 0.01 0.98 
 
0.05 0.02 1.93 ** 
AWomPDSPres 0.17 0.05 3.08 *** 0.15 0.07 4.52 *** 0.14 0.08 6.09 *** 
Del_Wom_pds 0.05 0.06 5.27 *** 0.04 0.07 6.18 *** 0.04 0.07 7.27 *** 
ASelfSPres 0.16 0.02 1.49 
 
0.14 0.03 2.2 ** 0.15 0.03 2.2 ** 
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Variable Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  Controls Difference T-stat  
             
Del_Self_school 0.05 0.03 2.34 ** 0.05 0.03 2.83 *** 0.05 0.03 2.9 *** 
AWomSPres 0.17 0.06 3.66 *** 0.15 0.06 4.26 *** 0.16 0.07 5.47 *** 
Del_Wom_school 0.05 0.07 5.46 *** 0.05 0.06 5.38 *** 0.05 0.06 6.32 *** 
ASelfMPres 0.10 0.01 0.72 
 
0.09 0.01 0.87 
 
0.09 0.02 2.01 ** 
Del_Self_mukhiya 0.03 0.01 1.56 
 
0.03 0.01 1.13 
 
0.03 0.01 2.06 ** 
AWomMPres 0.12 0.04 2.92 *** 0.11 0.04 3.45 *** 0.12 0.05 3.99 *** 
Del_Wom_mukhiya 0.03 0.05 5.15 *** 0.03 0.04 4.72 *** 0.03 0.04 5.7 *** 
 
Significance at 95% denoted by “**”, significance at 99% denoted by “***”. 
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Appendix 2: Runs of Matching without Retrospective Levels of Outcomes 
Matching Variables: TIME CONSTANT VARIABLES measured at VILLAGE LEVEL 
HC_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a HEALTH CENTER 
PDS_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a PDS 
School_Absent Percentage of HHs in village without a SCHOOL 
TargetPopLevel1 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 1 of Target Population [0 < (SC+ST) < 660] 
TargetPopLevel2 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 2 of Target Population [661 < (SC+ST) < 1320] 
TargetPopLevel3 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 3 of Target Population [1321 < (SC+ST) < 1980] 
TargetPopLevel4 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 4 of Target Population [1981 < (SC+ST) < 2640] 
TargetPopLevel5 Percentage of HHs in village in Stratum 5 of Target Population [2641 < (SC+ST) ] 
 
Matching Variables: TIME CONSTANT VARIABLES measured at HH LEVEL 
Caste_SC Percentage of SC Households  
Caste_ST Percentage of ST Households 
Caste_EBC Percentage of EBC Households 
Caste_BC Percentage of BC Households 
Caste_GEN Percentage of GENERAL Households 
Hindu Percentage of HINDU Households 
Muslim Percentage of MUSLIM  Households 
Buddhist Percentage of BUDDHIST Households 
Jain Percentage of JAIN Households 
NAdultMales No. of adult males in HH 
NAdultFemales No. of adult females in HH 
TotChildren_SchoolAge No. of children in HH of school going age , 5-18 years 




Balance Diagnostics: Reruns without retrospective levels of outcomes 
  NN, with replacement RADIUS KERNEL 
Variable Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t 
       
HC_Absent .58584   .60985 -1.54  0.122 .58526   .60985 -1.58  0.114 .58584   .60985 -1.54  0.122 
  .59176   .61922 -1.76  0.078 .60163   .58406 1.09  0.278 .59176   .59914 -0.47  0.637 
  
      PDS_Absent .33082   .32026 0.71  0.477 .33049   .32026 0.69  0.491 .33082   .32026 0.71  0.477 
  .33503   .34265 -0.51  0.613 .3393   .33275 0.42  0.674 .33503   .33092 0.27  0.785 
  
      School_Absent .08534   .07039 1.76  0.078 .08526   .07039 1.75  0.080 .08534   .07039 1.76  0.078 
  .08643   .08948 -0.34  0.736 .08347   .07909 0.49  0.626 .08643   .08211 0.49  0.626 
  
      TPLevel1 .57982   .61036 -1.96  0.050 .57924   .61036 -2.00  0.045 .57982   .61036 -1.96  0.050 
  .58719   .60397 -1.07  0.284 .60596   .60004 0.37  0.713 .58719   .58424 0.19  0.851 
  
      TPLevel2 .2756   .28457 -0.63  0.529 .27583   .28457 -0.61  0.539 .2756   .28457 -0.63  0.529 
  .27911   .28876 -0.67  0.502 .28564   .29157 -0.40  0.691 .27911   .28373 -0.32  0.747 
  
      TPLevel3 .06978   .06536 0.56  0.579 .06971   .06536 0.55  0.585 .06978   .06536 0.56  0.579 
  .07067   .05287 2.32  0.020 .06938   .07048 -0.13  0.895 .07067   .07011 0.07  0.946 
  
      TPLevel5 .03966   .00503 7.44  0.000 .04012   .00503 7.50  0.000 .03966   .00503 7.44  0.000 
  .02745   .02644 0.20  0.844 .00271   .00217 0.33  0.739 .02745   .02649 0.19  0.853 
  
      TPLevel4 .03514   .03469 0.08  0.938 .03511   .03469 0.07  0.943 .03514   .03469 0.08  0.938 
  .03559   .02796 1.36  0.173 .03631   .03574 0.09  0.925 .03559   .03543 0.03  0.978 
  
      Caste_SC .37199   .49522 -7.90  0.000 .37161   .49522 -7.93  0.000 .37199   .49522 -7.90  0.000 
  .37672   .38434 -0.49  0.622 .38808   .36978 1.15  0.252 .37672   .37782 -0.07  0.943 
  
      Caste_ST .0241   .01559 1.93  0.054 .02407   .01559 1.92  0.055 .0241   .01559 1.93  0.054 
  .02237   .02186 0.11  0.914 .02276   .02006 0.57  0.571 .02237   .02184 0.11  0.910 
  
      Caste_EBC .12801   .10709 2.05  0.040 .12788   .10709 2.04  0.042 .12801   .10709 2.05  0.040 
  .12811    .1271 0.10  0.924 .12737   .14247 -1.34  0.180 .12811   .13254 -0.41  0.681 
  
      Caste_BC .41315   .28004 8.91  0.000 .41374   .28004 8.95  0.000 .41315   .28004 8.91  0.000 
  .40925   .41332 -0.26  0.796 .40163   .40653 -0.30  0.762 .40925   .40602 0.21  0.836 
  
      rel2 .04819   .06536 -2.34  0.019 .04814   .06536 -2.35  0.019 .04819   .06536 -2.34  0.019 
  .04881    .0483 0.07  0.941 .04661   .05866 -1.64  0.101 .04881   .04808 0.11  0.916 
  
      rel3 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 
  0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 
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  NN, with replacement  RADIUS  KERNEL  
Variable Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t Treated Control     t        p>t 
       
rel4 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 
  0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 0        0 .      . 
  
      NAdultMales 1.4629   1.5525 -3.36  0.001 1.4629   1.5525 -3.36  0.001 1.4629   1.5525 -3.36  0.001 
  1.4667   1.4143 2.11  0.035 1.4672   1.4612 0.23  0.817 1.4667   1.4593 0.29  0.770 
  
      NAdultFemales 1.3494   1.4067 -2.83  0.005 1.3495   1.4067 -2.83  0.005 1.3494   1.4067 -2.83  0.005 
  1.3528   1.3198 1.71  0.088 1.3512    1.372 -1.00  0.315 1.3528   1.3489 0.20  0.840 
  
      Tot_School_~e 2.2681   2.1141 3.04  0.002 2.2678   2.1141 3.03  0.002 2.2681   2.1141 3.04  0.002 
  2.2578   2.2293 0.57  0.569 2.2379   2.2427 -0.09  0.928 2.2578   2.2265 0.61  0.540 
  
      HH_Head_Edu~n 1.0939   .86777 5.13  0.000 1.0938   .86777 5.13  0.000 1.0939   .86777 5.13  0.000 
  1.0834   1.0285 1.21  0.228 1.0515   1.0296 0.47  0.636 1.0834   1.0266 1.25  0.211 
  
      rel1 .95181   .93464 2.34  0.019 .95186   .93464 2.35  0.019 .95181   .93464 2.34  0.019 
  .95119    .9517 -0.07  0.941 .95339   .94134 1.64  0.101 .95119   .95192 -0.11  0.916 
  
      Caste_GEN .06275   .10206 -4.52  0.000 .06269   .10206 -4.53  0.000 .06275   .10206 -4.52  0.000 












Estimated ATTs, including difference-in-difference (Del): Matching without Retrospective levels of Outcomes 
 Nearest Neighbor with Replacement Radius with Caliper=0.0005 Kernel Matching with Default Epanechnikov B-Width 
variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
land_owned 13.01 -2.67 -1.26 
 
11.97 -1.95 -1.55 
 
11.73 -1.38 -1.24 
 
Del_Land -0.04 0.02 0.26 
 
-0.03 0.03 0.76 
 
-0.05 0.03 0.71 
 
leased_in_2010 5.23 0.46 0.71 
 
5.04 0.6 1.16 
 
4.86 0.83 1.78 ** 
Del_LeaseIn 0.34 -0.41 -1.42 
 
0.13 -0.2 -0.85 
 
0.15 -0.22 -1.02 
 
chair_current 0.63 0.14 2.43 *** 0.66 0.08 1.89 ** 0.68 0.08 2.15 ** 
cot_current 1.92 0.04 0.58 
 
1.99 -0.05 -1.07 
 
1.98 -0.02 -0.56 
 
mobile_current 0.41 0.15 5.24 *** 0.43 0.13 6.26 *** 0.43 0.14 7.15 *** 
watch_current 0.29 0.12 4.02 *** 0.31 0.09 4.46 *** 0.31 0.1 5.26 *** 
cycle_current 0.35 0.1 3.54 *** 0.41 0.03 1.62 
 
0.39 0.06 3.09 *** 
cows_current 0.3 0.04 1.34 
 
0.32 0.02 0.69 
 
0.32 0.02 0.99 
 
buffaloes_curr~t 0.35 -0.06 -1.76 ** 0.33 -0.04 -1.51 
 
0.33 -0.05 -2.17 ** 
bullocks_current 0.25 -0.03 -0.86 
 
0.26 -0.03 -1.49 
 
0.26 -0.03 -1.57 
 
goats_current 0.49 0.09 1.73 ** 0.57 0.01 0.3 
 
0.57 0.01 0.35 
 
Del_Chair 0.11 0.05 1.83 ** 0.13 0.02 1.01 
 
0.14 0.03 1.5 
 
Del_Cot 0.15 0.03 0.9 
 
0.19 -0.01 -0.41 
 
0.21 -0.03 -1.26 
 
Del_Mobile 0.16 0.06 2.77 *** 0.17 0.04 2.82 *** 0.16 0.05 3.81 *** 
Del_Cycle 0.06 0.02 1.32 
 
0.08 0 -0.07 
 
0.08 0 0.15 
 
Del_Watch 0.06 0.03 1.81 ** 0.07 0.02 1.88 ** 0.07 0.02 2.24 ** 
Del_Cows 0.03 0.02 1.42 
 
0.03 0.01 1.24 
 
0.03 0.02 2.13 ** 
Del_Buffaloes 0.04 0 -0.12 
 
0.04 0 0.01 
 
0.05 -0.01 -1.63 
 
Del_Bullocks 0.02 0 0.35 
 
0.01 0.01 1.88 ** 0.01 0.01 1.77 ** 
Del_Goats 0.03 -0.02 -0.71 
 
0.02 -0.01 -0.24 
 
0.02 0 -0.21 
 
Roof_Pres_Pucca 0.28 0.03 1.12 
 
0.26 0.04 2.53 *** 0.27 0.04 2.61 *** 
Del_Roof 0.03 0 0.15 
 
0.03 0.01 0.97 
 
0.03 0.01 1.08 
 
Floor_Pres_Pucca 0.06 0.01 1.13 
 
0.06 0.02 2.1 ** 0.05 0.02 2.57 *** 
Del_Floor 0.01 0 -0.52 
 
0.01 0 -0.94 
 
0.01 0 -1.19 
 
Wall_Pres_Pucca 0.34 -0.02 -0.83 
 
0.3 0.01 0.78 
 




variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
Del_Wall 0.04 0 -0.05 
 
0.04 0 -0.06 
 
0.04 0 -0.07 
 
Field_Toilet_~nt 0.91 -0.03 -1.79 ** 0.91 -0.02 -2.03 ** 0.92 -0.03 -3.38 *** 
Del_Field -0.01 -0.02 -2.32 ** -0.01 -0.02 -2.51 *** -0.01 -0.02 -2.92 *** 
Common_Toilet~nt 0.05 0.01 0.42 
 
0.05 0.01 0.72 
 
0.04 0.01 1.77 ** 
Del_Common 0.01 0.01 0.93 
 
0.01 0 0.67 
 
0.01 0.01 1.29 
 
Private_Toile~nt 0.04 0.02 2.14 ** 0.04 0.02 2.09 ** 0.04 0.02 2.89 *** 
Del_Private 0 0.01 2.37 *** 0.01 0.01 2.91 *** 0.01 0.01 2.75 *** 
rooms_present 1.86 0.05 0.94 
 
1.86 0.04 0.97 
 
1.86 0.05 1.44 
 
food_secure_pr~t 0.38 -0.04 -1.7 ** 0.39 -0.05 -2.7 *** 0.39 -0.05 -2.9 *** 
Del_Insecure -0.01 -0.03 -1.89 ** -0.02 -0.02 -1.64 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -2.69 *** 
months_insecu~nt 1.06 -0.18 -2.24 ** 1.07 -0.2 -3.49 *** 1.06 -0.18 -3.55 *** 
Del_Month -0.28 -0.03 -0.57 
 
-0.33 0.04 0.89 
 
-0.3 -0.01 -0.42 
 
Del_Intensity1 0.66 0.01 0.45 
 
0.64 0.03 1.63 
 
0.64 0.03 1.64 
 
Del_Intensity2 0.14 -0.01 -0.72 
 
0.14 -0.02 -1.34 
 
0.14 -0.02 -1.63 
 
Del_Intensity3 0.21 0 0.07 
 
0.22 -0.01 -0.76 
 
0.21 -0.01 -0.53 
 
Tot_Earner_Pre~t 1.69 0.06 1.45 
 
1.71 0.04 1.46 
 
1.7 0.05 1.81 ** 
Del_Earner 0.01 0 0.2 
 
0.01 0 -0.4 
 
0.01 0 -0.39 
 
Tot_PermEarne~nt 1.63 0.02 0.4 
 
1.65 0 0.02 
 
1.64 0 0.15 
 
Del_Perm_Earner 0 0.01 1.32 
 
0 0.01 1.45 
 
0 0.01 1.27 
 
H~K_Pri_AgOwn_In 0 0 -0.51 
 
0 0 -1.15 
 
0 0 -0.4 
 
H~R_Pri_AgOwn_In 0 0 -0.29 
 
0 0 -0.99 
 
0 0 -0.37 
 
H~Z_Pri_AgOwn_In 0 -0.01 -1.01 
 
0 -0.01 -1.8 ** 0 -0.01 -1.54 
 
HH_Net_Del_K_P~t 0 -0.01 -1.56 
 
0 0 -1.08 
 
0 0 -1.61 
 
HH_Net_Del_R_P~t 0 -0.01 -1.32 
 
0 0 -1.18 
 
0 -0.01 -1.86 ** 
HH_Net_Del_Z_P~t 0 0 -0.93 
 
0 0 -1.16 
 
0 0 -1.46 
 
H~K_Pri_AgLab_In -0.01 0 0.71 
 
-0.01 0 0.71 
 
-0.01 0 0.95 
 
H~R_Pri_AgLab_In -0.01 0 0.81 
 
-0.01 0 0.86 
 
-0.01 0 1.11 
 
H~Z_Pri_AgLab_In 0 0 -0.6 
 
0 0 0.04 
 
0 0 -0.13 
 
H~K_Pri_AHusb_In 0 0 0.58 
 
0 0 1.49 
 
0 0 1.99 ** 
H~R_Pri_AHusb_In 0 0 0.58 
 
0 0 1.26 
 
0 0 1.87 ** 
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variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
H~Z_Pri_AHusb_In 0 0 0.95 
 
0 0 1.45 
 
0 0 1.87 ** 
H~K_Pri_NFarm_In 0 0 -0.77 
 
0 0 -0.08 
 
0 0 -0.68 
 
H~R_Pri_NFarm_In 0 0 -0.63 
 
0 0 0.13 
 
0 0 -0.44 
 
H~Z_Pri_NFarm_In 0 0 0.23 
 
0 0 1.64 
 
0 0 1.01 
 
H~K_Pri_ClabU_In 0 0.01 1.53 
 
0 0.01 1.46 
 
0 0.01 1.63 
 
H~R_Pri_ClabU_In 0 0.01 1.31 
 
0 0 1.04 
 
0 0 1.12 
 
H~Z_Pri_ClabU_In 0 0 0.39 
 
0.01 0 -0.19 
 
0.01 0 -0.18 
 
H~K_Pri_ClabR_In -0.01 0 0.41 
 
0 0 0.05 
 
0 0 0.01 
 
H~R_Pri_ClabR_In -0.01 0 0.65 
 
-0.01 0 0.83 
 
-0.01 0 0.82 
 
H~Z_Pri_ClabR_In -0.01 0.01 1.08 
 
0 0 0.92 
 
0 0 1.07 
 
HH_~K_Pri_Sal_In 0 0 -0.16 
 
0 0 -0.65 
 
0.01 0 -1.98 ** 
HH_~R_Pri_Sal_In 0 0 -0.42 
 
0 0 -0.82 
 
0.01 -0.01 -2.02 ** 
HH_~Z_Pri_Sal_In 0 0 0 
 
0 0 -0.25 
 
0 0 -0.63 
 
Tot_Boy_in_Sch~l 0.99 0.08 1.5 
 
1 0.06 1.55 
 
0.99 0.09 2.47 *** 
Tot_Girl_in_Sc~l 0.89 0.02 0.33 
 
0.87 0.03 0.73 
 
0.87 0.04 1.17 
 
savings_2010 0.2 0.75 37.57 *** 0.21 0.74 56.96 *** 0.22 0.73 63.96 *** 
Del_Saving 0.1 0.6 32.62 *** 0.11 0.59 40.3 *** 0.11 0.59 43.69 *** 
NFormal_present 0.01 -0.01 -1.62 
 
0.01 -0.01 -2.91 *** 0.01 -0.01 -3.92 *** 
Del_NFormal 0 -0.01 -2.92 *** 0 -0.01 -4.12 *** 0 -0.01 -3.59 *** 
Formal_present 0.06 -0.04 -2.75 *** 0.07 -0.04 -4.72 *** 0.08 -0.05 -7.1 *** 
Del_Formal 0.01 -0.01 -0.75 
 
0.02 -0.02 -2.56 *** 0.02 -0.02 -2.96 *** 
SHG_present 0.09 0.82 53.73 *** 0.1 0.82 74.8 *** 0.1 0.82 84.39 *** 
Del_SHG 0.08 0.64 37.94 *** 0.08 0.64 46.49 *** 0.08 0.63 50.08 *** 
IndebtedOldHC 0.04 -0.01 -1 
 
0.06 -0.03 -3.13 *** 0.06 -0.03 -3.45 *** 
HC_OldLoan_Total 825.04 614.27 0.99 
 
1253.02 281.4 0.4 
 
1261.65 177.66 0.28 
 
IndebtedNewHC 0.43 -0.19 -7.36 *** 0.43 -0.17 -9.81 *** 0.44 -0.19 -12.16 *** 
HC_NewLoan_Total 8770.53 -4529.81 -2.27 ** 7573.5 -3208.2 -3.28 *** 8214.09 -3973.37 -4.75 *** 
N_Loan 0.66 0.51 12.84 *** 0.67 0.5 17.05 *** 0.69 0.48 18.06 *** 
Total_Borrowed 11180.5 589.78 0.28 
 
10277.5 1571.56 1.28 
 
10990.4 779.84 0.72 
 
Tot_Loan_Health 0.26 0.18 6.47 *** 0.28 0.16 7.39 *** 0.28 0.16 7.72 *** 
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variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
Tot_Amt_Health 4175.05 255.55 0.14 
 
3810.04 704.17 0.69 
 
4006.25 424.35 0.47 
 
Tot_Loan_Marital 0.15 -0.01 -0.43 
 
0.15 0 -0.26 
 
0.15 -0.01 -0.54 
 
Tot_Amt_Marital 2858.3 -757.8 -1.35 
 
2801.01 -653.37 -1.68 ** 2671.56 -571.05 -1.67 ** 
Tot_Loan_Food 0.08 0.03 1.91 ** 0.08 0.03 2.83 *** 0.08 0.03 3.12 *** 
Tot_Amt_Food 931.54 -342.45 -1.58 
 
745.5 -138.93 -0.46 
 
813.2 -224.11 -0.88 
 
Tot_Loan_House 0.05 0.05 4.35 *** 0.05 0.05 4.68 *** 0.05 0.05 4.89 *** 
Tot_Amt_House 1173.69 -21.53 -0.07 
 
852.33 230.92 1.05 
 
1146.46 5.7 0.03 
 
Tot_Loan_Durab~s 0.03 0.04 3.73 *** 0.03 0.04 4.07 *** 0.04 0.03 3.38 *** 
Tot_Amt_Durables 378.62 102.03 0.45 
 
576.19 -78.96 -0.46 
 
691.14 -210.49 -1.4 
 
Tot_Loan_School 0.02 -0.01 -0.68 
 
0.01 0 0.17 
 
0.01 0 0.4 
 
Tot_Amt_School 112.75 15.95 0.18 
 
68.61 68.73 1.29 
 
69.92 58.77 1.23 
 
Tot_Loan_Debt 0.01 0.08 10.54 *** 0.01 0.08 10.87 *** 0.01 0.08 11.41 *** 
Tot_Amt_Debt 42.15 671.1 7.16 *** 37.56 664.45 7.5 *** 46.44 666.81 7.95 *** 
Tot_Loan_Lives~k 0.02 0.05 5.34 *** 0.01 0.05 7.78 *** 0.01 0.05 8.01 *** 
Tot_Amt_Livest~k 163.53 383.32 3.7 *** 150.5 408.17 4.51 *** 161.98 384.87 4.69 *** 
Tot_Loan_Shop 0.02 0.04 4.72 *** 0.01 0.04 5.46 *** 0.02 0.04 5.59 *** 
Tot_Amt_Shop 233.11 370.39 1.81 ** 195.77 397.89 3.11 *** 253.19 350.31 3.05 *** 
Tot_Loan_Machine 0 0.01 1.62 
 
0 0.01 2.03 ** 0 0.01 2.35 *** 
Tot_Amt_Machine 137.13 67.34 0.36 
 
248.57 -35.24 -0.13 
 
390.97 -186.5 -0.84 
 
Self_Response 0.75 0.15 6.83 *** 0.74 0.16 10.97 *** 0.74 0.16 11.78 *** 
age_marriage 15.38 0.43 1.34 
 
15.39 0.28 1.16 
 
15.76 0.05 0.23 
 
son_education 9.3 0.56 2.28 ** 9.01 0.75 4.21 *** 9.19 0.66 4.06 *** 
daughter_educa~n 7.62 0.76 3.13 *** 7.67 0.59 3.4 *** 7.89 0.49 3.09 *** 
signature_lite~e 0.35 0.34 11.37 *** 0.33 0.35 18.57 *** 0.32 0.37 21.75 *** 
sign_literate 0.17 0.05 2.62 *** 0.15 0.06 3.9 *** 0.16 0.06 4.86 *** 
job_card 0.23 0.01 0.28 
 
0.23 0.01 0.71 
 
0.24 0 0.01 
 
kirana_present 0.87 0 -0.16 
 
0.85 0.02 1.19 
 
0.84 0.02 1.64 
 
Del_Kirana 0.05 0.01 0.95 
 
0.05 0.02 1.63 
 
0.06 0.01 1.24 
 
pds_present 0.7 -0.05 -1.97 ** 0.67 -0.01 -0.61 
 
0.67 -0.02 -1.17 
 
Del_PDS 0.04 0.02 1.66 ** 0.03 0.02 2.53 *** 0.04 0.02 2.17 ** 
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variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
health_present 0.82 0.05 2.56 *** 0.82 0.05 3.57 *** 0.81 0.06 4.7 *** 
Del_Health 0.05 0.03 2.46 *** 0.06 0.03 2.39 *** 0.06 0.03 2.98 *** 
neighbor_present 0.96 0.01 0.92 
 
0.96 0.01 1.55 
 
0.96 0.01 2.09 ** 
Del_Neighbor 0.05 0.01 1.06 
 
0.05 0.01 1.01 
 
0.06 0.01 0.76 
 
relative_present 0.89 0.01 0.49 
 
0.86 0.04 3.19 *** 0.86 0.04 3.51 *** 
Del_Relative 0.04 0.03 2.02 ** 0.05 0.02 2.18 ** 0.06 0.01 1.58 
 
panchayat_pres~t 0.02 0.07 6.88 *** 0.03 0.06 7.21 *** 0.03 0.06 7.27 *** 
Del_Panchayat 0 0.02 2.8 *** 0 0.02 3.89 *** 0 0.02 4.24 *** 
decision_cook~nt 0.92 0.01 0.37 
 
0.92 0 0.36 
 
0.92 0.01 0.71 
 
Del_Cook 0.01 0.02 2.01 ** 0.03 0.01 0.78 
 
0.03 0 0.24 
 
decision_dura~nt 0.42 0.09 3.42 *** 0.42 0.09 4.69 *** 0.41 0.1 5.72 *** 
Del_Durable 0.02 0.01 1.49 
 
0.03 0.01 1.75 ** 0.02 0.01 1.99 ** 
decision_pers~nt 0.93 0 0.15 
 
0.93 0 0.49 
 
0.93 0.01 0.67 
 
Del_Personal 0.05 0 -0.2 
 
0.05 0 -0.56 
 
0.05 0 -0.23 
 
decision_heal~nt 0.71 0.03 1.2 
 
0.72 0.02 1.1 
 
0.71 0.03 1.82 ** 
Del_Health 0.05 0.03 2.48 *** 0.06 0.03 2.39 *** 0.06 0.03 2.98 *** 
decision_educ~nt 0.7 0.09 3.96 *** 0.69 0.09 5.43 *** 0.69 0.1 6.76 *** 
Del_Education 0.05 0.03 2.31 ** 0.05 0.02 2.39 *** 0.05 0.02 2.66 *** 
dec_live_pres 0.47 0.08 3.06 *** 0.49 0.07 3.43 *** 0.49 0.06 3.64 *** 
Del_Livelihood 0.02 0.02 1.99 ** 0.03 0.02 2.08 ** 0.03 0.02 2.45 *** 
dec_employ_pres 0.52 0.07 2.75 *** 0.51 0.09 4.83 *** 0.5 0.09 5.01 *** 
Del_Employment 0.02 0.02 2.04 ** 0.02 0.02 3.18 *** 0.02 0.02 2.76 *** 
decision_loan~nt 0.59 0.22 8.89 *** 0.58 0.23 13.41 *** 0.57 0.23 15 *** 
Del_Loan 0.02 0.07 6.56 *** 0.03 0.07 7.5 *** 0.03 0.07 8.63 *** 
decision_poli~nt 0.18 0.11 5.34 *** 0.18 0.11 6.94 *** 0.19 0.1 6.7 *** 
Del_Politics 0.01 0.03 3.63 *** 0.01 0.03 5.14 *** 0.01 0.03 5.51 *** 
beating_actio~nt 0.75 0.09 3.83 *** 0.73 0.1 6.12 *** 0.74 0.09 6.5 *** 
Del_Beat_Act 0.17 0.05 2.51 *** 0.15 0.07 4.65 *** 0.15 0.07 5.29 *** 
pds_action_pre~t 0.39 0.05 1.96 ** 0.38 0.06 3.12 *** 0.38 0.06 3.66 *** 
Del_PDS_Act 0.11 0.04 2.23 ** 0.1 0.05 3.83 *** 0.1 0.05 4.68 *** 
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variable controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig controls difference tstat sig 
school_action~nt 0.33 0.08 3.4 *** 0.31 0.1 5.49 *** 0.3 0.11 6.81 *** 
Del_School_Act 0.11 0.05 2.66 *** 0.1 0.05 4.04 *** 0.1 0.05 4.38 *** 
mukhiya_actio~nt 0.26 0.03 1.38 
 
0.26 0.03 2.07 ** 0.25 0.04 2.72 *** 
Del_Mukhiya_Act 0.07 0.03 1.92 ** 0.07 0.03 2.49 *** 0.07 0.03 3.04 *** 
ASelfBPres 0.39 0.08 2.95 *** 0.37 0.09 4.99 *** 0.37 0.1 5.72 *** 
Del_Self_beat 0.09 0.05 2.74 *** 0.09 0.05 4.04 *** 0.09 0.06 4.76 *** 
AWomBPres 0.37 0.18 6.81 *** 0.39 0.16 8.59 *** 0.39 0.16 9.67 *** 
Del_Wom_beat 0.09 0.13 7.75 *** 0.08 0.14 9.95 *** 0.09 0.13 10.78 *** 
ASelfPDSPres 0.15 0.04 2.06 ** 0.16 0.03 2.03 ** 0.17 0.03 2.16 ** 
Del_Self_pds 0.03 0.03 2.47 *** 0.04 0.02 1.96 ** 0.04 0.02 2.27 ** 
AWomPDSPres 0.13 0.1 5.14 *** 0.13 0.09 6.74 *** 0.12 0.1 7.72 *** 
Del_Wom_pds 0.03 0.08 6.53 *** 0.04 0.07 6.99 *** 0.04 0.07 7.68 *** 
ASelfSPres 0.11 0.07 3.78 *** 0.12 0.06 4.55 *** 0.12 0.06 4.7 *** 
Del_Self_school 0.04 0.03 2.38 *** 0.05 0.03 2.94 *** 0.05 0.02 2.71 *** 
AWomSPres 0.14 0.09 4.66 *** 0.13 0.1 7.17 *** 0.13 0.1 8.11 *** 
Del_Wom_school 0.04 0.07 5.35 *** 0.05 0.07 6.6 *** 0.05 0.06 6.76 *** 
ASelfMPres 0.09 0.03 1.68 ** 0.09 0.02 2.08 ** 0.08 0.03 2.92 *** 
Del_Self_mukhiya 0.03 0.01 0.91 
 
0.03 0.01 1.96 ** 0.02 0.02 2.32 ** 
AWomMPres 0.1 0.07 3.92 *** 0.1 0.07 5.24 *** 0.1 0.06 5.75 *** 
Del_Wom_mukhiya 0.02 0.05 4.9 *** 0.03 0.04 5.5 *** 0.03 0.05 6.19 *** 
 
Not matching on retrospective levels of outcome variables tend to make the ATTs stronger, especially for the variables that were used 
(at retrospective levels) in the probit equation. This can be seen clearly for assets, where chairs, cycles and goats have been 
significantly affected by treatment. We note that the Delta on these outcomes are not significant, implying that the difference at 
current level was also driven by difference at retrospective level. To remove this difference, it makes sense to balance at pre-treatment 




Appendix 3: Derivations related to the RU Augmented Framework 
 
1) Proof on 2
nd
 order Conditions for Maxima 
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Therefore, the 5
th
 order principal minor in non-positive and the 4
th
 order principal minor is non-negative. This implies that the 
optimization program yields a maxima.  
2) F.O.Cs for Rescaled Lagrangean of the RU Augmented Framework 
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Hence, it can be seen that with respect to the consumption vector and the income multiplier, the partial of the original and the 
transformed Lagrangean are set to 0 at the optimum. With respect to µ, the derivative of the transformed Lagrangean is computed and 
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Some calculations show for the transformed Lagrangean, the necessary FOC with respect to µ is 
0),,(  BBA
B VQqqU           
3) Derivation of Equation 9´ 




















 (Where x reflects choice variables)        (A4) 
Conditions (A1) and (A2) imply that w.r.t. goods and the income multiplier, the partial derivative of the Lagrangean goes to 0. (A3) 
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Thus, we have Equation 9´. 
139 
 
Appendix 4: Empirical Analysis for Collective and RU Augmented Framework 
 
Table A6.1: Estimated Demand for Staple goods 
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; All 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Spouse 
Inc included 
VARIABLES ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple ShareStaple 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.105*** -0.100*** -0.0845*** -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.0998*** 
 (0.00728) (0.00652) (0.00440) (0.00797) (0.00775) (0.00780) 
Log_Tot_Inc    -0.000547 0.00129 0.00723** 
    (0.00363) (0.00343) (0.00300) 
Head_Income 1.51e-07*** 1.34e-07***  1.54e-07*** 1.28e-07***  
 (3.37e-08) (3.01e-08)  (4.10e-08) (3.52e-08)  
Spouse_Income 1.35e-07***  8.55e-08** 1.37e-07***  7.53e-08** 
 (3.91e-08)  (3.36e-08) (4.12e-08)  (3.51e-08) 
NL_Inc 1.33e-07 1.18e-07 5.13e-08 1.33e-07 1.18e-07 6.82e-08 
 (9.63e-08) (9.00e-08) (7.06e-08) (9.66e-08) (9.09e-08) (7.80e-08) 
Head_Age -0.000212 -0.000277 -0.000240 -0.000212 -0.000274 -0.000227 
 (0.000311) (0.000307) (0.000306) (0.000310) (0.000309) (0.000311) 
Spouse_Age 0.000707** 0.000811*** 0.000791** 0.000705** 0.000814*** 0.000813*** 
 (0.000316) (0.000311) (0.000310) (0.000315) (0.000311) (0.000314) 
totalboy_0to5 -0.0143*** -0.0132*** -0.00961*** -0.0142*** -0.0136*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.00259) (0.00254) (0.00239) (0.00255) (0.00254) (0.00254) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00911*** -0.00831*** -0.00574*** -0.00898*** -0.00865*** -0.00835*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00180) (0.00159) (0.00192) (0.00189) (0.00189) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00370** -0.00334** -0.00170 -0.00359** -0.00361** -0.00379** 
 (0.00171) (0.00168) (0.00157) (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00176) 
totalboy_19to21 -0.00365 -0.00327 -0.00128 -0.00352 -0.00359 -0.00361 
 (0.00308) (0.00306) (0.00299) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00313) 
totalgirl_0to5 -0.0133*** -0.0120*** -0.00866*** -0.0131*** -0.0124*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00276) (0.00253) (0.00289) (0.00284) (0.00283) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.0112*** -0.0106*** -0.00832*** -0.0111*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00188) (0.00171) (0.00198) (0.00196) (0.00199) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.00741*** -0.00688*** -0.00492*** -0.00728*** -0.00718*** -0.00715*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00180) (0.00166) (0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00196) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00384 -0.00365 -0.00182 -0.00374 -0.00390 -0.00370 
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 (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00300) (0.00309) (0.00310) (0.00306) 
Head_Edu -0.000592* -0.000671** -0.000696** -0.000595* -0.000661** -0.000613* 
 (0.000316) (0.000310) (0.000308) (0.000316) (0.000313) (0.000316) 
Spouse_Edu -0.000129 -8.52e-05 -0.000294 -0.000135 -7.13e-05 -0.000162 
 (0.000255) (0.000254) (0.000244) (0.000255) (0.000255) (0.000252) 
MP1 -0.00329 -0.00320 -0.00314 -0.00328 -0.00323 -0.00345 
 (0.00229) (0.00227) (0.00224) (0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00229) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp 0.00118 0.000562 0.000122 0.00115 0.000650 0.000754 
 (0.00167) (0.00164) (0.00159) (0.00167) (0.00166) (0.00165) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00222 0.00228 0.00148 0.00218 0.00239 0.00226 
 (0.00193) (0.00191) (0.00184) (0.00195) (0.00194) (0.00193) 
Log_Index_Food 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.0678* 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.0690* 
 (0.0307) (0.0305) (0.0354) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0354) 
Log_Index_Sin -0.0336 -0.0335 -0.0460* -0.0331 -0.0346 -0.0560** 
 (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0257) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0261) 
Log_Index_Fuel -0.0543*** -0.0534*** -0.0404*** -0.0542*** -0.0536*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0144) 
Log_Index_Clothing 0.0491 0.0451 -0.0234 0.0482 0.0473 -0.0126 
 (0.0376) (0.0374) (0.0345) (0.0377) (0.0375) (0.0348) 
Log_Index_Misc 0.0887 0.0915 0.112*** 0.0892 0.0904 0.102*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0728) (0.0284) (0.0710) (0.0712) (0.0283) 
Constant 0 0 0.463* 0 0 0.573** 
 (0) (0) (0.264) (0) (0) (0.268) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.575 0.581 0.594 0.576 0.578 0.580 









Table A6.2: Estimated Demand for Food (other than Staple) 
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; Spouse 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Spouse 
Inc included 
VARIABLES ShareOthFood ShareOthFood ShareOthFood ShareOthFood ShareOthFood ShareOthFood 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.0302*** -0.0401*** -0.0598*** -0.0369*** -0.0415*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00962) (0.00692) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0122) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.00490 0.000987 -0.00172 
    (0.00525) (0.00501) (0.00461) 
Head_Income -1.74e-07*** -1.39e-07***  -1.97e-07*** -1.43e-07***  
 (4.96e-08) (4.50e-08)  (5.64e-08) (4.89e-08)  
Spouse_Income -2.75e-07***  -1.92e-07*** -2.92e-07***  -1.90e-07*** 
 (7.45e-08)  (7.20e-08) (7.55e-08)  (7.24e-08) 
NL_Inc -1.79e-07 -1.49e-07 -5.50e-08 -1.82e-07 -1.49e-07 -5.90e-08 
 (2.04e-07) (1.93e-07) (1.82e-07) (2.01e-07) (1.92e-07) (1.85e-07) 
Head_Age 0.000195 0.000327 0.000246 0.000199 0.000329 0.000243 
 (0.000509) (0.000505) (0.000505) (0.000506) (0.000505) (0.000506) 
Spouse_Age -0.000519 -0.000732 -0.000561 -0.000496 -0.000729 -0.000566 
 (0.000546) (0.000540) (0.000538) (0.000542) (0.000539) (0.000538) 
totalboy_0to5 -0.00882** -0.0111*** -0.0157*** -0.0101** -0.0114** -0.0149*** 
 (0.00434) (0.00425) (0.00399) (0.00450) (0.00448) (0.00437) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00457 -0.00620** -0.00956*** -0.00575* -0.00646** -0.00894*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00289) (0.00268) (0.00315) (0.00312) (0.00309) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00606** -0.00680** -0.00976*** -0.00706** -0.00701** -0.00926*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00276) (0.00259) (0.00297) (0.00296) (0.00290) 
totalboy_19to21 -0.00774 -0.00852 -0.0111** -0.00891 -0.00877 -0.0106* 
 (0.00572) (0.00565) (0.00550) (0.00576) (0.00575) (0.00566) 
totalgirl_0to5 -0.00240 -0.00502 -0.00931** -0.00384 -0.00534 -0.00852* 
 (0.00429) (0.00415) (0.00389) (0.00449) (0.00445) (0.00444) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.00459 -0.00594* -0.00961*** -0.00579* -0.00620* -0.00898*** 
 (0.00312) (0.00305) (0.00287) (0.00334) (0.00333) (0.00332) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.0106*** -0.0116*** -0.0142*** -0.0117*** -0.0119*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00305) (0.00285) (0.00333) (0.00333) (0.00326) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00188 -0.00227 -0.00512 -0.00278 -0.00245 -0.00467 
 (0.00611) (0.00603) (0.00591) (0.00610) (0.00607) (0.00600) 
Head_Edu -0.00111** -0.000945* -0.000835 -0.00108* -0.000937* -0.000855 
 (0.000559) (0.000554) (0.000552) (0.000558) (0.000555) (0.000555) 
Spouse_Edu 0.000564 0.000475 0.000834* 0.000622 0.000486 0.000803 
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 (0.000500) (0.000496) (0.000482) (0.000501) (0.000499) (0.000492) 
MP1 0.00145 0.00127 6.96e-05 0.00136 0.00125 0.000145 
 (0.00379) (0.00377) (0.00373) (0.00377) (0.00377) (0.00375) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.00221 -0.000957 -0.000931 -0.00195 -0.000889 -0.00108 
 (0.00322) (0.00319) (0.00312) (0.00321) (0.00321) (0.00315) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp -0.00388 -0.00400 -0.00292 -0.00347 -0.00392 -0.00311 
 (0.00331) (0.00329) (0.00321) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00325) 
Log_Index_Food -0.0145 -0.00110 -0.0871 -0.0116 -0.000401 -0.0874 
 (0.0523) (0.0516) (0.0555) (0.0518) (0.0516) (0.0558) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0934* 0.0932* 0.0492 0.0893* 0.0924* 0.0516 
 (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0393) (0.0500) (0.0501) (0.0398) 
Log_Index_Fuel 0.0510** 0.0491* 0.0679*** 0.0500** 0.0489* 0.0681*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0200) (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0201) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.00447 0.00382 -0.0717 0.00349 0.00547 -0.0743 
 (0.0718) (0.0709) (0.0604) (0.0713) (0.0709) (0.0611) 
Log_Index_Misc -0.0207 -0.0266 -0.0289 -0.0249 -0.0275 -0.0267 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.0479) (0.129) (0.129) (0.0485) 
Constant 0 0 1.337*** 0 0 1.311*** 
 (0) (0) (0.431) (0) (0) (0.437) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.329 0.341 0.364 0.339 0.343 0.361 











Table A6.3: Estimated Demand for Fuel  
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; 
Spouse Inc 
included 
VARIABLES ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel ShareFuel 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.00899 -0.0137** -0.0306*** -0.00927 -0.0114 -0.0210*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00610) (0.00417) (0.00813) (0.00798) (0.00789) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.000206 -0.00157 -0.00451 
    (0.00341) (0.00330) (0.00293) 
Head_Income -1.31e-07*** -1.14e-07***  -1.32e-07*** -1.07e-07***  
 (3.46e-08) (3.15e-08)  (3.99e-08) (3.50e-08)  
Spouse_Income -1.32e-07***  -7.27e-08** -1.33e-07***  -6.63e-08* 
 (4.05e-08)  (3.67e-08) (4.10e-08)  (3.64e-08) 
NL_Inc -2.30e-07* -2.16e-07* -1.41e-07 -2.31e-07* -2.16e-07* -1.52e-07 
 (1.28e-07) (1.19e-07) (1.09e-07) (1.28e-07) (1.20e-07) (1.12e-07) 
Head_Age 0.00119*** 0.00125*** 0.00123*** 0.00119*** 0.00125*** 0.00122*** 
 (0.000281) (0.000280) (0.000275) (0.000281) (0.000281) (0.000277) 
Spouse_Age -0.000967*** -0.00107*** -0.00101*** -0.000966*** -0.00107*** -0.00102*** 
 (0.000304) (0.000302) (0.000295) (0.000305) (0.000304) (0.000299) 
totalboy_0to5 -0.00646** -0.00754*** -0.0114*** -0.00651** -0.00707** -0.00945*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00266) (0.00245) (0.00281) (0.00279) (0.00271) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00552*** -0.00631*** -0.00914*** -0.00557*** -0.00590*** -0.00751*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00182) (0.00168) (0.00196) (0.00194) (0.00194) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00953*** -0.00988*** -0.0121*** -0.00957*** -0.00955*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00154) (0.00172) (0.00171) (0.00169) 
totalboy_19to21 -0.00486 -0.00523* -0.00731** -0.00491 -0.00484 -0.00586* 
 (0.00307) (0.00301) (0.00287) (0.00313) (0.00312) (0.00306) 
totalgirl_0to5 -0.000413 -0.00167 -0.00542** -0.000473 -0.00116 -0.00334 
 (0.00261) (0.00251) (0.00234) (0.00279) (0.00276) (0.00275) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.00705*** -0.00770*** -0.0106*** -0.00710*** -0.00728*** -0.00899*** 
 (0.00195) (0.00190) (0.00177) (0.00210) (0.00209) (0.00207) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.00874*** -0.00925*** -0.0113*** -0.00878*** -0.00888*** -0.00996*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00166) (0.00155) (0.00183) (0.00182) (0.00182) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00800** -0.00819** -0.0103*** -0.00804** -0.00789** -0.00915*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00320) (0.00313) (0.00325) (0.00324) (0.00321) 
Head_Edu -0.000357 -0.000279 -0.000171 -0.000356 -0.000292 -0.000223 
 (0.000318) (0.000314) (0.000310) (0.000319) (0.000317) (0.000316) 
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Spouse_Edu -3.41e-05 -7.67e-05 0.000160 -3.17e-05 -9.37e-05 7.73e-05 
 (0.000277) (0.000276) (0.000268) (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000276) 
MP1 -0.00344 -0.00352 -0.00433** -0.00344 -0.00349 -0.00413* 
 (0.00218) (0.00217) (0.00213) (0.00219) (0.00218) (0.00216) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.00707*** -0.00647*** -0.00612*** -0.00706*** -0.00658*** -0.00651*** 
 (0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00172) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00177) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00277 0.00271 0.00347* 0.00278 0.00258 0.00299 
 (0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00196) 
Log_Index_Food 0.00372 0.0101 -0.0340 0.00383 0.00892 -0.0348 
 (0.0280) (0.0275) (0.0325) (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0328) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0386 0.0385 0.0125 0.0384 0.0398 0.0187 
 (0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0226) (0.0293) (0.0295) (0.0234) 
Log_Index_Fuel -0.000136 -0.00103 0.00859 -0.000174 -0.000682 0.00905 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0119) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.0344 -0.0304 -0.0665* -0.0341 -0.0332 -0.0733** 
 (0.0468) (0.0464) (0.0359) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0371) 
Log_Index_Misc 0.0286 0.0258 0.0202 0.0284 0.0273 0.0260 
 (0.0820) (0.0825) (0.0334) (0.0811) (0.0812) (0.0343) 
Constant 0 0 0.777*** 0 0 0.709*** 
 (0) (0) (0.263) (0) (0) (0.266) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.214 0.224 0.248 0.215 0.218 0.237 










Table A6.4: Estimated Demand for Public Goods 
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; 
Spouse Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Spouse 
Inc included 
VARIABLES ShareHHPub ShareHHPub ShareHHPub ShareHHPub ShareHHPub ShareHHPub 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp 0.0583*** 0.0554*** 0.0531*** 0.0548*** 0.0535*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.00994) (0.00948) (0.00728) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0130) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.00247 0.00128 0.000206 
    (0.00565) (0.00555) (0.00509) 
Head_Income -3.67e-08 -2.63e-08  -4.82e-08 -3.17e-08  
 (5.68e-08) (5.51e-08)  (6.49e-08) (6.17e-08)  
Spouse_Income -8.04e-08  -6.78e-08 -8.87e-08  -6.81e-08 
 (8.36e-08)  (8.23e-08) (8.48e-08)  (8.22e-08) 
NL_Inc -2.01e-07 -1.92e-07 -1.81e-07 -2.03e-07 -1.93e-07 -1.80e-07 
 (2.97e-07) (2.98e-07) (3.00e-07) (2.98e-07) (2.99e-07) (3.00e-07) 
Head_Age -0.000748 -0.000710 -0.000741 -0.000746 -0.000707 -0.000740 
 (0.000519) (0.000517) (0.000519) (0.000520) (0.000518) (0.000520) 
Spouse_Age 0.000167 0.000105 0.000148 0.000179 0.000108 0.000148 
 (0.000580) (0.000575) (0.000581) (0.000579) (0.000575) (0.000580) 
totalboy_0to5 0.0143*** 0.0136*** 0.0131*** 0.0136*** 0.0132*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00433) (0.00416) (0.00468) (0.00466) (0.00476) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00103 -0.00151 -0.00187 -0.00163 -0.00184 -0.00195 
 (0.00298) (0.00294) (0.00277) (0.00324) (0.00323) (0.00330) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00831*** -0.00853*** -0.00882*** -0.00882*** -0.00880*** -0.00888*** 
 (0.00289) (0.00288) (0.00285) (0.00316) (0.00316) (0.00324) 
totalboy_19to21 0.00250 0.00227 0.00191 0.00191 0.00195 0.00184 
 (0.00591) (0.00591) (0.00584) (0.00607) (0.00607) (0.00610) 
totalgirl_0to5 0.00410 0.00334 0.00295 0.00338 0.00292 0.00285 
 (0.00415) (0.00408) (0.00386) (0.00451) (0.00449) (0.00461) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.000363 -0.000758 -0.00110 -0.000971 -0.00110 -0.00118 
 (0.00303) (0.00301) (0.00289) (0.00328) (0.00327) (0.00338) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.00119 -0.00150 -0.00180 -0.00173 -0.00180 -0.00187 
 (0.00300) (0.00298) (0.00289) (0.00323) (0.00323) (0.00330) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00170 -0.00182 -0.00221 -0.00216 -0.00206 -0.00226 
 (0.00618) (0.00619) (0.00615) (0.00623) (0.00624) (0.00625) 
Head_Edu 0.000704 0.000751 0.000732 0.000719 0.000761 0.000735 
 (0.000581) (0.000580) (0.000584) (0.000582) (0.000582) (0.000588) 
Spouse_Edu -0.000701 -0.000727 -0.000660 -0.000672 -0.000713 -0.000656 
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 (0.000522) (0.000521) (0.000520) (0.000523) (0.000522) (0.000524) 
MP1 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00402) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.00664** -0.00628* -0.00639** -0.00651** -0.00619* -0.00637** 
 (0.00322) (0.00321) (0.00320) (0.00325) (0.00324) (0.00324) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp 0.00610* 0.00607* 0.00629* 0.00631* 0.00617* 0.00631* 
 (0.00333) (0.00333) (0.00332) (0.00334) (0.00335) (0.00334) 
Log_Index_Food -0.0117 -0.00784 -0.000482 -0.0103 -0.00688 -0.000447 
 (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0481) (0.0457) (0.0453) (0.0480) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0289 0.0289 0.0308 0.0269 0.0278 0.0305 
 (0.0510) (0.0516) (0.0401) (0.0511) (0.0515) (0.0409) 
Log_Index_Fuel 0.0194 0.0189 0.0167 0.0190 0.0186 0.0167 
 (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0176) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0175) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.0858 -0.0834 -0.0711 -0.0818 -0.0812 -0.0708 
 (0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0484) (0.0698) (0.0696) (0.0488) 
Log_Index_Misc -0.0193 -0.0210 -0.0245 -0.0215 -0.0222 -0.0248 
 (0.142) (0.144) (0.0413) (0.139) (0.140) (0.0415) 
Constant 0 0 -0.0769 0 0 -0.0737 
 (0) (0) (0.354) (0) (0) (0.368) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 











Table A6.5: Estimated Demand for Private Goods (Apart from Clothing) 
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; Spouse 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Spouse 
Inc included 
VARIABLES ShareOthHHGoods ShareOthHHGoods ShareOthHHGoods ShareOthHHGoods ShareOthHHGoods ShareOthHHGoods 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp 0.0210*** 0.0203*** 0.0145*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.00470) (0.00396) (0.00284) (0.00590) (0.00577) (0.00573) 
Log_Tot_Inc    -0.00646*** -0.00645*** -0.00754*** 
    (0.00240) (0.00226) (0.00225) 
Head_Income -4.64e-08* -4.38e-08**  -1.63e-08 -1.65e-08  
 (2.47e-08) (2.05e-08)  (2.73e-08) (2.10e-08)  
Spouse_Income -2.07e-08  -4.90e-09 9.97e-10  5.77e-09 
 (6.98e-08)  (6.30e-08) (7.15e-08)  (6.35e-08) 
NL_Inc 2.20e-09 4.43e-09 2.79e-08 6.39e-09 6.28e-09 1.03e-08 
 (1.39e-07) (1.41e-07) (1.39e-07) (1.41e-07) (1.42e-07) (1.42e-07) 
Head_Age -0.000213 -0.000203 -0.000204 -0.000218 -0.000218 -0.000218 
 (0.000219) (0.000220) (0.000218) (0.000223) (0.000223) (0.000224) 
Spouse_Age 2.81e-05 1.22e-05 3.48e-06 -2.16e-06 -1.37e-06 -1.88e-05 
 (0.000234) (0.000239) (0.000233) (0.000240) (0.000245) (0.000242) 
totalboy_0to5 0.00489** 0.00472** 0.00342** 0.00664*** 0.00664*** 0.00671*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00188) (0.00166) (0.00213) (0.00213) (0.00210) 
totalboy_6to12 0.000759 0.000636 -0.000300 0.00231 0.00232 0.00243* 
 (0.00132) (0.00126) (0.00110) (0.00150) (0.00149) (0.00147) 
totalboy_13to18 0.00227 0.00221 0.00162 0.00360** 0.00360** 0.00380** 
 (0.00142) (0.00138) (0.00129) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00158) 
totalboy_19to21 0.00617* 0.00611* 0.00543 0.00772** 0.00772** 0.00786** 
 (0.00343) (0.00339) (0.00335) (0.00354) (0.00355) (0.00354) 
totalgirl_0to5 0.00262 0.00243 0.00117 0.00452** 0.00452** 0.00464** 
 (0.00194) (0.00182) (0.00155) (0.00214) (0.00210) (0.00206) 
totalgirl_6to12 0.00219* 0.00209* 0.00126 0.00378*** 0.00378*** 0.00399*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00120) (0.00112) (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) 
totalgirl_13to18 0.000829 0.000749 5.23e-05 0.00225 0.00225* 0.00237* 
 (0.00124) (0.00118) (0.00111) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00136) 
totalgirl_19to21 0.00176 0.00173 0.00112 0.00295 0.00295 0.00308 
 (0.00281) (0.00280) (0.00275) (0.00289) (0.00290) (0.00289) 
Head_Edu 0.000286 0.000298 0.000321 0.000248 0.000248 0.000235 
 (0.000222) (0.000224) (0.000222) (0.000228) (0.000230) (0.000231) 
Spouse_Edu -7.96e-05 -8.63e-05 -2.72e-05 -0.000157 -0.000156 -0.000165 
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 (0.000223) (0.000221) (0.000221) (0.000227) (0.000225) (0.000228) 
MP1 -0.000189 -0.000203 -0.000260 -6.00e-05 -5.96e-05 6.90e-05 
 (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00165) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp 0.00351** 0.00361** 0.00384*** 0.00317** 0.00316** 0.00318** 
 (0.00148) (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00149) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp -0.00423*** -0.00424*** -0.00400*** -0.00476*** -0.00476*** -0.00481*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00147) (0.00146) (0.00147) 
Log_Index_Food -0.00712 -0.00612 0.00753 -0.0109 -0.0109 0.00626 
 (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0238) 
Log_Index_Sin -0.0202 -0.0203 -0.0177 -0.0148 -0.0148 -0.00728 
 (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0147) (0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0159) 
Log_Index_Fuel 0.00623 0.00609 0.00267 0.00748 0.00749 0.00345 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00673) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.00711) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.0134 -0.0128 0.00567 -0.0239 -0.0240 -0.00560 
 (0.0375) (0.0371) (0.0292) (0.0382) (0.0380) (0.0300) 
Log_Index_Misc 0.00885 0.00842 0.00221 0.0144 0.0144 0.0119 
 (0.0660) (0.0666) (0.0233) (0.0660) (0.0661) (0.0239) 
Constant 0 0 -0.103 0 0 -0.217 
 (0) (0) (0.164) (0) (0) (0.175) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.050 0.009 0.009 0.007 











Table A6.6: Estimated Demand for Clothing 
 SPEC 6C SPEC 8A SPEC 6B SPEC 8B 
 Tot Inc Excl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Excl; Head 
Inc included       
Tot Inc Excl; Spouse 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Both 
Ind Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Head 
Inc included 
Tot Inc Incl; Spouse 
Inc included 
VARIABLES ShareClothing ShareClothing ShareClothing ShareClothing ShareClothing ShareClothing 
       
Log_Ann_PC_Exp 0.00708** 0.00859** 0.00801*** 0.00551 0.00611 0.00574 
 (0.00347) (0.00344) (0.00245) (0.00461) (0.00461) (0.00462) 
Log_Tot_Inc    0.00114 0.00165 0.00107 
    (0.00192) (0.00192) (0.00182) 
Head_Income 5.22e-09 -2.23e-10  -9.59e-11 -7.22e-09  
 (1.70e-08) (1.73e-08)  (1.80e-08) (1.85e-08)  
Spouse_Income 4.22e-08  3.95e-08 3.83e-08  3.80e-08 
 (3.32e-08)  (3.34e-08) (3.33e-08)  (3.35e-08) 
NL_Inc -1.16e-07** -1.21e-07** -1.20e-07** -1.17e-07** -1.21e-07** -1.17e-07** 
 (5.62e-08) (5.73e-08) (5.65e-08) (5.54e-08) (5.60e-08) (5.51e-08) 
Head_Age -0.000201 -0.000221 -0.000203 -0.000200 -0.000217 -0.000201 
 (0.000172) (0.000172) (0.000173) (0.000172) (0.000171) (0.000172) 
Spouse_Age 0.000160 0.000193 0.000161 0.000166 0.000196 0.000164 
 (0.000190) (0.000188) (0.000190) (0.000189) (0.000187) (0.000189) 
totalboy_0to5 0.00109 0.00144 0.00130 0.000782 0.000944 0.000835 
 (0.00157) (0.00155) (0.00145) (0.00171) (0.00171) (0.00172) 
totalboy_6to12 0.00270** 0.00295*** 0.00286*** 0.00243* 0.00252** 0.00247* 
 (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00104) (0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00128) 
totalboy_13to18 0.00253** 0.00264** 0.00265*** 0.00230* 0.00229* 0.00234** 
 (0.00107) (0.00108) (0.00103) (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00119) 
totalboy_19to21 0.00513** 0.00525** 0.00524** 0.00486** 0.00484** 0.00489** 
 (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00229) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00240) 
totalgirl_0to5 0.00379** 0.00419** 0.00401*** 0.00346** 0.00365** 0.00351** 
 (0.00161) (0.00163) (0.00153) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00174) 
totalgirl_6to12 0.00217** 0.00238** 0.00233** 0.00189 0.00194 0.00194 
 (0.00103) (0.00101) (0.000957) (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00122) 
totalgirl_13to18 0.00377*** 0.00394*** 0.00389*** 0.00352*** 0.00355*** 0.00356*** 
 (0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00119) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00133) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00148 -0.00142 -0.00137 -0.00169 -0.00173 -0.00165 
 (0.00170) (0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00179) 
Head_Edu 0.000375* 0.000350* 0.000366* 0.000382* 0.000363* 0.000378* 
 (0.000200) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000201) (0.000200) (0.000201) 
Spouse_Edu -0.000731*** -0.000718*** -0.000740*** -0.000718*** -0.000700*** -0.000720*** 
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 (0.000184) (0.000183) (0.000184) (0.000182) (0.000181) (0.000181) 
MP1 -0.00197 -0.00194 -0.00192 -0.00199 -0.00198 -0.00196 
 (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00144) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.000363 -0.000555 -0.000402 -0.000302 -0.000441 -0.000308 
 (0.00101) (0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00101) (0.00100) (0.00101) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp -0.00158 -0.00156 -0.00160 -0.00148 -0.00142 -0.00149 
 (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) 
Log_Index_Food -0.0380** -0.0400** -0.0348* -0.0373** -0.0388** -0.0346* 
 (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0188) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0328* 0.0329* 0.0346** 0.0319* 0.0315* 0.0331** 
 (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0150) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0152) 
Log_Index_Fuel -0.000937 -0.000653 -0.00169 -0.00116 -0.00101 -0.00180 
 (0.00821) (0.00826) (0.00713) (0.00820) (0.00823) (0.00711) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.0244 -0.0257 -0.0213 -0.0225 -0.0228 -0.0197 
 (0.0253) (0.0256) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0211) 
Log_Index_Misc 0.0296 0.0305 0.0297** 0.0286 0.0289 0.0283* 
 (0.0487) (0.0496) (0.0149) (0.0475) (0.0478) (0.0149) 
Constant 0 0 -0.0538 0 0 -0.0375 
 (0) (0) (0.145) (0) (0) (0.148) 
       
Observations 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 3,371 
R-squared 0.064 0.056 0.059 0.071 0.068 0.070 
p-value (Over Id Test)                 0.7404                        0.5409                0.8882                       0.5761  0.4223                 0.8554 
Statistics on 1
st
 Stage Regression for Specification 5C:  
Staple Demand, Excluded Instruments: HH Assets, Logged Total Income, Logged General CPI 
F(  3,  3300) =   92.26, Partial R-Squared = 0.1291 
Statistics on 1
st
 Stage Regression for Specification 5B:  
Staple Demand, Excluded Instruments: HH Assets, Logged General CPI 




Table A6.7 Conditional Demand System: Conditioning Good-Staples; Specification 5D 
Excluded Instruments-General CPI, Logged Total Expenditure and Income, Price of Staple Goods  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ShareOthFood ShareFuel ShareHHPub ShareOthHHGoods ShareClothing 
      
ShareStaple 0.145 0.279*** -0.231 -0.0648 -0.207*** 
 (0.180) (0.107) (0.168) (0.0806) (0.0631) 
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.0218 0.0194* 0.0292* 0.0151* -0.0161*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0105) (0.0167) (0.00834) (0.00618) 
Head_Income -1.70e-07*** -1.68e-07*** 1.29e-08 -4.15e-08 4.09e-08** 
 (5.12e-08) (3.79e-08) (5.45e-08) (2.64e-08) (1.79e-08) 
Spouse_Income -2.92e-07*** -1.73e-07*** -2.02e-08 -1.11e-08 7.72e-08** 
 (7.46e-08) (4.43e-08) (8.48e-08) (6.90e-08) (3.35e-08) 
NL_Inc -1.51e-07 -2.75e-07** -1.68e-07 -2.62e-09 -8.31e-08 
 (2.02e-07) (1.40e-07) (3.12e-07) (1.41e-07) (5.49e-08) 
Head_Age 0.000332 0.00125*** -0.000781 -0.000229 -0.000214 
 (0.000511) (0.000305) (0.000526) (0.000222) (0.000177) 
Spouse_Age -0.000704 -0.00115*** 0.000317 7.57e-05 0.000273 
 (0.000554) (0.000330) (0.000597) (0.000237) (0.000200) 
totalboy_0to5 -0.00650 -0.00315 0.0108** 0.00424** -0.00200 
 (0.00459) (0.00293) (0.00463) (0.00202) (0.00162) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00422 -0.00312 -0.00362 0.000339 0.000477 
 (0.00307) (0.00202) (0.00306) (0.00133) (0.00119) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00644** -0.00910*** -0.00939*** 0.00238 0.00175 
 (0.00291) (0.00178) (0.00296) (0.00150) (0.00120) 
totalboy_19to21 -0.00799 -0.00444 0.00209 0.00619* 0.00434* 
 (0.00580) (0.00315) (0.00589) (0.00343) (0.00231) 
totalgirl_0to5 -0.00282 0.00317 6.55e-05 0.00196 0.000681 
 (0.00447) (0.00293) (0.00441) (0.00208) (0.00180) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.00363 -0.00370 -0.00402 0.00168 -0.000597 
 (0.00344) (0.00231) (0.00329) (0.00141) (0.00117) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.00978*** -0.00702*** -0.00390 0.000367 0.00216* 
 (0.00322) (0.00184) (0.00303) (0.00134) (0.00126) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00290 -0.00804** -0.00243 0.00171 -0.00244 
 (0.00617) (0.00325) (0.00628) (0.00289) (0.00173) 
Head_Edu -0.000850 -0.000147 0.000620 0.000261 0.000281 
 (0.000600) (0.000363) (0.000616) (0.000236) (0.000215) 
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Spouse_Edu 0.000577 2.71e-06 -0.000691 -0.000122 -0.000750*** 
 (0.000511) (0.000302) (0.000540) (0.000232) (0.000198) 
MP1 0.00118 -0.00191 0.00947** -0.000554 -0.00292* 
 (0.00381) (0.00234) (0.00412) (0.00163) (0.00150) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.00318 -0.00741*** -0.00570* 0.00357** 1.52e-05 
 (0.00321) (0.00195) (0.00321) (0.00149) (0.00101) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp -0.00241 0.00261 0.00623* -0.00420*** -0.00119 
 (0.00330) (0.00218) (0.00334) (0.00142) (0.00118) 
Log_Index_Food -0.0159 -0.0297 0.0184 0.000224 -0.0111 
 (0.0809) (0.0487) (0.0792) (0.0372) (0.0287) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0930** 0.0472* 0.0229 -0.0225 0.0262* 
 (0.0438) (0.0268) (0.0434) (0.0158) (0.0157) 
Log_Index_Fuel 0.0581 0.0153 0.00554 0.00288 -0.0126 
 (0.0379) (0.0232) (0.0380) (0.0164) (0.0139) 
Log_Index_Clothing -0.00476 -0.0477 -0.0670 -0.0114 -0.0119 
 (0.0527) (0.0346) (0.0433) (0.0269) (0.0171) 
Log_Index_Misc -0.0422 0.00310 -0.000941 0.0153 0.0469 
 (0.253) (0.161) (0.274) (0.125) (0.0956) 
Constant 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
      
Observations 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,333 
R-squared 0.332 0.106 0.226 0.035 0.045 




 Stage Regression Spec 5D: Excluded Instruments: HH Assets, Total Income and General CPI, Price Staple Goods 
Demand Staple:         Shea’s Partial R-squared = 0.0385            Shea’s Adjusted Partial R-squared = 0.0175 





Table A6.8 Conditional Demand System: Conditioning Good-Staples; Specification 5E 
Excluded Instruments-General CPI, Logged Total Expenditure and Income, Price of Staple Goods, Spouse Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ShareOthFood ShareFuel ShareHHPub ShareOthHHGoods ShareClothing 
      
ShareStaple 0.0268 0.209** -0.240 -0.0689 -0.177*** 
 (0.176) (0.102) (0.167) (0.0852) (0.0622) 
Log_Ann_PC_Exp -0.0407** 0.00813 0.0279* 0.0144* -0.0112* 
 (0.0171) (0.00946) (0.0163) (0.00832) (0.00607) 
Head_Income -1.29e-07*** -1.44e-07*** 1.57e-08 -3.99e-08* 3.01e-08* 
 (4.57e-08) (3.34e-08) (5.22e-08) (2.18e-08) (1.76e-08) 
NL_Inc -1.21e-07 -2.58e-07** -1.66e-07 -1.51e-09 -9.08e-08* 
 (1.89e-07) (1.27e-07) (3.12e-07) (1.43e-07) (5.47e-08) 
Head_Age 0.000442 0.00132*** -0.000774 -0.000224 -0.000244 
 (0.000497) (0.000296) (0.000523) (0.000221) (0.000175) 
Spouse_Age -0.000848 -0.00124*** 0.000307 7.00e-05 0.000311 
 (0.000542) (0.000320) (0.000592) (0.000237) (0.000198) 
totalboy_0to5 -0.00949** -0.00492* 0.0106** 0.00413** -0.00121 
 (0.00443) (0.00280) (0.00450) (0.00201) (0.00159) 
totalboy_6to12 -0.00641** -0.00442** -0.00378 0.000258 0.00105 
 (0.00296) (0.00192) (0.00298) (0.00129) (0.00116) 
totalboy_13to18 -0.00726*** -0.00959*** -0.00945*** 0.00235* 0.00197* 
 (0.00278) (0.00170) (0.00290) (0.00142) (0.00117) 
totalboy_19to21 -0.00875 -0.00488 0.00203 0.00616* 0.00454** 
 (0.00568) (0.00305) (0.00589) (0.00339) (0.00230) 
totalgirl_0to5 -0.00629 0.00111 -0.000175 0.00183 0.00160 
 (0.00426) (0.00273) (0.00428) (0.00196) (0.00178) 
totalgirl_6to12 -0.00584* -0.00501** -0.00418 0.00160 -1.65e-05 
 (0.00332) (0.00218) (0.00322) (0.00133) (0.00113) 
totalgirl_13to18 -0.0113*** -0.00792*** -0.00401 0.000310 0.00256** 
 (0.00313) (0.00175) (0.00301) (0.00130) (0.00124) 
totalgirl_19to21 -0.00340 -0.00834*** -0.00247 0.00169 -0.00231 
 (0.00602) (0.00315) (0.00628) (0.00288) (0.00172) 
Head_Edu -0.000805 -0.000119 0.000623 0.000263 0.000268 
 (0.000577) (0.000347) (0.000606) (0.000231) (0.000211) 
Spouse_Edu 0.000409 -9.69e-05 -0.000702 -0.000128 -0.000706*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000291) (0.000534) (0.000227) (0.000192) 
154 
 
MP1 0.000581 -0.00227 0.00943** -0.000576 -0.00277* 
 (0.00373) (0.00226) (0.00410) (0.00163) (0.00150) 
Log_Avg_Groom_Exp -0.00198 -0.00669*** -0.00562* 0.00361** -0.000305 
 (0.00319) (0.00191) (0.00319) (0.00143) (0.00100) 
Log_Avg_Bride_Exp -0.00259 0.00251 0.00622* -0.00421*** -0.00114 
 (0.00327) (0.00211) (0.00334) (0.00142) (0.00117) 
Log_Index_Food 0.00878 -0.0151 0.0201 0.00113 -0.0175 
 (0.0684) (0.0395) (0.0651) (0.0319) (0.0235) 
Log_Index_Sin 0.0893** 0.0451* 0.0226 -0.0227 0.0271* 
 (0.0452) (0.0271) (0.0454) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
Log_Index_Fuel 0.0505* 0.0107 0.00500 0.00261 -0.0107 
 (0.0292) (0.0174) (0.0285) (0.0122) (0.0105) 
Log_Index_Clothing 0.00483 -0.0420 -0.0664 -0.0110 -0.0144 
 (0.0507) (0.0337) (0.0413) (0.0263) (0.0166) 
Log_Index_Misc -0.0351 0.00725 -0.000446 0.0155 0.0451 
 (0.227) (0.143) (0.250) (0.115) (0.0868) 
Constant 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
      
Observations 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,333 
R-squared 0.350 0.153 0.226 0.035 0.051 




 Stage Regression Spec 5E: Excluded Instruments: HH Assets, Total Income and General CPI, Price Staple Goods and 
Spouse Income 
Demand Staple:         Shea’s Partial R-squared = 0.0404            Shea’s Adjusted Partial R-squared = 0.0195 
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